What is Privacy?

And why am I talking about it in a security class?
Privacy and Security Are Linked

- Many privacy breaches start as security breaches
- Security is a *requirement* for privacy
- Either sort of breach can be very costly
- Privacy breaches can lead to security failures
Security and Privacy Overlap

Source: Pollyanna Sanderson, Future of Privacy Forum
Equifax, a major data broker and credit bureau, was hacked; personal data on about 150,000,000 people was stolen. (Many believe that a foreign intelligence agency was behind the hack)

The FTC settlement could cost them up to $700 million

Plus: up to $425 million in compensation and $1 billion to upgrade their data security

But there was nothing of direct monetary value taken

The root cause was a (series of) security and operational failures
Definitions

anonymity: The condition of an identity being unknown or concealed. (RFC 4949)

privacy: The right of an entity (normally a person), acting in its own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing to share its personal information with others. (RFC 4949)

confidentiality: The property that data is not disclosed to system entities unless they have been authorized to know the data.
## Security as a Privacy Requirement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU GDPR</th>
<th>CCPA</th>
<th>CA Ballot Initiative</th>
<th>WPA 2019</th>
<th>WPA 2020</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lawful Bases for Collection</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Privacy Policies</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Risk Assessments for High-Risk Activities</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data Minimization</td>
<td>Y (strongest)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose Limitation</td>
<td>Y (strongest)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duty to Avoid Secondary Use</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Reasonable Security</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Non-Discrimination</td>
<td>Y (Indirectly)*</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The GDPR does not include an explicit provision stating that a data subject must not be discriminated against on the basis of their choices to exercise rights. However, it is implicit from other principles of the GDPR that individuals must be protected from discrimination on these grounds. ([Article 5](https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article29/website/index_en.html#article29), [Article 13](https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article29/website/index_en.html#article13), [Article 22](https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article29/website/index_en.html#article22), and elements of “freely given” consent and fair processing).
Current and Proposed Laws

- All five require security
- An entity cannot determine the “degree to which the entity is willing to share its personal information with others” if some other parties can simply take it
- Security has been part of the requirements for security since the beginning
Compliance Obligations

- There are many privacy laws around the world
- The GDPR is the most famous, but all developed nations except the US have broad privacy laws
- The US has a variety of sector-specific laws (HIPAA, FERPA, Fair Credit Reporting Act, COPPA, etc) and state laws (e.g., CCPA, Illinois biometric act)
- You may need to do geolocation to figure out which laws apply to you
- But geolocation is itself a privacy risk!
Early Warnings

Senate committee hearing, 1967
Senator Long: But he could give that password to someone else, could he not?
Dr. Piore: He can, and you find that some people do not protect their own password.

Miller, 1969
“Another important security function that a privacy-oriented monitor program must perform is the identification of all users and terminals attempting to gain access to the files.”

HEW committee, 1973
“Take reasonable precautions to protect data in the system from any anticipated threats or hazards to the security of the system.”
First “code of fair information practices” developed in 1973 at HEW (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare)

Basic rules for minimizing information collection, ensuring due process, protection against secret collection, provide security, ensure accountability

Emphasize individual knowledge and consent

Principles are broadly accepted (and form the basis of privacy law in the EU and many other places), but individual principles not implemented uniformly
Fair Information Principles and Practices (FIPP)

- Collection limitation
- Data quality
- Purpose specification
- Use limitation
- **Security**
- Openness/notice
- Individual participation
- Accountability

Note: these revolve around PII (personally identifiable information)
Many password reset questions depend on private information
Some sites, e.g., the IRS, use last year’s data to authenticate new interactions
Some private information can be used for blackmail or extortion
An attacker can gain access to these sorts of information
So—How Do We Get Privacy?
Privacy is Old

- Jewish tradition from 1800 years ago finds a right to privacy in the Bible
  - Semayne’s Case, 1604: “The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress.”
  - Warren and Brandeis, 1890: *Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let alone”*
- In the 1960s, lawyers, academics, and Congress started worrying about privacy
Warren and Brandeis

- They worried about loss of privacy due to technological change
- Their threat: photography!
- “Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life”
- “the latest advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to take pictures surreptitiously”
- And news business models for newspapers: gossip columns!
- Imagine them in an era of social media...
(Relevant) Privacy Principles

- Do not collect more information than necessary
- Discard data when it is no longer necessary
- Avoid persistent identifiers
- Avoid linkable identifiers
- Avoid secondary uses
- Audit all uses
Overcollection

- Some information is collected but not needed
- Other information is needed for just a short time
- Get rid of it when feasible
Digital photos contain a lot of metadata.

If you run a site that permits photo uploads, you can’t control what people send you.

But you can control what you do with it.
Photos and Metadata

![Image of an eagle standing on a branch]

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**GPS Information:**
- **Altitude:** 13.8 m (44.62 ft)
- **GPS Version:** 2.2.0.0
- **Latitude:** 40° 51’ 42.942” N
- **Longitude:** 73° 64’ 59.844” W

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**Metadata Details:**
- **Aperture Value:** 3.4
- **Body Serial Number:** 3198927
- **Color Space:** sRGB
- **Contrast:** Normal
- **Date Time Original:** Dec 8, 2019 at 2:36:44 PM
- **Digital Zoom Rates:** 1
- **Exposure Bias Value:** 0
- **Exposure Mode:** Auto exposure
- **Exposure Program:** Prevention
- **Exposure Time:** 1/8000
- **File Source:** DNG
- **Flash:** Off, did not fire
- **Framer:** 9
- **Focal Length:** 700
- **Focal Length in 35mm Film:** 700
- **Focal Plane Resolution Unit:** Centimeters
- **Focal Plane X Resolution:** 1,875,016
- **Focal Plane Y Resolution:** 1,875,016
- **Gain Control:** High gain-up
- **Lens Model:** 290/2.5-500/2.5 mm f/5.6
- **Lens Specification:** 200, 500, 5, 5, 5

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20/55
Photo Metadata

- Location—obviously sensitive if it’s someone’s residence
- But photos can also contain the camera’s and lens’ serial numbers
- That can link photos taken by a given individual on different sites, with different usernames
You can’t help collecting it

You can strip it before displaying to other users—Twitter and Facebook indeed do that

But—do you retain that data internally?

(Photo metadata includes camera model—a useful clue to what someone will spend on photographic gear, and hence a clue for targeted advertising)

(But what of photo-sharing sites like Flickr? Photographers often want to see the metadata of pictures they’re viewing)
IP Addresses

- Sites *must* know the IP address of users, and IP addresses convey location information.
- It’s always logged; these logs are necessary for operational reasons.
- Location is also useful for advertising.
- How long do you retain the logs? How long do you retain logs *linked to a user*?
- Is there an operational necessity to keep that more than a few weeks?
- Is there an audit-related reason to keep advertising-related data?
A persistent identifier allows for long-term collection of information on a particular entity

Examples: Web cookies, login name, email address, phone number, (US) Social Security Number

Sometimes, an IP address is persistent
IPv6 was designed so that hosts could get IP addresses without any infrastructure like a DHCP server.

For (presumed) uniqueness, use the interface’s 48-bit MAC address as part of the IP address.

But—that becomes a persistent identifier, one that can even track laptops and other mobile devices across networks.

The IETF fixed it: hosts can generate random IPv6 addresses and check for uniqueness.
Persistent Identifiers: Not PII!

- Many privacy laws focus on the presence of PII: Personally Identifiable Information
- PII: name, email address, street address, SSN
- Identifiers can be persistent, and hence potentially privacy-violative, without being PII
- Example: one of my Twitter IDs is @UrbanDinosaurs—I don’t use that as a login name anywhere else, but my Twitter activity under that login is traceable
- The account is not anonymous: “UrbanDinosaurs” is a pseudonym
NetFlix and Tivo know what you watch
Google knows what you search for, and what you click on
Amazon knows what you buy
They don’t need your PII for any of that
Combining Sources

- Suppose you clear all cookies and do some Web searches
- Google builds up an anonymous profile of you
- You then log in—and Google combines the anonymous history with its existing profile of you
- Or: Facebook will buy information from data brokers to combine with your online activity
Secondary Uses

- Per the FIPPs and the GDPR, when data is collected it must be for a specified purpose.
- Today’s US privacy policies are generally very vague about the purpose.
- This permits secondary uses, which is where most privacy problems come from.
- Glaring example: Facebook collected mobile phone numbers for login security, but then used them as persistent identifiers for user-matching.
- Possible consequence: people will avoid 2FA, and lose out on its security benefits.
Secondary Uses

- A driver’s license to board a plane or enter a bar
- The swipe card readers some bars use for verification also record names, addresses, etc
- Digital rights management verifies that you’ve paid for the content—but it also tracks viewing habits
- The Medical Information Bureau tracks all health insurance claims in the US
Some of the worst privacy problems occur when two or more independent datasets are joined.

Use persistent identifiers to match rows in tables.

Mobile phone numbers and SSNs are idea for that—they very rarely change, and (especially for phone numbers) there is often an obvious legitimate reason for users to share them.

Combining multiple databases is the easiest way to find the real person who uses a given pseudonym.
Collect or Retain: It’s Not Easy

- Sometimes, data has to be collected
- Sometimes, there’s a legitimate reason for retaining it
- But you may be able to achieve goals without compromising privacy
TJX (owner of T.J. Maxx, Marshall’s, and other stores) was hacked; credit card numbers and personal information was stolen.

This was a potential violation of Canadian privacy law; the Privacy Commissioner investigated.

The report is an interesting case study.
Several stores used WEP for WiFi security. WEP was known to be insecure but had not yet been replaced in their stores. From store LANs, intruders were able to attack internal machines, and moved laterally to a good place for information theft. Log files were deleted by the intruders, making it hard to track what they did.

In 1994, Bill Cheswick and I suggested keeping log files on a separate machine: “Hackers generally go after the log files before they do anything else, even before they plant their backdoors and Trojan horses. You’re much more likely to detect any successful intrusions if the log files are on the protected inside machine.”
Losses

- 77 Millions of credit card numbers might have been compromised
- 23 Names and addresses were taken
- 20 Driver’s license numbers were taken
Credit card number collection and limited retention is probably proper: “it may be reasonable to retain this personal information for the length of time [emphasis added] specified in the organizations’ contracts with financial institutions”

But... “with respect to retaining this information for ‘troubleshooting’ purposes, TJX/WMI has not presented a persuasive argument regarding the retention of this information for longer than 18 months”
License numbers were collected and retained to deal with “return fraud.”

But—after the hack, they decided to hash the license numbers; this meets their needs but protects privacy.
Is Hashing License Numbers Secure?

- How large is the namespace?
- Many states have small namespaces—California, for example, uses a letter and 7 digits: 260,000,000 possibilities
- That’s far too few—it’s trivial to precalculate 260M hashes
Usernames and email addresses can be persistent identifiers

Biometrics are persistent identifiers

Third-party single sign-on, e.g., “log in with your Google or Facebook account” is a privacy risk

A single client-side identity certificate is a privacy risk

In privacy-sensitive environments, you must take this into account.
Credit Card Numbers and Privacy

- Stores track you by your credit card number
- Especially useful for stores with physical and online presence—transactions can be linked
- An old payment protocol intended to replace the need for stored credit card numbers online nevertheless included them, for precisely that reason
Another privacy risk: side channels

A **side channel** “is any communication channel that is incidental to another communication channel”

Example: the timing of cryptographic operations can leak key bits

Browsers leak *lots* of information, via fonts, languages, extensions, and more
Browsers leak *lots* of information

To test your browser thoroughly, go to [https://panopticlick.eff.org](https://panopticlick.eff.org)
I heard you say

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: greylock.cs.columbia.edu
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:72.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

from 128.59.23.26:63049

I just sent you, #846930886, a cookie; reload this page to see it coming back to me.
I heard you say

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: greylock.cs.columbia.edu
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:72.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/72.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://greylock.cs.columbia.edu/
Cookie: WhoYouAre=846930886; ID-Age=1582059315; Last-Seen=1582059315
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

from 128.59.23.26:63227

I just sent you, #846930886, a cookie; reload this page to see it coming back to me.
ID Age: Tue Feb 18 15:55:15 2020
Last visit: Tue Feb 18 15:55:15 2020
Within our dataset of several hundred thousand visitors tested in the past 45 days, only **one** in 2010.63 browsers have the same fingerprint as yours.

Currently, we estimate that your browser has a fingerprint that conveys **10.97 bits of identifying information**.

The measurements we used to obtain this result are listed below. You can read more about our methodology, statistical results, and some defenses against fingerprinting here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Browser Characteristic</th>
<th>bits of identifying information</th>
<th>one in x browsers have this value</th>
<th>value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>User Agent</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>86.55</td>
<td>Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:72.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTTP_ACCEPT Headers</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>24.18</td>
<td>text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,<em>/</em>;q=0.8 gzip, deflate, br en-US,en;q=0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Browser Plugin Details</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>no javascript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Zone</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>no javascript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen Size and Color Depth</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>no javascript</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Within our dataset of several hundred thousand visitors tested in the past 45 days, only **one in 16237.5 browsers have the same fingerprint as yours.**

Currently, we estimate that your browser has a fingerprint that conveys **13.99 bits of identifying information.**

The measurements we used to obtain this result are listed below. You can read more about our methodology, statistical results, and some defenses against fingerprinting here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Browser Characteristic</th>
<th>bits of identifying information</th>
<th>one in x browsers have this value</th>
<th>value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>User Agent</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>327.56</td>
<td>Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15_3) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/13.0.5 Safari/605.1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTTP ACCEPT Headers</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>25.32</td>
<td>text/html; <em>/</em>; q=0.01 gzip, deflate, br en-us</td>
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<tr>
<td>Browser Plugin Details</td>
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<td>Plugin 0: WebKit built-in PDF; ; ; (Portable Document Format; application/pdf; pdf) (Portable Document Format; text/pdf; pdf) (PostScript; application/postscript; ps).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Zone</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Screen Size and Color Depth</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>34.03</td>
<td>2560x1440x24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Tor: The Onion Router**

- A popular anonymity technology—blocks traffic analysis
- Originally developed at the US Naval Research Lab
- Picked up by the EFF; has received funding from the US State Department because of its use by dissidents and human rights workers
- Traffic routed via changing relay and exit nodes
Onion Routing

- Pick a relay node
- Pick an exit node
- Send multiply encrypted traffic to the relay, thence to the exit, thence to the destination
- Not good against a “global adversary”—but real adversaries can’t see the whole Internet
- Caution: connections from Tor exit nodes are generally not from that site—and blocking it can affect many people
Onion Routing
Onion Routing: Encryption
Web servers can also set up listening posts on Tor
They pick a bridge node and tell a directory server
Clients going to a .onion URL use Tor to reach that node
Tor hidden services now used by the NY Times, the BBC, Facebook, and many others
Privacy violations can be seen as someone else gaining access to individuals’ data.

Using data for one purpose when it was collected for a different purpose is a security violation by our definition: the reuse was not authorized by the individual.

Merging databases is another kind of reuse, but one with more serious consequences.
Privacy and Security

- Protecting privacy is often a legal requirement
- You cannot protect privacy without strong security
Questions?

(Barred owl, Central Park, October 11, 2020)