




SECURITY AND HUMAN FACTORS

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ENIGMA MACHINE



BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION PROTECTION

- Psychological acceptability
- Fail-safe defaults (default deny)
- Least privilege
- Separation of privilege
- Least common mechanism
- Complete mediation
- Open design
- Economy of mechanism

J. Saltzer and M. Schroeder, "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems,"
Proceedings of the IEEE 63:9 (1975), 1278-1308.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCEPTABILITY

- Designed for ease of use
- Users can routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly
- The user's mental image of his protection goals must match the mechanisms he must use

J. Saltzer and M. Schroeder, "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems,"
Proceedings of the IEEE 63:9 (1975), 1278-1308.

USABILITY

- “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of user.” - ISO 9241-11

FROM LECTURE 1: SECURITY ENGINEERING

- Putting the pieces together
- Tradeoffs
- Balancing cost, **security, usability, acceptability,** and more

SECURITY ENGINEERING

- What if a proper balance is not reached?

SECURE BUT NOT USABLE

- A system designed to meet high security goals
- Can the user intentionally subvert your security mechanisms?
- Can they unknowingly influence the effective security?

USABLE BUT NOT SECURE

- A system designed for usability
- If the result does not match the user's intentions, the system is not usable
- A compromised machine is not usable
- Will users notice?
- When do users care?



IT AIN'T EASY

- Unmotivated user
- Abstraction
- Lack of feedback
- Barn door
- Weakest link

A. Whitten and J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Case Study of PGP 5.0. Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Security Symposium, August 1999.

SECURITY SOFTWARE IS USABLE IF THE PEOPLE WHO ARE EXPECTED TO USE IT:

- Are reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform
- Are able to figure out how to successfully perform those tasks

SECURITY SOFTWARE IS USABLE IF THE PEOPLE WHO ARE EXPECTED TO USE IT:

- Don't make dangerous errors
- Are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it.

A. Whitten and J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Case Study of PGP 5.0. Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Security Symposium, August 1999.

A FEW USABLE SECURITY PROBLEMS

- Encrypted Email
- Passwords
- Policy Management
- Phishing

ENCRYPTED EMAIL

- When should I use encryption?
- Which recipient key should I use?
- Is this message correctly encrypted?
- How do I differentiate between Public/Private keys?

A. Whitten and J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Case Study of PGP 5.0. Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Security Symposium, August 1999.

PASSWORDS

- Acceptable to users
- Cheap and easy to deploy
- Minimal maintenance costs

DISADVANTAGES OF PASSWORDS

- Must be memorized
- Must be kept a secret
- Easy to use for multiple accounts
- Very popular
- Existing password policies

PASSWORD RESET MECHANISMS

- Challenge Questions
- Rely on “shared secrets”
- Effect of information availability

PALIN'S HACKED YAHOO ACCOUNT

“The hacker guessed that Alaska's governor had met her husband in high school, and knew Palin's date of birth and home Zip code. Using those details, the hacker tricked Yahoo Inc.'s service into assigning a new password, "popcorn," for Palin's e-mail account”

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/18/palin-email-hacker-impers_n_127538.html

POLICY MANAGEMENT

- Firewall policy
- Privacy policy
- Access Control
- Privacy settings
- Distributed systems management
- Location-aware devices










POLICY MANAGEMENT

Privacy ▶ **Profile**


Basic **Contact Information**


Control who can see which sections of your profile. Visit the [Applications](#) page in order to change settings for applications. Visit the [Search Privacy](#) page to make changes to what people can see about you if they search for you.

See how a friend sees your profile:

Profile	 Only Friends	[?]
Basic Info	 Only Friends	[?]
Personal Info	 Only Friends	[?]
Status and Links	 Only Friends	[?]
Photos Tagged of You	 Custom  Can See Pics	[?]
	Edit Custom Settings	
Videos Tagged of You	 Custom  Can See Pics	[?]
	Edit Custom Settings	
Friends	 Only Friends	[?]

PHISHING

Mail Box CONTINGENT  [Print all](#)

☆ from **Billings, Ron** [hide details](#) Oct 8  [Reply](#) ▼




<rbillings@tfs.tamu.edu>

to "info@WebService"
<info@webservice>


date Thu, Oct 8, 2009 at 7:34 PM

subject Mail Box CONTINGENT


Web Service,
You have exceeded the limit of your mailbox set by your Web service, and you will be having problems in sending and receiving mails. To prevent this, please click on the link below to reset your account.
<http://app.formassembly.com/forms/view/120140>
Failure to do this, will result in limited access to your mailbox.
Warning!!! Do not send your user name and password via email.
Regards,
Web Service.

 [Reply](#)  [Reply to all](#)  [Forward](#)


BETTER SPAM FILTERS



AUTHENTICATE THE EMAIL SENDER



WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION



WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION WITH SHARED SECRET

If your SiteKey is correct, you know you are at the valid Bank of America site.

If you recognize your SiteKey, please enter your passcode and click the **Sign In** button.

An asterisk (*) indicates a required field.

Your SiteKey:




my private message

* Passcode:

(4-12 numbers and/or letters, case sensitive)

Sign In

WEBSITE BLACKLISTS



HARDWARE TOKENS



DESIGNING FOR USABLE SECURITY

- Know your user
 - Role
 - Background
 - Ability
 - Limitations/Handicaps
- Acceptability

DESIGNING FOR USABLE SECURITY

- Know the user goals and tasks
- Consider any environmental factors that may affect their behavior
- Design for robustness against potential attacks
 - Spoofability
 - Information overload
 - Warning fatigue

DESIGNING WARNING MESSAGES

- Use a warning appropriate to the situation
- Clearly state the situation in natural language
- Ask the question in context
- Give the user reasonable choices to resolve the issue

GENERAL RULES

- Make the default settings secure
- Use automation when possible
- Don't "punt" to the user when there's a problem

EVALUATING SECURITY INDICATORS

- Does it behave correctly when not under attack?
- Does it behave correctly when under attack?
- Can it be spoofed, obscured, or otherwise manipulated?
- Do users notice it?
- Do the users know what it means?
- Do users know what they are supposed to do when they see it?
- Do they actually do it?
- Do they keep doing it over time?
- How does it interact with other indicators that may be installed on a user's computer?

Lorrie Cranor, What do they "indicate?": evaluating security and privacy indicators. interactions, May/June 2006, p. 45-57.

USABILITY TESTING

- If there is a human in the loop usability evaluation is necessary
- Test under real conditions
- Use real users

EARLY EVALUATION

- Low fidelity prototyping
- Expert evaluation
- Cognitive walk-through

EVALUATION METHODS

- Ethnographic studies
- In-lab studies
- In-the-wild studies

IRB: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD

- A committee that reviews research projects involving human subjects to assure the protection and safety, rights and welfare of research participants (human subjects).
- Informed consent
- <http://www.rascal.columbia.edu>

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

- HCISec Bibliography
 - <http://www.gaudior.net/alma/biblio.html>
- Usable Security Blog
 - <http://usablesecurity.com/>
- Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
 - <http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/>
- HCI Bibliography
 - <http://www.hcibib.org/>