Cryptography and the Internet: Where It Is, Where It Isn’t, Where it Should Be — and Why It Isn’t There...

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Why Use Crypto?

- Sniffing threats (at least since 1993)
- Authentication (attack demonstrated in 1984)
- Enable e-commerce (1994-5)
Why Avoid Crypto

- It’s complicated
- It’s slow
- It’s often incompatible with NATs
- Who needs a security blanket?
- The bad guys own the endpoints anyway
The Big “Success”: SSL

- Every browser has SSL built in
- Some even default to SSLv2 being off...
- But does it help?
Is HTTPS Useful?

- Almost certainly a technical win — credit card number sniffers are easier to write than password sniffers
- But — the fancy stuff is pretty useless
- 99.999% of users don’t know what a certificate is
- Of those who do, most don’t verify the certificate details
- Virtually no one knows or cares what CAs their browser trusts (or how those CAs earned that trust)
- Not a good trust chain from the shopping pages to the purchasing pages
The Uses of SSL

- It was extremely important to the development of the web — but much of the benefit was psychological
- The protocol itself has proved useful, since it’s easily plugged in in other contexts
- Total secure systems integration remains rare, especially with regard to trust anchors
S/MIME and PGP

- Two different — and incompatible — ways to protect email
- S/MIME, when available, tends to be reasonably well integrated with MUAs
- But — actual use is very low
- Is the PKI the problem? Do people not perceive the threat?
- PKI software is very unpleasant to use; few well-known cases of stolen email to provide motivation
- Beyond that, there’s a “network effect” — you can only send secure email to someone else who uses the technology, infrastructure, etc.
IPsec

- Protect everything! Don’t touch the applications!
- Host-to-host, host-to-gateway, gateway-to-gateway!
- But — applications can’t really take advantage of it, precisely because they haven’t been changed
- Host-to-host mode has never really caught on.
- IPsec is used for VPNs, but it’s under some pressure there, too
IKE

- The all singing, all dancing key exchange protocol
- Badly specified, poorly implemented, often doesn’t interoperate
- Public key mode is the most problematic — PKIs are hard here, too
- But shared secret mode is buggy
- IKEv2 fixes some of these problems, but retains a lot of complexity: it combines a key exchange protocol with a security association management protocol
- Will IKEv2 ever be adopted?
What’s Wrong with IPsec?

- It doesn’t interoperate well
- It doesn’t interface well to things like RADIUS — the officially preferred approach disagreed with reality, and reality won
- Implementations are very complex to set up
DNSsec

- We finally have a spec that appears to be usable
- Well, maybe not — the “authoritative negation” mechanism can be abused to dump the zone; may run afoul of EU privacy law
- Major problems with the original design: DNS was not designed to be secured (some of its constructs made life difficult); also, the designers didn’t really understand DNS operational practices
Lessons from DNSsec

- Design the protocol and the security mechanisms together
- (And design the security mechanisms with provability in mind)
- Pay attention to how the protocol is actually used
Secure Shell

- Nice way to do remote login
- Of course, most of the world doesn’t do remote login any more
- Very important, but in niche markets
- Deployable because it requires no infrastructure
- Old wine in new bottles: current target of password-guessing attacks
Where Crypto Isn’t?

- Secure routing
- Cryptographic protection against spam and phishing
- Non-repudiation
- Users...
Routing

- Concrete proposals on the table for how to secure OSPF and BGP
- Neither is being used
- The solutions are expensive; worse yet, for BGP it doesn’t match operational reality
- People either don’t understand the threat, or think that the security costs outweigh the likely losses
Anti-Spam

- Great idea — let’s authenticate all email, to get rid of spam
- But — the problem is *authorization*, not *authentication*, and for most users, everyone is *authorized* to send them mail
- Authentication guards against “joe jobs”; that’s a minority of the spam
- Besides, most of the spam comes from hacked endpoints; any possible secret key would also be stolen
Anti-Phishing

- What’s needed: a strong way to tie email messages back to the original interaction with the financial institution.
- What we have: at best, assertions of “identity” by commercial CAs.
- These are not the same!
- The first phishing attempt I saw was from paypal.com
- If financial institutions start signing their email, we’ll see a lot more of that
- There is a cryptographic solution, but is it deployable?
Non-Repudiation

- Do we really need it?
- Real-world signatures don’t meet our stringent tests; Xs and printed signatures are perfectly legal
- “Real signatures are strongly bound to the person and weakly bound to the document; digital signatures are weakly bound to the person and strongly bound to the document.” (Matt Blaze)
- If the signer’s machine has been hacked, the signature means nothing
- Is non-repudiation just a cryptographer’s trick?
Non-Use

- Except for SSL-protected credit card number entry, there’s very little use of cryptography by the general public
- Some people use VPNs because they have to
- More people use Kerberos without knowing it — it’s hidden under the hood of Windows 2000 network authentication
- Virtually no one uses SSL-protected POP3, SMTP, IM, etc.
- Virtually no web traffic is encrypted except for credit card number entry
- Virtually no one uses client-side certificates with SSL
- Why not?
Why Isn’t Crypto Used?

- No perceived threat?
- Bad endpoints?
- Too hard to use?
- Operational errors in the design?
- All of the above?
No Perceived Threat

- For most users, eavesdropping isn’t a major threat
- It happens, but it’s hard to do at scale
- (The bad guys prefer to hack the servers)
- There are keystroke loggers — but they avoid the crypto
Bad Endpoints

- “Using encryption on the Internet is the equivalent of arranging an armored car to deliver credit card information from someone living in a cardboard box to someone living on a park bench”. (Gene Spafford)
- Our host security is incredibly weak
- Most users believe — correctly — that viruses and other malware are bigger threats; crypto won’t stop those
Ease of Use

- Much cryptography is fiendishly hard to configure and use
- Too many choices, and too much inherent complexity
- Closed systems can do it invisibly, and do it well
- Users don’t notice the crypto with Web browsers, with GSM phones, with Lotus Notes
- Invisible crypto is possible if we can deploy the infrastructure
Operational Errors

- Crypto design must be matched to the operational environment
- The cryptographic trust flow has to mirror the real-world trust flow
- The cryptographic management transactions have to mirror the real world management transactions
Conclusions

- Most of the problems with cryptography are not due to lack of cryptographic science
- We need to do some basic engineering
- We need to do a lot of human factors work
- We need to bind the crypto to reality
- We need to educate users