Case Study: Access Control



Case Studies in Access Control

- Joint software development
- Mail

Situations

- Small team on a single machine or group of machines with a shared file system
- Medium-to-large team on a LAN
- Large, distributed team, spread among several organizations

Roles

- Developer (i.e., can commit changes)
- Tester
- Code reviewer

Permissions

- We want the technical mechanisms to reflect the organizational roles
- The real challenge: mapping the organizational structure to OS primitives
- Why?

Why Enforce Access Controls?

- Protect software from outsiders reading/stealing it
- Protect against unauthorized changes
- ☞ That can include internal rivalries—developers are sometimes evaluated on their bug rate, so some have been known to reach into the tester tree to fix things. . .
- Know *who* made certain changes?

Classic Unix Setup

- Assume you just have user/group/other permissions, with no ACLs. How would you set things up?
- Put all developers in a certain group
- Make files and directories group readable/writable
- Decision to turn off “other” read access is site-dependent

Why Avoid ACLs?

- Not available on all systems
- Not available on all file system types on some systems
- Command line support varies

ACL Setup

- Could add each developer individually
- Bad idea — if a developer leaves or joins the group, many ACLs must be updated
- Still want to use groups; vary group membership instead
- Advantage: can have multiple sets of group permissions — why?

Reviewer/Tester Access

- Reviewers and testers need read access
- They do not need write access
- No good, built-in solution on classic Unix
- With ACLs, one group can have **`r/w`** permissions; another can have **`r`** permissions
- Or: let them use “other” read permission? But is that safe?

Medium-Size Group

- No longer on single file system with simple file permissions
- More need for change-tracking
- More formal organizational structure

Basic Structure

- Basic permission structure should be the same
- Again: use group permissions as the fundamental permission unit
- Limits of non-ACL systems become more critical

Version Control Systems

- For medium-size projects, use of a version control system (i.e., CVS, Subversion, Mercurial, git, etc.) is *mandatory*
- (Why?)
- What are the permission implications of a version control system?

Why use a VCS?

- Auditability — who made which change?
- When was a given change made?
- Can you roll back to a known-clean version of the codebase?
- What patches have been applied to which versions of the system?

Note Well

- All of those features are important just for manageability
- Security needs are strictly greater — we have to deal with active malfeasance as well as ordinary bugs and failures

Structure of a VCS

Repository Master copy; records all changes, versions, etc.

Working copies Zero or more working copies. Developers *check out* a version from the repository, make changes, and *commit* the changes

Permission Structure

Here are the Linux client commands for CVS, git, Mercurial, and Subversion. What are the security implications?

```
$ ls -l `which cvs svn hg git`
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  820480 Feb 10  2012 /usr/bin/cvs
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1347232 Jan 13  2015 /usr/bin/git
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root    1052 Jun 17 16:01 /usr/bin/hg
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  188192 Aug 20 11:31 /usr/bin/svn
```

They're Not SetUID!

- They execute with the permissions of the invoker
- They could try to do access control, but it's meaningless — anyone else could write code to do the same things
- The permission structure of the repository is what's important

The Repository

- Essential feature: developers must have write permission on the directories
- File permissions are irrelevant; old files can be renamed and unlinked instead of being overwritten
- (Potential for annoyance if new directories are created with the wrong permission — must set **`umask`** properly)
- But — what prevents a developer with write permission on the respository from doing nasty things?
- Nothing. . .

Repository Security Without Privilege

- Create a repository directory with mode 711
- Create a subdirectory with random characters in the name; make it mode 777.
- The random characters must be kept secret, to protect the actual repository data
- To do that, the working copy directories should be mode 700

Large Organization

- Use client/server model for repository access
- Most users (including developers) have no direct access to the VCS repository
- Either build access control into VCS server or layer on top of underlying OS permissions
- But — must restrict what commands can be executed on repository by developers

Complications

- If you rely on OS permissions, *something* has to have **`root`** privileges, to let the repository part of the process run as that user
- If the VCS itself has a root component, is it trustable?
- If you use, say, **`ssh`**, is the command restriction mechanism trustable?
- If you rely on VCS permissions, you need to implement a reliable authentication and ACL mechanism
- All of this is possible — but is it *secure*?

Mailers

- Issue of interest: local mail delivery and retrieval
- Surprisingly enough, network email doesn't add (too much) security complexity

Issues

- Email *must* be reliable
- Users must be able to send email to any other users
- The system should reliably identify the sender of each message
- All emails should be logged
- Locking is often necessary to prevent race conditions when reading and writing a mailbox
- Authentication

Accepting Mail

- Must accept mail from users
- Copy it, either to protected spool directory for network delivery or directly to recipient's mailbox

Spool Directory

- If the mailer is setuid, it can copy the email to a protected directory with no trouble
- If the directory is world-writable but not world-readable, you don't even need setuid — add a random component to the filenames to prevent overwriting
- (Homework submission script does this)
- File owner is automatically set correctly, for use in generating `From:` line

However…

- Cannot securely write metadata for such directories — others could overwrite the metadata file
- Cannot prevent users from overwriting their own pending email
- Listing the mail queue still requires privilege

Local Access or Client/Server?

- For client/server, issues are similar to VCS: authentication, root programs, restricting actions, etc
- For local access, must confront permission issues
- This is complicated by the many different versions of Unix over the years

Client/Server

- Standardized, (relatively) simple access protocols, POP and IMAP
- For ISP or large enterprise, neither need nor want general shell-type access to mail server
- Large system mailers have their own authentication database
- Does not rely on OS permissions
- But — a mail server bug exposes the entire mail repository
- Also — how do users change their passwords?

Bug Containment

- Separate programs into two sections:
  - Small, simple section that does authentication and changes uid (must run as **`root`**)
  - Large section that runs as that user
- Major advantage: security holes in large section don't matter, since it has no special privileges
- Much more on program structure later in the semester

Local Mail Storage

- Where is mail stored? Central mailbox directory or user's home directory?
- Note that mail delivery program must be able to (a) create, and (b) write to mailboxes
- If mailbox is in the user's directory, mail delivery program must have root permissions

Central Mail Directory

- We can put all mailboxes in, say, **`/var/mail`**
- What are the permissions on it?
- If it's writable by group **`mail`**, delivery daemon can create new mailboxes
- Make mailboxes writable by group **`mail`**, and owned by the recipient?
- Permits non-**`root`** delivery — but how do new mailboxes get created *and* owned by the user?

Dangers of User-Writable Mailbox Directories

Permission escalation	`ln -s /etc/passwd /var/mail/me`
Vandalism	`rm /var/mail/you`
Denial of service	`touch /var/mail/does-not-exist-yet`

Defending Against These Attacks

Escalation Check mailbox permissions and ownership before writing (note: watch for race conditions)

Vandalism Set “sticky bit” on directory

DoS Remove (or change ownership of) mailboxes with wrong ownership

Note well: most of these are trickier than they seem

Delivering Mail to a Program

- Most mail systems permit delivery of email to a program
- Must execute that program as the appropriate user
- (Who is the “appropriate” user? Note that on Solaris, you may (depending on system configuration) be able to give away files)
- Implies the need for `root` privileges by the local delivery program

Privileged Programs

- What must be privileged?
- What privileges?
- Local delivery needs some privileges, frequently **`root`**
- Delivery to a program always requires **`root`**
- The mail reader?

Privileged Mail Readers

- The System V mail reader was **`setgid`** to group **`mail`**
- Could delete empty mailboxes
- More importantly, could create lock files by linking in the mailbox directory
- But — note the danger if the mailer was buggy
  "You don't give privileges to a whale" (about 21K lines of code. . .)

Many More Subtleties

- Writing a mailer is *hard*
- I've barely scratched the surface of the design decisions, even the permission-related ones
- Complicated by varying system semantics

Why is it Hard?

- Mailers cross protection boundaries
- That is, they copy data from one permission context to another
- Both can be arbitrary userids
- Simply importing data to a userid is a lot easier
- In addition, a lot of functionality is needed
- Not surprisingly, mailers have a very poor security record