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# Architecture



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# Web Servers and Security

- The Web is the most visible part of the net
- Two web servers — Apache (open source) and Microsoft's IIS — dominate the market
  - 👉 Apache has 46%; IIS has 22% (source: [http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web\\_server\\_survey.html](http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_server_survey.html))
- Both major servers have lots of functionality
- Are they secure? Let's look at Apache.

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## Warning

- You're going to hear about web server security issues — and problems
- Some of these issues apply to `www.cs.columbia.edu`
- You do *not* have permission to explore these holes

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## Metanote on Program Complexity

- Both Apache and IIS are very large, complex programs
- Large, complex programs are often buggy; these are no exception
- Both have had security problems
- IIS used to be *very* insecure:

*Using Internet-exposed IIS Web servers securely has a high cost of ownership. Nimda has again shown the high risk of using IIS and the effort involved in keeping up with Microsoft's frequent security patches.*

—The Gartner Group, 2001

- (They canceled that warning in 2004)
- Web servers are still large and complex. . .

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## Important Web Server Features

- Access control
- User behavior
- CGI (Apache) or ASP (IIS) scripts (often via special scripting languages)
- Plug-ins
- Back-end databases
- Cryptography
- (Does this remind you of an operating system?)

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# Access Control

- Many different forms
- Many different types of authentication
- Many interactions

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## Document Root

- All files served must reside under a certain directory
- Watch out for “.” in URLs (gee, we’ve seen that before)
- For convenience, some “subtrees” can reside somewhere else:

```
ScriptAlias /mailman/ "/usr/pkg/lib/mailman/cgi-bin/"  
Alias /pipermail/ "/var/db/mailman/archives/public/"  
Alias /mailman-icons/ "/usr/pkg/lib/mailman/icons/"
```

- If the Web server supports “virtual hosting”, each “host” gets its own subtree
  - 👉 With virtual hosting, a single machine and web server can offer up several different web sites

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## Explicit Access Control

- Access control lists settable by the webmaster for any directory tree
- Passwords or certificates can be configured as well
- Permission can be granted or withheld based on client IP address
- If a directory has no `index.html` file, should the web server just list its contents?
- Applications can do their own authentication and access control
- All of these interact; combinations can be used



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## A Sample Configuration

Here is a `.htaccess` file for a directory:

```
<Files *>
  AuthUserFile /home/smb/pwdir/.htpasswd
  AuthGroupFile /dev/null
  AuthName "File Access"
  AuthType Basic
  Require valid-user
</Files>
```

The string **File Access** is displayed to the user. Logins and passwords are stored in `/home/smb/pwdir/.htpasswd`.


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# Web Authentication

A web password file:

user1:e03rzWPNjjZFo

user2:CqkaeLJSVcRpI



A screenshot of a web authentication dialog box. The dialog has a light gray background and a speech bubble icon with a question mark on the left. The text inside the dialog reads: "Enter username and password for 'File Access' at <https://www.cs.columbia.edu>". Below this text are two input fields: "User Name:" followed by a text box, and "Password:" followed by a text box. At the bottom right of the dialog are two buttons: "Cancel" and "OK".

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# Operating System Access Control

- Can the web server benefit from OS access control?
- What UIDs does the server run under?
- What permissions can/should be used for the files being served?

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## “Privileged” Ports versus Security

- Most Unix systems reserve ports  $< 1024$  for root
- Web servers listen on port 80; therefore, they have to run as root
- Do we really want such a large, complex program running as root?  
Not if we can help it. . .

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# Shedding Privileges

- Apache starts as root
- Note: it is *not* setuid; it must be invoked by root. (Why is that the right choice?)
- It opens the socket and some log files, then forks and sheds privileges
- Serving web pages is done as non-privileged user “www”

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## File Permissions

- If the web server isn't root, it can't open protected files
- All pages served must be readable by the web server, its group, or "other"
- *Don't* make them owned by www; that way, a compromised web server can't overwrite them
- In other words, the web server itself has as few privileges as possible

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## Design Philosophy

- Use the OS to protect the system against the web server
- Assume the web server can enforce its own access control mechanisms

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## User Behavior

- Who creates web content?
- Can ordinary users supply web pages?
- At many sites, the answer is yes
- This complicates things



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# User Directories

- Can users export things they shouldn't?
  - ☞ Is that a software problem or a management problem?
- Where does user content live? Under DocumentRoot, or under the user's home directory?
- Can user-configured access control (`.htaccess`) override system access control settings?
- Scripts...

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## Users versus Web Access Control

- Suppose there's a `.htaccess` file to restrict web access to some directory
- The directory and its contents probably have to be world-readable
- Other users on that machine can read the files in that directory, without satisfying the requirements of the `.htaccess` file
- Oops...

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## Can We Lock Things Away?

- We don't want content owned by user www
- We could try putting user content under some lock directory, with a setuid helper program to let people publish web pages
- That doesn't work well if user-written scripts are allowed
- We can protect a few resources by using group read permissions — make the content group-readable but not other-readable, and let the web server run with several groups' permissions
- 👉 Unfortunately, Apache doesn't seem to support that
  - There's still a problem with scripts

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# Scripts

- Retrieving static files is ok, but scripts make life interesting
- Scripts are *programs*
- Each script is a separate network service
- Is each one correct?
- From the Apache Security Guide: “Always remember that you must trust the writers of the CGI script/programs or your ability to spot potential security holes in CGI, whether they were deliberate or accidental.”

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## Script Permissions

- In general, all scripts run with the same permissions
- This uid shouldn't own any files; see above for OS access controls
- Scripts can interfere with each other: “All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential to conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts e.g. User A hates User B, so he writes a script to trash User B's CGI database.”

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## User-Written Scripts

- Can ordinary users supply scripts?
- Translation: can ordinary users write secure programs that will do the right thing given arbitrary input?
- From the Apache Security Guide:

*Allowing users to execute CGI scripts in any directory should only be considered if:*

- 1. You trust your users not to write scripts which will deliberately or accidentally expose your system to an attack.*
- 2. You consider security at your site to be so feeble in other areas, as to make one more potential hole irrelevant.*
- 3. You have no users, and nobody ever visits your server.*

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## Restricting Scripts

- Allow scripts only in certain directories
- That way, the administrator has some control over what scripts are run
- Use suEXEC to switch uids

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## suEXEC

- suEXEC runs user CGI scripts as that user
- A dangerous operation: let an unprivileged user — www — tell a setuid-root program to run some arbitrary program as some user
- *Very* difficult to get right!
- suEXEC performs 20 different checks; see <http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/suexec.html> for details
- Sample check: Is the directory NOT writable by anyone else?
- Make sure that suEXEC is only executable by group www
- Watch out for race condition attacks!
- Caution: the CGI script owns *itself*; if subverted, it can overwrite itself (and other files belonging to that user)



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## Design Philosophy

- Use Apache access controls to isolate the dangerous stuff
- Use OS permission mechanisms — as invoked by Apache — to isolate CGI scripts from each other
- Separation isn't as strong as for the base Apache system, because of the overwrite scenario

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# Plug-Ins

- Scripting languages are often available as Apache *modules*
- This means that they run as part of the Apache process
- Modules are an efficiency hack: save the expense of `fork()/exec()`
- Modules run with the full permissions (and address space) of Apache
- Very dangerous!

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## User-Written Plug-in Scripts

- In the standard installation, user-written scripts run with the web server's permission
- Again, *all* such scripts, even if written by different, mutually hostile users, run with the same UID
- Do the plug-in languages provide access control? Some do

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## PHP's Safe\_Mode

- PHP, if `safe_mode` is turned on, restricts scripts to opening files owned by the script owner
- This in an application — PHP — enforcing something resembling OS permissions
- Did they get it right? Are there race condition attacks?
- Still does not protect against attacks from on-machine

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## Other Script Languages

- Java can be configured to be secure
- To my knowleged, neither Perl nor TCL — two other languages that can run as plug-ins — have such a feature
- There is *no* way to confine C or C++

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## Invoking Scripts

- Scripts are often invoked with client-supplied parameters
- Magic shell characters aren't as big a problem for parameters, because they're passed to scripts via an environment variable, not on the command line
- But — what about magic shell characters *in the script name*?
- Example: `http://www.example.com/cgi-bin/`rm-rf/``
- After all, if it's in `cgi-bin` it's executable...

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## Administrator Strategy

- Use a complex local scheme
- Provide a setuid program to copy user content to the web server
- Do not allow user programs to execute on that server
- Permit only “safe” scripting languages with their own access control
- Do *not* permit execution of C or C++ programs!
- Use web server access controls to restrict other access

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## Uploading Files

- If all scripts run with the same permissions, and if local users have read-access to user content, how can you do safe upload?
- Example: suppose I wanted to write a PHP script for homework submission
- Create an upload directory owned by me that is mode `rwX, -wX, -wX`: anyone can write to it or trace a search path, but not read it
- Use a true-random string for part or all of the filename
- For instance, store `smb2132.0.tar` as `158cb5864f2c7662b-smb2132.0.tar` (generated from `/dev/urandom`)
- No one will guess that to retrieve it or overwrite it
- Note: I'll be able to list the directory and read the files (if I set the file permissions correctly), but I won't own the files; `www` will



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## Back-End Databases

- Scripts are often front-ends to databases
- Does the database have its own access control? Where is the password stored?
- How does the script supply the password?
- Remember that any file on the server is readable by all other users or script writers. . .

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## Design Issues

- Neither the OS nor Apache's access controls can help us much
- We have to rely on the script language's access controls
- Even that may not protect us from subverted scripts

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# Cryptography

- SSL encryption used for most e-commerce
- SSL uses hybrid public key/symmetric crypto
- Where does the web server get its private key?
- Again, how do we store a key on a computer?

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## Key Storage

- Ideally, it's stored in encrypted form, or in some tamper-resistant device
- We can't store it encrypted — how is the decryption key supplied at Apache startup?
- A few large sites use SSL front-end/load-balancer devices, but these aren't common
- We must store the key in the clear, on the web server machine

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## Protecting the Key

- Of course, it's stored mode `r-- , --- , ---`
- It's also owned by root, and read in at startup before changing UIDs
- Why? To provide maximum OS protection against subversion

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# Authentication

- Two basic types: passwords and client-side certificates
- Passwords can be for the built-in Web browser authentication or for application-specific authentication
- Passwords should *never* be used without encrypting the network connection
- Client-side certificates are more secure, but they're rare
- They're also less convenient: how does the user carry around a private key to multiple machines?
- Ultimately, the client's identity feeds into Apache's access control mechanisms

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# Lessons

- Web servers are *very* hard to secure
- We need all of our tools: OS permissions, application ACLs, script language security, cryptography, and more
- There are often residual issues even then