Steven M. Bellovin. The danger of `exceptional access'. CNN.com, November 18, 2015. [ bib | .html ]
Harold Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, Matthew Green, Peter G. Neumann, Susan Landau, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffrey I. Schiller, Bruce Schneier, Michael Specter, and Daniel J. Weitzner. Keys under doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications. Journal of Cybersecurity, 1(1), 2015. To appear. [ bib | http ]
Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, and Susan Landau. Comments on proposed remote search rules, October 2014. [ bib | .pdf ]
Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, and Susan Landau. Lawful hacking: Using existing vulnerabilities for wiretapping on the Internet. Northwestern Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property, 12(1), 2014. [ bib | http ]
For years, legal wiretapping was straightforward: the officer doing the intercept connected a tape recorder or the like to a single pair of wires. By the 1990s, though, the changing structure of telecommunications-there was no longer just “Ma Bell” to talk to-and new technologies such as ISDN and cellular telephony made executing a wiretap more complicated for law enforcement. Simple technologies would no longer suffice. In response, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which mandated a standardized lawful intercept interface on all local phone switches. Technology has continued to progress, and in the face of new forms of communication-Skype, voice chat during multiplayer online games, many forms of instant messaging, etc.-law enforcement is again experiencing problems. The FBI has called this “Going Dark”: their loss of access to suspects' communication. According to news reports, they want changes to the wiretap laws to require a CALEA-like interface in Internet software. CALEA, though, has its own issues: it is complex software specifically intended to create a security hole-eavesdropping capability-in the already-complex environment of a phone switch. It has unfortunately made wiretapping easier for everyone, not just law enforcement. Congress failed to heed experts' warnings of the danger posed by this mandated vulnerability, but time has proven the experts right. The so-called “Athens Affair”, where someone used the built-in lawful intercept mechanism to listen to the cell phone calls of high Greek officials, including the Prime Minister, is but one example. In an earlier work, we showed why extending CALEA to the Internet would create very serious problems, including the security problems it has visited on the phone system. In this paper, we explore the viability and implications of an alternative method for addressing law enforcement's need to access communications: legalized hacking of target devices through existing vulnerabilities in end-user software and platforms. The FBI already uses this approach on a small scale; we expect that its use will increase, especially as centralized wiretapping capabilities become less viable. Relying on vulnerabilities and hacking poses a large set of legal and policy questions, some practical and some normative. Among these are: * Will it create disincentives to patching? * Will there be a negative effect on innovation? (Lessons from the so-called “Crypto Wars” of the 1990s, and, in particular, the debate over export controls on cryptography, are instructive here.) * Will law enforcement's participation in vulnerabilities purchasing skew the market? * Do local and even state law enforcement agencies have the technical sophistication to develop and use exploits? If not, how should this be handled? A larger FBI role? * Should law enforcement even be participating in a market where many of the sellers and other buyers are themselves criminals? * What happens if these tools are cpatured and repurposed by miscreants? * Should we sanction otherwise-illegal network activity to aid law enforcement? * Is the probability of success from such an approach too low for it to be useful? As we will show, though, these issues are indeed challenging. We regard them, on balance, as preferable to adding more complexity and insecurity to online systems.
Steven M. Bellovin, Renée M. Hutchins, Tony Jebara, and Sebastian Zimmeck. When enough is enough: Location tracking, mosaic theory, and machine learning. NYU Journal of Law and Liberty, 8(2):555-628, 2014. [ bib | .pdf ]
Steven M. Bellovin. Why healthcare.gov has so many problems. CNN.com, October 15 2013. [ bib | http ]
Steven M. Bellovin. Submission to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: Technical issues raised by the Section 215 and Section 702 surveillance programs, July 2013. [ bib | .pdf ]
Steven M. Bellovinand Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, and Susan Landau. Going bright: Wiretapping without weakening communications infrastructure. IEEE Security & Privacy, 11(1):62-72, January-February 2013. [ bib | DOI | .pdf ]
Mobile IP-based communications and changes in technologies, including wider use of peer-to-peer communication methods and increased deployment of encryption, has made wiretapping more difficult for law enforcement, which has been seeking to extend wiretap design requirements for digital voice networks to IP network infrastructure and applications. Such an extension to emerging Internet-based services would create considerable security risks as well as cause serious harm to innovation. In this article, the authors show that the exploitation of naturally occurring weaknesses in the software platforms being used by law enforcement's targets is a solution to the law enforcement problem. The authors analyze the efficacy of this approach, concluding that such law enforcement use of passive interception and targeted vulnerability exploitation tools creates fewer security risks for non-targets and critical infrastructure than do design mandates for wiretap interfaces.
Steven M. Bellovin, Scott O. Bradner, Whitfield Diffie, Susan Landau, and Jennifer Rexford. Can it really work? Problems with extending EINSTEIN 3 to critical infrastructure. National Security Journal, 3, 2012. [ bib | .pdf ]
In 2004 the increasing number of attacks on U.S. federal civilian agency computer systems caused the government to begin an active effort to protect federal civilian agencies against cyber intrusions . This classified program, EINSTEIN, sought to do real-time, or near real-time, automatic collection, correlation, and analysis of computer intrusion information as a first step in protecting federal civilian agency computer systems . EINSTEIN grew into a series of programs, EINSTEIN, EINSTEIN 2, and EINSTEIN 3, all based on intrusion-detection and intrusion-prevention systems (IDS and IPS). Then there was public discussion of extending the EINSTEIN system to privately held critical infrastructure.
Extending an EINSTEIN-like program to the private sector raises serious technical and managerial issues. Scale matters, as do the different missions of the private sector and the public one. Expanding EINSTEIN-type technology to critical infrastructure is complicated by the complex legal and regulatory landscapes for such systems. There are simply fundamental differences between communication networks supporting the U.S. federal government and those supporting the private-sector critical infrastructures that create serious difficulties in attempting to extend EINSTEIN-type technologies beyond the federal sector. This paper examines the technology's limitations, pointing out the problems involved in expanding EINSTEIN beyond its original mandate.
Steven M. Bellovin, Scott O. Bradner, Whitfield Diffie, Susan Landau, and Jennifer Rexford. As simple as possible-but not more so. Communications of the ACM, 2011. Note: this is a shorter version of “Can it really work?”. [ bib | .pdf ]
Maritza L. Johnson, Steven M. Bellovin, and Angelos D. Keromytis. Computer security research with human subjects: Risks, benefits and informed consent. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2011. [ bib | .pdf ]
Computer security research frequently entails studying real computer systems and their users; studying deployed systems is critical to understanding real world problems, so is having would-be users test a proposed solution. In this paper we focus on three key concepts in regard to ethics: risks, benefits, and informed consent. Many researchers are required by law to obtain the approval of an ethics committee for research with human subjects, a process which includes addressing the three concepts focused on in this paper. Computer security researchers who conduct human subjects research should be concerned with these aspects of their methodology regardless of whether they are required to by law, it is our ethical responsibility as professionals in this field. We augment previous discourse on the ethics of computer security research by sparking the discussion of how the nature of security research may complicate determining how to treat human subjects ethically. We conclude by suggesting ways the community can move forward.
Elli Androulaki, Binh Vo, and Steven M. Bellovin. Cybersecurity through identity management. In Engaging Data: First International Forum on the Application and Management of Personal Electronic Information, October 2009. [ bib | .pdf ]
Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, Susan Landau, Peter G. Neumann, and Jennifer Rexford. Risking communications security: Potential hazards of the “Protect America Act”. IEEE Security & Privacy, 6(1):24-33, January-February 2008. [ bib | .pdf ]
Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, Susan Landau, Peter G. Neumann, and Jennifer Rexford. Internal surveillance, external risks. Communications of the ACM, 50(12), December 2007. [ bib ]
Paula Hawthorn, Barbara Simons, Chris Clifton, David Wagner, Steven M. Bellovin, Rebecca Wright, Arnold Rosenthal, Ralph Poore, Lillie Coney, Robert Gellman, and Harry Hochheiser. Statewide databases of registered voters: Study of accuracy, privacy, usability, security, and reliability issues, February 2006. Report commissioned by the U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery. [ bib | http ]
Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Ernest Brickell, Clinton Brooks, Vint Cerf, Whitfield Diffie, Susan Landau, Jon Peterson, and John Treichler. Security implications of applying the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act to Voice over IP, 2006. [ bib | .pdf ]
Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, and Susan Landau. The real national-security needs for VoIP. Communications of the ACM, 48(11), November 2005. “Inside RISKS” column. [ bib | .pdf ]
Steven M. Bellovin. Cybersecurity research needs, July 2003. Testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, Research, & Development, hearing on “Cybersecurity-Getting it Right”. [ bib | .ps | .pdf ]
Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, David Farber, Peter Neumann, and Gene Spafford. Comments on the Carnivore system technical review draft, December 2000. [ bib | .html ]
Matt Blaze and Steven M. Bellovin. Tapping on my network door. Communications of the ACM, 43(10), October 2000. [ bib | .html ]
Matt Blaze and Steven M. Bellovin. Open Internet wiretapping, July 2000. Written testimony for a hearing on “Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's `Carnivore' Program” by the Subcommittee on the Constitution, House Judiciary Committee. [ bib | .html ]
Steven M. Bellovin. Wiretapping the Net. The Bridge, 20(2):21-26, Summer 2000. [ bib | .ps | .pdf ]
Fred Schneider, Steven M. Bellovin, and Alan Inouye. Critical infrastructures you can trust: Where telecommunications fits. In Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, October 1998. [ bib | .ps | .pdf ]
Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffrey I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier. The risks of key recovery, key escrow, and trusted third-party encryption, May 1997. A report by an ad hoc group of cryptographers and computer scientists. [ bib | .pdf ]
Yakov Rekhter, Paul Resnick, and Steven M. Bellovin. Financial incentives for route aggregation and efficient address utilization in the Internet. In Proceedings of Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 1997. [ bib | .html ]