


Tor: The Onion Router



Metadata

- Data that is “about data”
- Many different forms
- Today is about communications metadata

Communications Metadata

- Who is talking to whom, when, and for how long
- Visible even if the content is encrypted
- Originally developed during World War I as an adjunct to cryptanalysis
👉 (May be even a bit older)
- Later, as *traffic analysis*, it became very important as an intelligence field of its own
- Michael Hayden: “We kill people based on metadata”

The EFF's Examples

- They know you rang a phone sex service at 2:24 am and spoke for 18 minutes.
- They know you called the suicide prevention hotline from the Golden Gate Bridge.
- They know you spoke with an HIV testing service, then your doctor, then your health insurance company in the same hour.
- They know you received a call from the local NRA office while it was having a campaign against gun legislation, and then called your senators and congressional representatives immediately after.
- They know you called a gynecologist, spoke for a half hour, and then called the local Planned Parenthood's number later that day.

(From <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/why-metadata-matters>)

Traffic Analysis

- A person from a suspicious country has a pattern: a short Skype call at the same time every week
- One week, there's a long call
- The next week, there's nothing...

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Traffic Analysis

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- An agent checking in, a planning call, then the plan is in motion?
- Or a student hearing from home, learning of an illness, and then hurriedly returning?

Mixnets (Chaum, 1981)

- Assume a group of computers A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H
- Every five minutes, the following communications take place: A sends 10KB of encrypted data to B ; B then sends 10KB of ciphertext to C , etc., ending in H sending to A
- Who is talking to whom? Was it real data or dummy padding data?
- If the lengths and timing are the same, you can't tell
- But: it's inefficient: a lot of dummy traffic, and slow actual transmission

Threat Models

- Who is your enemy?
- Can they actually monitor all of the links for those eight communications paths?
- Could they if we replaced the deterministic pattern with a random one?
- What is the actual threat model?

Tor: The Onion Router

- Assume a *limited* adversary
- The adversary can listen to *some* links, but not all links, and not all the time
- Answer: Tor
- (Tor was invented at the Naval Research Lab—the military understands the need to foil traffic analysis)


- There are many ways to identify users and servers on the Internet
- One is IP address—every computer that talks on the net needs an IP address
- ISPs know who owns an IP address at a given time
- Governments can obtain that information if they wish to surveil or harass users
- The IP addresses are public, for governments that want to block certain sites

- Assumption: many clients
- Assumption: eavesdropping possible
- But—the adversary isn't *global*
- That is, it can monitor many links but not *all*

How it Works

- A client computer picks a set of “relay nodes” and an “exit node”
- (All of these nodes are volunteers)
- The client sends the traffic to the first node, which sends it to the second, etc.; the exit node forwards it to the real destination
- (Often, only one relay node is used)
- The set of Tor nodes used, including the exit node, is changed frequently
- In other words, the source IP address is short-lived

Multiple Hops




Onion Routing

- **G** thinks that both connections are coming from **D**
- The real sources—**A** and **B** — are hidden
- On subsequent visits, **C** and **Z** may be the exit nodes
- Intuitive understanding: nested envelopes


Why Multiple Hops?

- If someone is spying on **D** or its links, they'll see where traffic is coming from
- Here, though, traffic is coming from **E** and **C** — which is which?
- Can the same attacker spy on **E** and **C**?
- Remember that the path will switch soon

Change Paths Frequently



Using Cryptography



What is Known

- Each node knows only the previous and next hops
- Nodes do not know where on the path they are
- Only the exit nodes knows the destination
- Only the entrance node knows the source
- Intuitive understanding: nested sealed envelopes; each hop adds its own return address

Anonymous Browsing

- With Tor, it is possible to browse the web without being identified
- It's great for dissidents in oppressive countries
- It's also great for spies, law enforcement investigations, etc.
- No accountability...

What About Servers?

- Servers traditionally live at a known IP address
- But Tor is designed to hide IP addresses—even the exit nodes don't know the user's real IP address
- Even if we solve that problem, what about authenticity? How does the Tor network know which is the real claimant to some service?

Tor Hidden Services

- The details are very complex and I won't go into them here
- Briefly...

Tor Hidden Services

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- Briefly...
- A server does magic stuff to use Tor to *listen* for connections
- It does other magic stuff involving Tor to let folks find the connection point on the Tor network
- This is called a Tor *hidden service*
- A client uses yet more magic to connect to that point
- There are thus two Tor circuits glued together, the client's and the server's
- The client doesn't know the server's real IP address and the server doesn't know the client's

Naming and Authenticating Hidden Services

- The server generates a public-private key pair
- The private key is used to sign all of its announcements
- The server's name is formed from a hash of the public key
- In other words, you cannot have arbitrary “.onion” names—but you can keep generating keys until you get one you like

Generating .Onion Names

- Generate a key pair
- Take the hash of the public key, and truncate it to 80 bits
- Represent the truncated hash in base 32, using 26 letters and 6 digits
- If you don't like the result, try again

Facebook's Hidden Service Certificate

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

0e:87:85:21:62:33:85:ea:90:2d:16:5d:81:7f:37:1b

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 Extended

Validation Server CA


Validity

Not Before: Sep 25 00:00:00 2015 GMT

Not After : Nov 28 12:00:00 2016 GMT

Subject: businessCategory=Private Organization/1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=US/1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2=Delaware/serialNumber=3835815/street=1601 Willow Rd./postalCode=94025, C=US, ST=CA, L=Menlo Park, O=Facebook, Inc., CN=*.facebookcorewwwi.onion

Subject Public Key Info:



How Did They Get facebookcorewwi.onion?

- The prefix 'facebook' is 8 characters—40 bits, if a base 32 number
- Generating a key whose hash has the first 40 bits of that string takes $O(2^{40})$ tries
- They then looked at the candidate names for one that had a suffix—"corewwi"—for which they could construct a plausible story
- Facebook has *lots* of computers. . .

Why Does Facebook Use Tor?

- Facebook, of course, wants to learn lots about its users
- Why should it like Tor?
- Some countries, notably Iran, were blocking Facebook—but not Tor
- They noticed that many of their Iranian users were connecting over Tor, so they decided to make it work properly

The Dark Web

- There are other services that use Tor hidden services as well
- Some of them are rather less benign than Facebook

The Silk Road

- An online drug, etc., market place
- Created by “Dread Pirate Roberts” (DPR), later shown to be Ross Ulbricht
- More of an EBay than an Amazon—the site hosted independent sellers
- Payment was in Bitcoin; delivery was by UPS, FedEx, etc.
- DPR also solicited murders of former lieutenants he thought had betrayed him

The Fall of the Silk Road

- The FBI—somehow!—located the physical server, in Iceland
- Assorted Federal agents wormed their way into DPR's confidence—after all, it was all online, anonymous activity—and became assistant site admins
- Early on, Ulbricht had posted a query to Stack Overflow on setting up Tor services—and he used his own name
- He was arrested in a San Francisco library, while online as DPR
- To add to the fun, two of the Federal agents investigating the Silk Road were themselves corrupt. . .

Child Pornography

- Child pornography is also popular on the Dark Web
- It's a natural fit—it's all information-based; there's no need to ship anything physical
- The FBI has had some success here, too

- Suppose you control a Tor hidden server
- Maybe you've found it and done something physical—or maybe you've hacked into it
- Plant malware on that server—and when other Tor users visit it, infect their machines
- All that software has to do is send the FBI the machine's real IP address
- The FBI has done exactly that

Legal and Ethical Issues!

- Is it proper for the FBI to hack computers? There's no explicit statutory authority, but most lawyers say it's OK if they have a search warrant
 - Recent changes to [Rule 41](#) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do provide for "remote search"
- Do judges understand the warrants they're signing?
- Is it OK for the FBI to run a child porn server for a while?
- Is it OK to hack a machine in another country, or one where you don't even know what country it's in?
- Is it OK to hack hundreds or thousands of machines with a single warrant?
- Do judges understand those warrants?

- A Tor hidden service for whistleblowers
- News organizations run Tor SecureDrop services—to send information anonymously to such a organization, connect via Tor
- (See <https://theintercept.com/securedrop/> or <https://securedrop.propublica.org/>)
- Note well: procedural security matters, too

- Exit nodes have been seized or searched by the police
- What if the exit node is corrupt? That has happened.
- There are various statistical attacks on Tor links
- (The FBI apparently subpoenaed the results of some experiments at CMU)

The Bomb Threat During Finals

- At one school, a bomb threat was email in during finals
- It was sent over Tor
- The network folks found that only one person at that school was using Tor at that time. . .

- Tor protects the IP address, but not anything else
- Higher-level data is not anonymized—it can often reveal identity or at least continuity (e.g., login names or tracking cookies)
- If you don't patch your system, you can be hacked
- Never use Tor *except* through the official Tor Browser Bundle or the Tails bootable USB stick

Is Tor Worth It?

- Evading censorship is good
- Talking freely to news agencies is good
- Child pornography is not good
- Soliciting murders for hire is even worse
- Should Tor exist? What about Tor hidden services?

Bird of the Day



(Red-tailed hawk, Central Park, July 16, 2019)