Security for the NGI

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The Challenge

- •Most of the security problems in today's Internet come from its power, not from design flaws.
- •Any replacement will have to face the same challenges.
- \cdot That said, there are changes that can help.

Security Issues

- ·Cryptography.
- ·Correct code.
- \cdot New security model.
- ·Firewalls.
- ·Mobile code.

Cryptography

 \cdot Must be universally available.

-"Exportable" ciphers are not strong enough.

•Must be strong enough to resist determined, wellfunded attackers.

-DES will not suffice.

 \cdot Must be secure in the face of buggy host software.

·In general, escrow schemes fail on all three counts.

Key Escrow?

- •Many different needs/desires: intelligence, law enforcement, corporate key recovery, personal file recovery, personal privacy.
- \cdot Can we reconcile these needs?
- •Do we know how to build *and run* such systems?
- •Do they scale? Are they secure?

Correct Code

- •About half of the security problems we see are due to buggy code.
- \cdot Cryptographic code is affected by these bugs, too.
- •As a profession, we do not know how to solve the problem. 40+ years of research hasn't helped much, either.
- \cdot But we cannot give up and stop trying.

New Security Model

- •The "Orange Book" doesn't work for the new environment.
- •Systems run the gamut from multi-company Web servers to individual PCs.
- •Need very fine-grained security for things like credit card numbers.
- •How do users and/or administrators *manage* such a security model?

Firewalls

- •Firewalls as an element of an overall security architecture won't go away.
 - -But centralized corporate-size firewalls are dinosaurs.
- ·Protocols must be firewall-friendly.
- •Bad examples: X11, UDP, RPC, FTP.
- \cdot Many of these problems are unnecessary.

Mobile Code

- •What do we do about it (Java, Javascript, ActiveX, MSWord, PostScript, etc.)?
- \cdot Users *want* glitzy features (or so the perception goes).
- •How do we wall off untrusted code, while permitting semi-trusted code to have enough power?
- •The Net is *not* the same as the local disk (or is it?).

Currently Missing Pieces

·Routing security

-I expect such attacks soon...

·Object security

-Some individual objects secured; no overall architecture.

- ·Multicast
- ·Availability