19 November 2009
Some members of Congress have gotten extremely upset about peer-to-peer filesharing. Even the New York Times has editorialized about the issue. The problem of files leaking out is a real one, but the bills are misguided.
Fundamentally, the real issue is that files are being shared without the user intending that result. This is not a weakness unique to peer-to-peer software; more or less any mechanism for publishing files can do that. The real problem is that the targeted software — whatever it is; the news stories full of outrage haven't identified which package or packages are implicated — is bad software, either because they share files the user hadn't intended or because they make it too hard for the user to understand what will happen. Given the sub rosa nature of much peer-to-peer software, perhaps this is not surprising; developing good software is remarkably difficult. Perhaps Congress should instead decriminalize sharing of music and video…
I digress. The real issue I'm addressing is bad legislation. Quite apart from my general concerns, the bills are just poorly drafted.
The first bill, H.R. 1319, is in many ways more reasonable: it mandates notice to the user of what is happening, and bars software that is difficult to remove. However, it stumbles badly when trying to define peer-to-peer software:
the term `peer-to-peer file sharing program' means computer software that allows the computer on which such software is installed—As best I can tell, any web browser is covered by that definition.
(A) to designate files available for transmission to another computer;
(B) to transmit files directly to another computer; and
(C) to request the transmission of files from another computer.
The newer bill, H.R. 4098, does a much better job on a workable definition, though it's fun to try to twist it into knots, too. I particularly like the way software "designed primarily to operate as a server that is accessible over the Internet using the Internet Domain Name system" is not covered; who would have thought that the DNS had such mystical shielding properties?
The problem with H.R. 4098 is that it bans the wrong thing. Yes, NASA's use of BitTorrent would be permitted because it is "instrumental in completing a particular task or project that directly supports the agency's overall mission", but NASA employees probably wouldn't be allowed to download such files on their home computers because the bill seeks to block "the download, installation, or use by Government employees and contractors of such software on home or personal computers as it relates to telework and remotely accessing Federal computers, computer systems, and networks". In other words, you can either view such files or you can save the government money by using your own computer to work from home.
I should add a personal disclaimer: I, like most professors in the sciences and engineering, receive substantial goverment grants and contracts; that technically makes me a government contractor, as best I can tell. Am I covered? My students who receive stipends from such grants?
For those who are wondering if this bill is really just another ploy by a paid shill for the content industry, campaign finance records do not seem to support the notion. According to OpenSecrets.org, while Rep. Towns (the introducer) did indeed receive considerable campaign funding from from PACs associated with content owners, he has also received a lot of money from PACs associated with companies like Verizon that have not been particularly sympathetic to the content industry's demands. I do not think that that claim is supported by the data.
Overall, what we have here is too much firepower being aimed in the wrong direction. If the incidents are taking place from home computers, the solution is to provide government employees with the government-owned equipment — and government-provided sofware, support, and system administration — to let them do their jobs properly. Using poorly managed or maintained machines carries many more security risks than just peer-to-peer software; I could make a very good case that such software is the least of the security problems. If the incidents have taken place on office computers, the issue is really a management problem: employees are making more than the normal and acceptable de minimus personal use of their employer's equipment. There is also likely a problem with the quality of systems administration in such organizations. Again, those issues pose many more risks. These are real problems; focusing on peer-to-peer software won't address them.