

# HYDRA: Pruning Adversarially Robust Neural Networks


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## Abstract

In safety-critical but computationally resource-constrained applications, deep learning faces two key challenges: lack of robustness against adversarial attacks and large size of neural networks (often millions of parameters). While the research community has extensively explored the use of robust training and network pruning *independently* to address one of these challenges, only a few recent works have studied them jointly. However, these works inherit a heuristic pruning strategy that was developed for benign training, which performs poorly when integrated with robust training techniques, including adversarial training and verifiable robust training. To overcome this challenge, we propose to make pruning techniques aware of the robust training objective and let the training objective guide the search for which connections to prune. We realize this insight by formulating the pruning objective as an empirical risk minimization problem which is solved efficiently using SGD. We demonstrate that our approach, titled HYDRA<sup>1</sup>, achieves compressed networks with *state-of-the-art* benign and robust accuracy, *simultaneously*. We demonstrate the success of our approach across CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet dataset with four robust training techniques: iterative adversarial training, randomized smoothing, MixTrain, and CROWN-IBP. We also demonstrate the existence of highly robust sub-networks within non-robust networks. Our code and compressed networks are publicly available<sup>2</sup>.

## 1 Introduction

How can we train deep neural networks (DNNs) that are robust against adversarial examples while minimizing the size of the neural network? In safety-critical and resource-constrained environments, both robustness and compactness are *simultaneously* necessary. However, existing work is limited in its ability to answer this question since it has largely addressed these challenges in *isolation*. For example, neural network pruning is an efficient approach to minimize the size of the neural networks. In parallel, robust training techniques can significantly improve the adversarial robustness of neural networks. However, improving adversarial robustness has been shown to require even larger neural networks [30, 49]. Thus it is even more critical



**Figure 1:** Comparison of our proposed approach ( $\star$ ) and least-weight magnitude based pruning ( $\+$ ) for adversarial training ( $l_\infty \leq \epsilon$ ) with VGG16 network and CIFAR-10 dataset. For both a weaker adversary ( $\epsilon=2/255$ ) or a stronger adversary ( $\epsilon=8/255$ ), our proposed technique leads to higher empirical robust accuracy where the gap increases with compression ratio.

<sup>1</sup>a small organism with high resiliency and biological immortality due to regenerative abilities.

<sup>2</sup><https://github.com/inspire-group/compactness-robustness>

to ask *whether network pruning techniques can reduce the size of the network, i.e., number of connections, while preserving robustness?*

A gold standard for network pruning has been the approach of Han et al. [19], which prunes connections that have the lowest weight magnitude (LWM) under the assumption that they are least useful. Sehwag et al. [34] demonstrated early success of LWM pruning with adversarially robust networks while Ye et al. [45] and Gui et al. [15] further improved its performance by integrating with alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) based optimization. These works inherit the heuristic assumption that connections with the least magnitude are also unimportant in the presence of robust training. While both LWM and ADMM based pruning techniques are highly successful with benign training [19, 50], they incur a huge performance degradation with adversarial training. Our design goal is to develop a pruning technique which achieves high performance and also generalizes to multiple types of robust training objectives including *verifiable* robustness [30, 49, 38, 48, 8].

Instead of inheriting a pruning heuristic and applying it to all robust training objectives, we argue that a better approach is to *make the pruning technique aware of the robust training objective itself*. We achieve this by formulating the pruning step, i.e., deciding which connections to prune, as an empirical risk minimization problem with a robust training objective, which can be solved efficiently using stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Our formulation is generalizable and can be integrated with multiple types of robust training objectives including verifiable robustness. Given a pre-trained network, we optimize the importance score [32] for each connection in the pruning step while keeping the fine-tuning step intact. Connections with the lowest importance scores are pruned away. We propose a scaled initialization of importance scores, which is a key driver behind the high benign and robust accuracy of our compressed networks.

Our proposed technique achieves much higher robust accuracy compared to LWM. Fig. 1 shows these results for adversarial training with both a weaker ( $\epsilon=2$ ) and a stronger ( $\epsilon=8$ ) adversary. With increasing pruning ratios, the gap between the robust accuracy achieved with both techniques further increases. Due to the accuracy-robustness trade-off in DNNs [49, 30], a rigorous comparison of pruning techniques should consider both benign and robust accuracy. We demonstrate that our compressed networks *simultaneously* achieve both state-of-the-art benign and robust accuracy.

Recently, Ramanujan et al. [32] demonstrated that there exist hidden sub-networks with high benign accuracy within randomly initialized networks. Using our pruning technique, we extend this observation to robust training, where we uncover *highly robust (both empirical and verifiable) sub-networks within non-robust networks*. In particular, within empirically robust networks that have no verifiable robustness, we found sub-networks with verified robust accuracy close to the state-of-the-art [33].

**Key contributions:** We make the following key contributions.

- We develop a novel pruning technique, which is aware of the robust training objective, by formulating it as an empirical risk minimization problem, which we solve efficiently with SGD. We show the generalizability of our formulation by considering multiple types of robust training objectives, including verifiable robustness. We employ an importance score based optimization technique with our proposed scaled initialization of importance scores, which is the key driver behind the success of our approach.
- We evaluate the proposed approach across four robust training objectives, namely iterative adversarial training [7, 30, 49], randomized smoothing [8, 7], MixTrain [38], and CROWN-IBP [48] on CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet dataset with multiple network architectures. Notably, at 99% connection pruning ratio, we achieve gains up to 3.2, 11.2, and 17.8 percentage points in robust accuracy, while simultaneously achieving state-of-the-art benign accuracy, compared to previous works [34, 45, 15] for ImageNet, CIFAR-10, and SVHN dataset, respectively.
- We also demonstrate the existence of highly robust sub-networks within non-robust or weakly robust networks. In particular, within empirically robust networks that have no verifiable robustness, we were able to find sub-networks with verified robust accuracy close to state-of-the-art.

## 2 Background and related work

**Robust training.** Robust training is one of the primary defenses against adversarial examples [5, 13, 6, 30, 3] where it can be divided into two categories: Adversarial training and verifiable robust training. The key objective of adversarial training is to minimize the training loss on adversarial

examples obtained with iterative adversarial attacks, such as projected gradient descent (PGD) [30] based attacks, under the following formulation.

$$\min_{\theta} E_{(x,y) \sim D} L_{adv}(\theta, x, y, \Omega), \quad L_{adv}(\theta, x, y, \Omega) = L(\theta, PGD(x), y) \quad (1)$$

Verifiable robust training provides provable robustness guarantees by minimizing a sound over-approximation to the worse-case loss  $L_{ver}(\theta, x, y, \Omega)$  under a given perturbation budget. We focus on two state-of-the-art verifiable robust training approaches: (1) MixTrain [38] based on linear relaxations, and (2) CROWN-IBP [47] based on interval bound propagation (IBP). We also consider randomized smoothing [8, 26, 33, 24], which aims to provide certified robustness by leveraging network robustness against Gaussian noise.

**Neural network pruning.** Network pruning aims to compress neural networks by reducing the number of parameters to enhance efficiency in resource-constrained environments [19, 18, 27, 11, 25, 16, 29, 23]. One such highly successful approach is a three-step compression pipeline [19, 16]. It involves pre-training a network, pruning it, and later fine-tuning it. In the pruning step, we obtain a binary mask ( $\hat{m}$ ), which determines which connections are most important. In the fine-tuning step, we only update the non-pruned connections to recover the performance. We refer the network obtained after fine-tuning as the *compressed network*. Note that both pruning and fine-tuning steps can be alternatively repeated to perform multi-step pruning [19], which incurs extra computational cost. In addition to this compression pipeline, network pruning can be performed with training, i.e, run-time pruning [28, 4] or before training [11, 25, 37]. We focus on pruning after training, in particular, LWM based pruning, since it still outperforms multiple other techniques (Table 1 in Lee et al. [25]) and is a long-standing gold standard for pruning techniques.

**Pruning with robust training.** Sehwag et al. [34] demonstrated that empirical adversarial robustness can be achieved with LWM based pruning heuristic. Ye et al. [45] and Gui et al. [15] further employed an alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) pruning framework [50], while still using LWM based pruning heuristic, to achieve better empirical robustness for compressed networks. We refer these previous works as Adv-LWM and Adv-ADMM respectively. In contrast, our work introduces an intellectually different direction as we let the robust training objective itself decide which connections to prune. Our compressed networks achieve both better accuracy and robustness than the previous works. In addition, our work is also the first 1) to study network pruning with verifiable robust training where we achieve heavily pruned networks with high verifiable robust accuracy, and 2) to demonstrate robust and compressed networks for the ImageNet dataset.

Some of these works [15, 42] also focused on other aspects of compression which are also applicable to our technique, such as quantization of weights. Another related line of research aims to use pruning itself to instill robustness against adversarial examples [10, 41, 17]. However, either these works are not successful at very high pruning ratios [17, 41] (we focus on  $\geq 90\%$  pruning ratios) or give a false sense of security as the robustness is diminished in the presence of an adaptive attacker [10, 2].

### 3 HYDRA: Our approach to network pruning with robust training

A central question in making robust networks compact is to decide *which connections to prune?* In LWM based pruning, irrespective of the training objective, connections with lowest weight magnitude are pruned away, with the assumption that those connections are the least useful. We argue that a better approach would be to perform an architecture search for a neural network with the desired pruning ratio that has the least drop in targeted accuracy metric compared to the pre-trained network.

We achieve this by formulating pruning as an empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem and integrating it with a robust training objective. Our formulation is generalizable where we show its integration with multiple empirical and verifiable robust training objectives, including adversarial training, MixTrain, CROWN-IBP, and randomized smoothing. We employ an importance score based optimization [32] approach to solve the ERM problem. However, we find that naive initialization of importance scores [20, 12, 32] brings little to no gain in the performance of compressed networks. We thus propose a *scaled initialization* of importance scores, and show that it enables our approach to simultaneously achieve state-of-the-art benign and robust accuracy at high pruning ratios. In addition, we also demonstrate the existence of hidden robust sub-networks within non-robust networks.

**Pruning as an empirical risk minimization problem (ERM) with adversarial loss objectives.**

To recover performance loss incurred with a pruning heuristic such as LWM, a standard approach is to fine-tune the network. In contrast, we explicitly aim to reduce the degradation of performance in the pruning step itself. We achieve this by integrating the robust training objective in the pruning strategy itself by formulating it as the following learning problem.

$$\hat{m} = \underset{m \in \{0, 1\}^N}{\operatorname{argmin}} \ E_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [L_{\text{pruning}}(\theta_{\text{pretrain}} \odot m, x, y)] \quad \text{s.t. } \|m\|_0 \leq k \quad (2)$$

$\theta \odot m$  refers to the element-wise multiplication of mask ( $m$ ) with the weight parameters ( $\theta$ ). Predefined pruning ratio of the network can be written as  $(1 - \frac{k}{N})$ , where  $k$  is the number of parameters we keep after pruning and  $N = |\theta_{\text{pretrain}}|$  is the total number of parameters in the pre-trained network. Our formulation is generalizable and can be integrated with different types of robust training objectives by selecting  $L_{\text{pruning}}$  equal to  $L_{\text{adv}}$  or  $L_{\text{ver}}$  (Section 2). Since the distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  is unknown, we minimize the empirical loss over the training data using SGD. The generated pruning mask  $\hat{m}$  is then used in the fine-tuning step.

**Importance score based optimization.** It is challenging to directly optimize over the mask  $m$  since it is binary (either the weight parameter is pruned or not). Instead, we follow the importance scores based optimization [32]. It assigns an importance score (floating-point) to each weight indicating its importance to the predictions on all input samples and optimizes based on the score. While making a prediction, it only selects the top- $k$  weights with the highest magnitude of importance scores. However, on the backward pass, it will update all scores with their gradients.

**Scaled-initialization.** We observe that the performance of the proposed pruning approach depends heavily on the initialization of importance scores. At high pruning ratios, which we study in this work, we observe slow and poor convergence of SGD with random initialization [20, 12] of importance scores. To overcome this challenge, we propose a scaled initialization for importance scores (Equation 3) where instead of random values, we initialize importance scores proportional to pre-trained network weights. With scaled-initialization we thus give more importance to large weights at the start and let the optimizer find a better set of pruned connections.

$$s_i^{(0)} \propto \frac{1}{\max(|\theta_{\text{pretrain},i}|)} \times \theta_{\text{pretrain},i} \quad (3)$$

where  $\theta_{\text{pretrain},i}$  is the weight corresponding to  $i_{th}$  layer in the pre-trained network. We normalize each layer weight to map it to  $[-1, 1]$  range. For the concrete scaling factor in Eq. 3, we use  $\sqrt{\frac{6}{\text{fan-in}_i}}$ , motivated from He et al. [20], where *fan-in* is the product of the receptive field size and the number of input channels. We provide additional ablation studies on choice of different scaling factors in Appendix B.1. We summarize our pipeline to compress networks in Algorithm 1.

While our approach to solving the optimization problem in the pruning step is inspired by Ramanujan et al. [32], our key objective is to focus on adversarially robust networks, which is different from their work. In addition, as we demonstrate in section 4.1, without the proposed scaled initialization, solving the optimization problem in the pruning step brings negligible gains. The objective in Ramanujan et al. [32] is to find sub-networks with high *benign* accuracy, hidden in a *randomly initialized* network, without the use of fine-tuning. Next, we present a more general formulation of their objective below.

**Imbalanced training objectives: Hidden robust sub-networks within non-robust networks.** To optimize for a robustness metric in the compressed network, we use its corresponding loss function in both pre-training and pruning. *But what if we use different loss functions in pre-training and pruning steps (no fine-tuning)?* For example, if we select  $L_{\text{pruning}} = L_{\text{ver}}$ , where  $L_{\text{pretrain}} = L_{\text{benign}}$ , it will search for verifiable robust sub-network within a benign, non-robust network. Using our pruning approach, we uncover the existence of robust sub-networks within non-robust networks in Section 5.

## 4 Experiments

We conduct extensive experiments across three datasets, namely CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet. We first establish strong baselines and then show that our method outperforms them significantly and achieves state-of-the-art accuracy and robustness simultaneously for compressed networks.

**Setup.** We experiment with VGG-16 [36], Wide-ResNet-28-4 [46], CNN-small, and CNN-large [43] network architectures. The  $l_\infty$  perturbation budget for adversarial training is 8/255 for CIFAR-10, SVHN and 4/255 for ImageNet. For verifiable robust training, we choose an  $l_\infty$  perturbation budget of 2/255 in all experiments. These design choices are consistent with previous work [7, 38, 47]. We used PGD attacks with 50 steps and 10 restarts to measure *era*. We use state-of-the-art adversarial training approach from Carmon et al. [7] which supersedes earlier adversarial training techniques [30, 49, 22]. We present a detailed version of our experimental setup in appendix A.

#### 4.1 Network pruning with HYDRA

We now demonstrate the success of our pruning technique in achieving highly compressed networks. In this subsection, we will focus on CIFAR-10 dataset, VGG-16 network, and adversarial training [7]. We present our detailed results later in Section 4.2 across multiple datasets, networks, pruning ratios, and robust training techniques. Our results (Table 1, 2 and Figure 1) demonstrate that the proposed method can achieve compression ratio as high as 100x while achieving much better benign and robust accuracy compared to other baselines.

**Metrics** We use following metrics to capture the performance of trained networks. 1) *Benign accuracy*: It is the percentage of correctly classified benign (i.e., non-modified) images. 2) *Empirical robust accuracy (era)*: It refers to the percentage of correctly classified adversarial examples generated with projected gradient descent based attacks. 3) *Verified robust accuracy (vra)*: Vra corresponds to verified robust accuracy, and **vra-m**, **vra-t**, and **vra-s** correspond to vra obtained from MixTrain, CROWN-IBP, and randomized smoothing, respectively. We refer pre-trained networks as PT.

In summary: 1) HYDRA improves both benign accuracy and robustness *simultaneously* over previous works (including Adv-LWM and Adv-ADMM), 2) HYDRA improves performance at multiple perturbations budgets (see Figure 1), 3) HYDRA’s improvements over prior works increase with compression ratio, and 4) HYDRA generalizes as it achieves state-of-the-art performance across four different robust training techniques (Section 4.2).

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#### Algorithm 1 End-to-end compression pipeline.

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**Inputs:** Neural network parameters ( $\theta$ ), Loss objective:  $L_{pretrain}$ ,  $L_{prune}$ ,  $L_{finetune}$ , Importance scores ( $s$ ), pruning ratio ( $p$ )

**Output:** Compressed network, i.e.,  $\theta_{finetune}$

Step 1: Pre-train the network.

$$\theta_{pretrain} = \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmin}} E_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [L_{pretrain}(\theta, x, y)]$$

Step 2: Initialize scores ( $s$ ) for each layer.

$$s_i^{(0)} = \sqrt{\frac{6}{fan-in_i}} \times \frac{1}{\max(|\theta_{pretrain,i}|)} \times \theta_{pretrain,i}$$

Step 3: Minimize pruning loss.

$$\hat{s} = \underset{s}{\operatorname{argmin}} E_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [L_{prune}(\theta_{pretrain}, s, x, y)]$$

Step 4: Create binary pruning mask  $\hat{m} = \mathbb{1}(|\hat{s}| > |\hat{s}|_k)$ ,  $|\hat{s}|_k$ :  $k$ th percentile of  $|\hat{s}|$ ,  $k = 100 - p$

Step 5: Finetune the non-pruned connections, starting from  $\theta_{pretrain}$ .

$$\theta_{finetune} = \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmin}} E_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [L_{finetune}(\theta \odot \hat{m}, x, y)]$$


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**Table 1:** Benign accuracy/era of compressed networks obtained with pruning from scratch, LWM, random initialization, and proposed pruning technique with scaled initialization. We use CIFAR-10 dataset and VGG16 network in this experiment.

Pruning ratio	PT	90%	95%	99%
<i>Scaled-initialization</i>				
Scratch		80.5/49.5	78.9/48.7	73.2/41.7
LWM [19]	82.7	74.7/45.6	71.5/42.3	34.4/24.6
Xavier-normal	151.9	78.8/47.7	76.7/45.2	63.2/34.1
Xavier-uniform		74.8/45.2	72.5/42.3	65.4/36.8
Kaiming-normal		75.1/45.0	73.0/42.4	65.8/36.5
Kaiming-uniform		75.3/44.9	72.4/42.1	66.3/36.5
		75.0/44.8	73.3/42.5	66.1/36.4

**Table 2:** Comparison of our approach with Adv-ADMM based pruning. We use CIFAR-10 dataset and VGG16 networks, iterative adversarial training from Madry et al. [30] for this experiment.


Pruning ratio	PT	90%	95%	99%
Adv-ADMM		76.3/44.4	72.9/43.6	55.2/34.1
HYDRA	79.4/44.2	76.6/45.1	74.0/44.7	59.9/37.9
$\Delta$		+0.3/+0.7	+1.1/+1.1	+4.7/+3.8

A key driver behind the success of HYDRA is the scaled initialization of importance scores in pruning. We found that widely used random initializations [20, 12], with either Gaussian or uniform distribution, perform even worse than training from scratch, our first baseline which we discuss below (Table 1). In contrast, architecture search with our scaled-initialization can significantly improve both benign accuracy and *era* of the compressed networks simultaneously, at all pruning ratios. To delve

deeper, we further compare the performance of each initialization technique at each epoch in the optimization for the pruning step (Figure 2 left). We find that with the proposed initialization, SGD converges faster and to a better pruned network, in comparison to widely used random initializations. It is because, with our initialization, SGD enjoys much higher magnitude gradients (using  $\ell_2$  norm) throughout the optimization in the pruning step (Figure 2 right).

**Validating empirical robustness with stronger attacks.** To further determine that robustness in compressed networks is not arising from phenomenon such as gradient masking [31, 2], we evaluate them with much stronger PGD attacks (up to 100 restarts and 1000 attack steps) along with an ensemble of gradient-based and gradient-free attacks [9]. Our results confirm that the compressed networks show similar trend as non-compressed nets with these attacks (Appendix A.1). Note that *vra* already provides a lower bound of robustness against *all possible attacks* in the given threat model.

**Comparison with training from scratch.** If the objective is to achieve a compressed and robust network, a natural question is why not train on a compact network from scratch? However, we observe in Table 1 that it achieves poor performance. For example, at 99% pruning ratio, the compressed network has only 24.6% *era* which is 27.3 and 17.1 percentage points lower than the non-compressed network and our approach, respectively. We present a detailed analysis in Appendix C.1.



**Figure 2:** We compare our proposed initialization with six other widely used initializations. With proposed initialization in the pruning step, SGD converges faster and to a better architecture (left), since it enjoys higher magnitude gradients throughout (right). (CIFAR10, 99% pruning)

Network	Adv-ADMM	Ours	$\Delta$
ResNet-18	58.7/36.1	69.0/41.6	+10.3/+5.5
ResNet-34	68.8/41.5	71.8/44.4	+3.0/+2.9
ResNet-50	69.1/42.2	73.9/45.3	+4.8/+3.1
WRN-28-2	48.3/30.9	54.2/34.1	+5.9/+3.2
GoogleNet	53.4/33.8	66.7/40.1	+13.3/+6.3
MobileNet-v2	10.0/10.0	39.7/26.4	+29.7/+16.4

**Table 3:** Comparing test accuracy/robustness (*era*) with Adv-ADMM (CIFAR10 dataset, 99% pruning). Our approach outperforms Adv-ADMM across all network architectures.

**Comparison with Adv-LWM based robust pruning.** LWM based pruning with robust training (following Sehwag et al. [34]) is able to partially improve the robustness of compressed networks compared to training from scratch. At 99% pruning ratio, it improves the *era* to 34.1% but this is still 17.8 and 7.6 percentage points lower than a non-compressed network and our proposed approach, respectively. We observe similar gaps when varying adversarial strength in adversarial training (Figure 1). Furthermore, our approach also achieves up to 10 percentage points higher benign accuracy compared to Adv-LWM. Note that our method also outperforms LWM based pruning with benign training (Appendix C.6). We use only 20 epochs in the pruning step (with 100 epochs in both pre-training and fine-tuning), thus incurring only  $1.1 \times$  the computational overhead over Adv-LWM.

**Comparison with Adv-ADMM based robust pruning.** Finally, we compare our approach with ADMM based robust pruning [45, 15] in Table 2. Note that Ye et al. [45] have reported results with a former adversarial training technique [30] while we use the state-of-the-art techniques [49, 7]. Thus for a fair comparison, we use the exact same adversarial training technique, network architecture, and pre-trained network checkpoints as their work. Our approach outperforms ADMM based pruning at every pruning ratio and achieves up to 4.7 and 3.8 percentage point improvement in benign accuracy and *era*, respectively (Table 2). Adv-ADMM uses 100 epochs in pruning (compared to 20 epochs in our work), making it  $5 \times$  and  $1.36 \times$  more time consuming than our approach in the pruning step and overall, respectively. We also provide a comparison along six more recent network architectures (Table 3). Our method achieves better accuracy and robustness, simultaneously, across all of them. Furthermore, while Adv-ADMM fails to even converge for MobileNet, which was already designed to be a highly compact network, we achieve non-trivial performance. In addition, while Adv-ADMM has been shown to work with only adversarial training, our approach also generalizes to multiple verifiable robust training techniques.

**Ablation studies.** First, we vary the amount of data used in solving ERM in pruning step. Though a small number of images do not help much, the transition happens around 10% of the training data (5k images on CIFAR-10) after which an increasing amount of data helps in significantly improving the *era* (Appendix B.2). Next, we vary the number of epochs in the pruning step from one to a hundred. We observe that even a small number of pruning epochs, such as five, are sufficient to achieve large gains in *era* and further gains start diminishing as we increase the number of epochs (Appendix B.3).

**Table 4:** Experimental results (benign/robust accuracy) for empirical test accuracy (era) and verifiable robust accuracy based on MixTrain (vra-m), randomized smoothing (vra-s), and CROWN-IBP (vra-t).

(a) Adversarial training (era)							
Architecture		VGG-16			WRN-28-4		
Method		Adv-LWM	HYDRA	$\Delta$	Adv-LWM	HYDRA	$\Delta$
CIFAR-10	PT		82.7/51.9			85.6/57.2	
	90%	78.8/47.7	<b>80.5/49.5</b>	+0.7/+1.8	82.8/53.8	<b>83.7/55.2</b>	+0.9/+1.4
	95%	76.7/45.2	<b>78.9/48.7</b>	+2.2/+3.5	79.3/48.8	<b>82.7/54.2</b>	+3.4/+5.4
	99%	63.2/34.1	<b>73.2/41.7</b>	+10.0/+7.6	66.6/36.1	<b>75.6/47.3</b>	+9.0/+11.2
SVHN	PT		90.5/53.5			93.5/60.1	
	90%	89.2/51.5	89.2/52.4	0/+0.9	92.3/59.4	<b>94.4/62.8</b>	+2.1/+3.4
	95%	84.9/50.4	<b>85.5/51.7</b>	+0.6/+1.3	90.4/53.4	<b>93.0/59.8</b>	+2.6/+6.4
	99%	50.4/29.0	<b>84.3/46.8</b>	+33.9/+17.8	<b>82.8/45.3</b>	<b>82.2/52.4</b>	-0.6/+7.1

(b) Randomized smoothing (vra-s)							
Architecture		VGG-16			WRN-28-4		
Method		Adv-LWM	HYDRA	$\Delta$	Adv-LWM	HYDRA	$\Delta$
CIFAR-10	PT		82.1/61.1			85.7/63.3	
	90%	82.3/59.6	<b>83.4/60.7</b>	+1.1/+1.1	82.3/61.0	<b>85.6/63.0</b>	+3.3/+2.0
	95%	80.3/56.8	<b>83.1/59.9</b>	+2.8/+3.1	80.3/59.9	<b>84.5/62.5</b>	+4.2/+2.4
	99%	65.1/44.1	<b>77.1/54.4</b>	+12.0/+10.3	65.1/49.1	<b>78.2/56.0</b>	+13.1/+6.9
SVHN	PT		92.8/60.1			92.7/62.2	
	90%	92.4/59.9	92.7/59.9	+0.3/0.0	92.4/62.2	<b>92.8/62.3</b>	+0.4/+0.1
	95%	92.2/59.8	<b>92.4/59.3</b>	+0.2/-0.6	92.2/61.4	<b>93.1/62.0</b>	+0.9/+0.6
	99%	87.5/51.9	<b>91.4/58.6</b>	+3.9/+6.7	87.5/45.0	<b>91.8/59.6</b>	+4.3/+14.6

(c) CROWN-IBP (vra-t)							
Architecture		CNN-small			CNN-large		
Method		Adv-LWM	HYDRA	$\Delta$	Adv-LWM	HYDRA	$\Delta$
CIFAR-10	PT		53.3/42.0			58.0/45.5	
	90%	53.5/42.4	<b>53.5/42.9</b>	+0.0/+0.5	58.9/46.9	<b>59.1/47.0</b>	+0.2/+0.1
	95%	<b>49.7/40.3</b>	49.5/40.0	-0.2/-0.3	57.2/46.1	<b>57.8/46.2</b>	+0.6/+0.1
	99%	19.8/17.3	<b>34.6/29.5</b>	+14.8/+12.2	42.9/34.6	<b>47.7/39.4</b>	+4.8/+4.8
SVHN	PT		59.9/40.8			68.5/47.1	
	90%	59.1/40.3	<b>60.4/40.6</b>	+1.3/+0.3	69.2/48.5	<b>68.8/48.9</b>	-0.4/+0.4
	95%	49.4/34.8	<b>53.0/36.7</b>	+3.6/+1.9	69.0/47.2	<b>69.2/47.6</b>	+0.2/+0.4
	99%	19.6/19.6	19.6/19.6	0.0/0.0	50.1/38.2	<b>56.3/42.8</b>	+6.2/+4.6

(d) MixTrain (vra-m)							
Architecture		CNN-small			CNN-large		
Method		Adv-LWM	HYDRA	$\Delta$	Adv-LWM	HYDRA	$\Delta$
CIFAR-10	PT		62.5/46.8			63.8/47.7	
	90%	46.9/35.3	<b>54.8/41.0</b>	+7.9/+5.7	63.3/47.1	<b>65.7/49.6</b>	+2.4/+2.5
	95%	29.4/24.0	<b>50.7/38.3</b>	+21.3/+14.3	50.6/39.3	<b>60.2/45.3</b>	+9.6/+6.0
	99%	10.0/10.0	<b>27.0/24.9</b>	+17.0/+14.9	30.0/25.8	<b>42.7/35.3</b>	+12.7/+9.5
SVHN	PT		72.5/48.4			77.0/56.9	
	90%	60.3/41.6	<b>57.5/45.7</b>	-2.8/+4.1	77.9/57.0	<b>78.4/57.9</b>	+0.5/+0.9
	95%	19.6/19.6	<b>52.5/33.7</b>	+32.9/+14.1	19.6/19.6	<b>74.8/53.7</b>	+55.2/+34.1
	99%	19.6/19.6	19.6/19.6	0.0/0.0	19.6/19.6	19.6/19.6	0.0/0.0

## 4.2 Results across multiple datasets and robust training techniques

Table 4 presents the experimental results on CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets across three pruning ratios, two network architectures, and four different robust training objectives. The key characteristics of the proposed pruning approach from these results are synthesized below:

**Improved robustness across datasets, architectures, and robust training objectives.** Across most experiments in Table 4, HYDRA achieves a significant improvement in robust accuracy with a mean and maximum improvement of 5.1 and 34.1 percentage points, respectively. Specifically, it achieves a mean improvement in robust accuracy by 5.6, 3.9, 2.0, 8.8 percentage points for adversarial training, randomized smoothing, CROWN-IBP, and MixTrain approach, respectively.

**Improved benign accuracy along with robustness.** Our approach not only improves robustness, but also the benign accuracy of pruned networks simultaneously across most experiments. Specifically, it achieves a mean improvement in benign accuracy by 5.4, 3.9, 2.6, 13.1 percentage points for adversarial training, randomized smoothing, CROWN-IBP, and MixTrain approach, respectively.

**Higher gains with an increase in pruning ratio.** At 99% pruning ratio, not only is our approach never worse than the baseline but it also achieves the highest gains in robust accuracy. For example, for VGG16 network with CIFAR-10 dataset at 99% pruning ratio, our approach is able to achieve 7.6 and 10.3 percentage points higher *era* and *vra-s*. These improvements are larger than the gains obtained at smaller pruning ratios. At very high pruning ratios for CROWN-IBP and MixTrain, the pruned networks with our approach are also more likely to converge.

**Help increase generalization for some cases.** Interestingly, we observe that our pruning approach can obtain robust accuracy even higher than pre-trained networks. For the SVHN dataset and WRN-28-4 network, we observe an increase by 2.7 and 0.1 percentage points for adversarial training and randomized smoothing, respectively at 90% pruning ratio. For verifiable training with CROWN-IBP, we observe improvement in *vra-t* from 0.9-1.8 percentage points for networks pruned at 90% ratio.

**Table 5:** Era for ResNet50 network trained on ImageNet dataset with adversarial training for  $\epsilon=4/255$ .

Pruning ratio	PT		95%		99%	
	top-1	top-5	top-1	top-5	top-1	top-5
Adv-LWM			45.0/19.6	70.2/43.3	24.8/9.8	47.8/24.4
HYDRA	60.2/32.0	82.4/61.1	<b>47.1/21.4</b>	<b>72.2/46.6</b>	<b>31.5/13.0</b>	<b>56.2/31.2</b>
$\Delta$			+2.1/+1.8	+2.0/+3.3	+6.7/+3.2	+8.4/+6.8

Similar improvements are also observed for CNN-large with MixTrain. Note that the improvement mostly happens for WRN-28-4 and CNN-large architectures, where both networks achieve better robust accuracy than their counterparts. This suggests that there still exists a potential room for improving the generalization of these models with robust training. We present additional results in Appendix C.4.

**Performance on ImageNet dataset.** To assess the performance of pruning techniques on large-scale datasets, we experiment with the ImageNet dataset. Table 5 summarizes our results. Similar to smaller-scale datasets, our approach also outperforms LWM based pruning for the ImageNet dataset. In particular, at 99% pruning ratio, our approach improves the top-1 *era* by 3.2 percentage points, and the top-5 *era* by 6.8 percentage points.

## 5 Imbalanced training objectives: Hidden robust sub-networks within non-robust networks.

We have already demonstrated that the success of HYDRA stems from finding a set of connections which, when pruned, incurs least degradation in the pre-trained network robustness. *What if the pre-trained network is trained with a different objective than pruning?* To answer this question, we prune a pre-trained network with three different objectives (no fine-tuning), namely benign training, adversarial training, and randomized smoothing. These results are presented in Table 6 where the pruning ratio for each sub-network is 50% with VGG16 network and CIFAR-10 dataset.

**Table 6:** *Performance of sub-networks within pre-trained networks. Given a pre-trained network, we search for a sub-network optimized for one metric from benign accuracy, era ( $\epsilon=8/255$ ), or vra-s ( $\epsilon=2/255$ ).*

	Pre-training objective	Targeted metric for each sub-network		
		benign accuracy	era	vra-s
Benign training	(benign accuracy = 95.0)	95.0	43.5	53.0
Adversarial training	(era = 51.9)	94.1	51.4	63.6
Randomized smoothing	(vra = 61.1)	93.7	48.8	60.7

Our results show that *there exist highly robust sub-networks even within non-robust networks*. For example, we were able to find a sub-network with 43.5% *era* when the pre-trained network was trained with benign training and had 0% *era*. As a reference, the pre-trained network with adversarial training has 51.9% *era*.

Surprisingly, in networks pre-trained with adversarial training, we found sub-networks with really high verified robust accuracy from randomized smoothing. For example, when searched with randomized smoothing technique from Carmon et al [7], we found a sub-network with 63.6% robust accuracy on CIFAR10 dataset.<sup>3</sup> Note that the sub-network has a higher *vra-s* than 60.7%, which is achieved with a network pre-trained with randomized smoothing from Carmon et al. [7]. Under a similar setup, we also find a sub-network with 61.3% *vra-s* within an adversarially trained network on SVHN dataset. In comparison, a pre-trained network could only achieve 60.1% *vra-s*.


## 6 Delving deeper into network pruning and concluding remarks

**Visualizing which connections are being pruned.** We visualize the distributions of weights in pruned networks from our proposed approach and the Adv-LWM baseline in Figure 3. There are two key insights 1) Our search for a better pruned architecture is likely to find connections with very small magnitudes unnecessary and prunes them away. 2) *However, in contrast to the LWM heuristic, our approach does favor pruning some large-magnitude weights instead of smaller ones.* We present more detailed visualizations in Appendix D.

**Further compression after integration with quantization (Appendix C.7).** We found that our pruned networks (even at 99% pruning ratio) can be quantized by 8-bits while only incurring <0.5 percentage point decrease in both benign and robust accuracy. This brings another 4x compression factor in already heavily pruned (10x-100x) networks.

<sup>3</sup>When searched with improved technique from Salman et al. [33], we find a even better sub-network with 64.3% *vra-s*.





**Figure 3:** Comparison of the weights preserved by each pruning technique. In background, we display the histogram of weights for the pre-trained network. Then we show the weights preserved by each technique after pruning (without fine-tuning). Note that the proposed pruning technique tends to preserve small-magnitude weights as opposed to other large-magnitude weights preserved by LWM. We use 99% pruning ratio with VGG16 network in figure (a), (b) and with CNN-large networks in figure (c), (d), and train on CIFAR-10 dataset.

**Multi-step pruning (Appendix C.8).** To reduce computational overhead, so far we only used a single pruning step. On ImageNet dataset, even when we use a multi-step (20-steps) Adv-LWM technique, our approach, which still uses a single pruning step, outperforms it by a large extent.

**Structured pruning (Appendix C.9).** Structured pruning, i.e., pruning filters instead of connections, has a much stronger impact on performance [27]. When pruning 50% filters with LWM technique, the *era* of VGG16 network decreases from 51% to 34.7% on CIFAR-10. Our approach achieves 38.0% *era* while also achieving 1.1 percentage point higher benign accuracy than Adv-LWM.

**Lower degradation in *era* for over-parameterized networks.** With 90% pruning for the over-parameterized WRN-28-10 network, we observe only 0.3 percentage point degradation in *era*, which is significantly lower than 1.4 percentage point degradation incurred for a smaller WRN-28-4 network.

## 6.1 Concluding Remarks

In this work, we study the interplay between neural network pruning and robust training objectives. We argue for integrating the robust training objective in the pruning technique itself by formulating pruning as an optimization problem and achieve state-of-the-art benign and robust accuracy, simultaneously, across different datasets, network architectures, and robust training techniques. An open research question is to further close the performance gap between non-pruned and pruned networks.

## Broader Impact

Our work provides an important capability for deploying machine learning in safety critical and resource constrained environments. Our compressed networks provide a pathway for higher efficiency in terms of inference latency, energy consumption, and storage. On the other hand, these networks provide robustness against adversarial examples, including verified robustness properties, mitigating test-time attacks on critical ML services and applications. Recent work has leveraged adversarial examples against neural networks for positive societal applications, such as pushing back against large-scale facial recognition and surveillance. The development of robust networks may hinder such societal applications. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the limits and capabilities of compressed networks in safety critical environments, as failure to develop robust systems can also have catastrophic consequences. Our approach does not leverage any biases in data.

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## A Experimental Setup

We conduct extensive experiments across three datasets, namely CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet. For each dataset, we pre-train the networks with a learning rate of 0.1. We perform 100 training epochs for CIFAR-10, SVHN and 90 epochs for ImageNet. In the pruning step, we perform 20 epochs for CIFAR-10, SVHN and 90 epochs for ImageNet. We experiment with VGG-16 [36], Wide-ResNet-28-4 [46], CNN-small, and CNN-large [43] network architectures. Since both MixTrain and CROWN-IBP methods only work with small scale networks (without batch-normalization), we use only CNN-large and CNN-small for them. We split the training set into a 90/10 ratio for training and validation for tuning the hyperparameters. Once hyperparameters are fixed, we use all training images to report the final results.

**Adversarial training:** We use the state-of-the-art iterative adversarial training setup (based on PGD) with  $l_\infty$  adversarial perturbations on CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset. The maximum perturbation budget, the number of steps, and perturbations at each step are selected as 8, 10, and 2 respectively. In particular, for CIFAR-10, we follow the robust semi-supervised training approach from Carmon et al. [7], where it used 500k additional pseudo-labeled images from the TinyImages dataset. For ImageNet, we train using the free adversarial training approach with 4 replays and perturbation budget of 4 [35]. We evaluate the robustness of trained networks against a stronger attack, where we use 50 iterations for the PGD attack with the same maximum perturbation budget and step size.

**Provable robust training:** We evaluate our pruning strategy under three different provable robust training settings. We choose an  $l_\infty$  perturbation budget of  $2/255$  in all experiments. These design choices are consistent with previous work [7, 38, 47].

- *MixTrain:* We use the best training setup reported in Wang et al. [38] for both CIFAR-10 and SVHN. In specific, we use sampling number  $k'$  as 5 and 1 for CNN-small and CNN-large. We select  $\alpha = 0.8$  to balance between regular loss and verifiable robust loss. The trained networks are evaluated with symbolic interval analysis [40, 39] to match the results in Wang et al. [38].

- *CROWN-IBP:* We follow the standard setting in Zhang et al. [47] for CROWN-IBP. We set the  $\epsilon$  scheduling length to be 60 epochs (gradually increase training  $\epsilon$  from 0 to the target one), during which we gradually decrease the portion of verifiable robust loss obtained by CROWN-IBP while increasing the portion obtained by IBP for each training batch. For the rest of the epochs after the scheduling epochs, only IBP contributes to the verifiable robust loss. We use IBP to evaluate the trained networks.

- *Randomized smoothing:* We train the network using the stability training for CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset (similar to Carmon et al. [7]). We calculated the certified robustness with  $N_0 = 100$ ,  $N = 10^4$ , noise variance ( $\sigma=0.25$ ), and  $\alpha = 10^{-3}$ . We choose an  $l_2$  budget of  $110/255$  which gives an upper bound on robustness against an  $l_\infty$  budget of  $2/255$  for CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset.

**Table 7:** All neural network architectures, with their number of parameters, used in this work.

Name	Architecture	Parameters
VGG4	conv 64 → conv 64 → conv 128 → conv 128 → conv 128 → fc 256 → fc 256 → fc 10	0.46m
VGG16	conv 64 → conv 64 → conv 128 → conv 128 → conv 256 → conv 256 → conv 256 → conv 512 → conv 512 → conv 512 → conv 512 → conv 512 → conv 512 → fc 256 → fc 256 → fc 10	15.30m
CNN-small	conv 16 → conv 32 → fc 100 → fc 10	0.21m
CNN-large	conv 32 → conv 32 → conv 64 → conv 64 → fc 512 → fc 512 → fc 10	2.46m
WideResNet-28-4	Proposed architecture from Zagoruyko et al.[46]	6.11m
ResNet50	Proposed architecture form He et al. [21]	25.50m

**Pruning and fine-tuning:** Except for learning rate and the number of epochs, pruning and fine-tuning have similar training parameters as pre-training. We choose the number of epochs as 20 in all experiments (if not specified). Similar to pre-training, for pruning we choose learning of 0.1 with cosine decay. Often when this learning rate is too high (in particular for MixTrain and CROWN-IBP), we report results with the learning of 0.001 for the pruning step. Fine-tuning is done with a learning rate of 0.01 and cosine decay. To make sure that the algorithm does not largely prune fully connected layers that have most parameters, we constrain it to prune each layer by equal ratio.


### A.1 Validating robustness against stronger attacks

Iterative adversarial training [30] has long withstood its performance against attacks of varied strength [2]. It is natural to ask whether our compressed networks bears the same strength. To evaluate it, we measure the robustness of our compressed network against stronger adversarial attacks.

**Increasing attack steps and the number of restarts.** With increasing step-size, i.e, enabling adversary to search for stronger adversarial examples, we choose the perturbation budget for each step with the  $\frac{2.5*\epsilon}{steps}$  rule suggested by Madry et al. [30]. Figure 4 shows the results for networks trained on CIFAR-10 datasets. It shows that gains in adversarial attack strength saturate after a certain number of attacks steps since the robust accuracy

stops decreasing significantly. Similarly, with 100 random restarts for VGG-16 at 95% pruning ratio, we observe only a 0.6 percentage point decrease in *era* compared to the baseline. Note that the pre-trained network also incurs an additional 0.7 percentage point degradation in *era* with 100 random restarts, suggesting that compressed networks behave similarly to pre-trained, i.e., non-compressed, networks under stronger adversarial attacks. We use 50 attack steps with 10 restarts for all adversarial attacks in our evaluation.

**Evaluation with auto-attack [9].** With auto-attack, which is an ensemble of gradient-based and gradient-free attacks, we observe similar trend for compressed networks compared to non-compressed, i.e., pre-trained networks. For example, the *era* of pre-trained VGG-16 with auto-attacks is 48.3% (3.6 percentage points lower than *era* with PGD-50 attack). In contrast, *era* of a 95% pruned VGG-16 network is 44.8, which is again only 3.7 percentage points lower than PGD-50 attack. In comparison to the PGD-50 baseline, the decrease in *era* with auto-attack is comparable for pre-trained, i.e., non-compressed, and pruned networks.



**Figure 4:** Empirical adversarial accuracy (*era*) of compressed networks with increasing number of steps in projected gradient descent (PGD) based attack. Beyond a certain number steps, *era* is largely constant with increase in steps. Results are reported for compressed networks up to 99% pruning ratio with CIFAR-10 dataset.

## A.2 Network architectures

Table 7 contains the architecture and parameters details of the neural networks used in this work. For WideResNet-28-4 and ResNet-50, we use the original architectures proposed in Zagoruyko et al. [46] and He et al. [21], respectively. CNN-large and CNN-small are similar to architectures used in Wong et al. [43]. VGG4 and VGG16 are the the variants of original VGG architecture [36].

## A.3 Comparison with Ramanujan et al. [32]

While our approach to solving the optimization problem in the pruning step is inspired by Ramanujan et al. [32], we note that the goals of the two works have several significant differences. Their work aims to find sub-networks with high *benign* accuracy, hidden in a *randomly initialized* network, without the use of fine-tuning. In contrast, (1) we focus on multiple types of robust training objectives, including verifiably robust training, (2) we employ pre-trained networks in our pruning approach, as opposed to randomly initialized networks, and (3) we argue for further fine-tuning of pruned networks resulted from the optimization problem to further boost performance. We further employ an additional scaled-initialization mechanism which is the key driver of the success of our pruning technique. In contrast to their work which searches for sub-networks close to 50% pruning ratio, our goal is to find highly compressed networks (up to 99% pruning ratio).

## B Further details on ablation studies

In this section, we further discuss the ablation studies for the pruning step in detail.

### B.1 Choice of scaling factor in importance scores initialization

Recall that we use  $s_i^{(0)} = \gamma \times \sqrt{\frac{6}{f_{an-in_i}}} \times \frac{1}{\max(|\theta_{pretrain,i}|)} \times \theta_{pretrain,i}$  to initialize the importance scores in each layer, where  $\gamma$  is the scaling factor. We use  $\sqrt{\frac{k}{f_{an-in}}}$ , with  $k = 6$ , as the scaling factor. Note the our choice of  $k$  is also motivated by an earlier work from He et al. [20]. We also provide an ablation study with different values of  $k$  in Table 8, where measure performance of each scaling factor after the pruning step, i.e., no fine-tuning. First it demonstrate that the performance without a scaling factor, i.e.,  $\gamma=1$ , is much worse. Next it validate our choice of  $k = 6$ , as it outperforms other choice for  $k$ .

### B.2 How much data is needed for supervision in pruning?

We vary the number of samples used from ten to all training images in the dataset for solving the ERM in the pruning step for CIFAR-10 dataset at a 99% pruning ratio. Fig. 5 shows there results. Data corresponding to zero samples refers to the least weight-magnitude based heuristic as it is used to initialize the pruning step. As the amount of data (number of samples) used in the pruning step increases, the robustness of the pruned network after fine-tuning also increases. For CIFAR-10, a small number of images doesn't help much in finding a better


**Table 8:** Ablation over different values of  $k$  in the choice of scaling factor for the proposed initialization of importance scores. We focus on the pruning step, i.e., no fine-tuning, for a VGG-16 network at 99% pruning ratio. We use  $k=6$  in our experiments.

$k$	No-scaling	2	4	6	8	10	12	14
Benign accuracy	57.9	62.4	64.5	<b>66.8</b>	66.7	66.4	65.0	66.1
<i>era</i>	31.6	33.9	35.7	<b>35.8</b>	34.7	35.7	33.2	35.2


pruned network. However, the transition happens around 10% of the training data (5k images for CIFAR-10) after which an increasing amount of data helps in significantly improving the *era*.

### B.3 Number of training epochs for pruning.

We vary the number for epochs used to solve the *ERM* problem for the pruning step from one to hundred. For each selection, the learning rate scheduler is cosine annealing with a starting learning rate of 0.1. Fig. 6 shows these results where we can see that an increase in the number of epochs leads to a network with higher *era* after fine-tuning. Data corresponding to zero epochs refers to the least weight-magnitude based heuristic since it is used to initialize the pruning step. We can see that even a small number of pruning epochs are sufficient to achieve large gains in *era* and the gains start diminishing as we increase the number of epochs.



**Figure 5:** Era of compressed networks with varying number of samples used in the pruning step at 99% pruning ratio for a VGG16 network and CIFAR-10 dataset.



**Figure 6:** Era of compressed networks with varying number of epochs used in the pruning step with VGG16 network and CIFAR-10 dataset.

## C Additional experimental Results


In this section, we first study the impact of sparsity in the network in the presence of benign and robust training. Next, we present the limitation of least weight magnitude pruning in the presence of robust training and discuss the choice of this heuristic as a baseline. After that, we study the improvement in the generalization of some networks after the proposed pruning technique. Next, we provide additional visualization on comparison of both techniques across the end-to-end compression pipeline. After that, we demonstrate the success of the proposed pruning technique with benign training. Finally we present integration of pruning technique with quantization, multi-step pruning, and structured pruning.

### C.1 Sparsity hurts more with robust training.


We first study the impact of sparsity in the presence of benign training and adversarial training. Fig. 7 shows these results, where we train multiple networks from scratch with different sparsity ratio and report the fractional decrease in performance compared to the non-sparse network trained from scratch. For each training objective (adversarial training or benign training) and sparsity ratio, we train an individual VGG4 network. These results show that robustness decreases at a faster rate compared to clean accuracy with increasing sparsity. Consider robust training against a stronger adversary ( $\epsilon=8$ ), where at 75% sparsity ratio, the *era* reduced to a fraction of 0.74 of the non-sparse network. The fractional decrease in test accuracy for a similar setup is only 0.92. Even

defending against a weaker adversary ( $\epsilon=2$ ), robust accuracy is hard to achieve in the presence of sparsity. The fractional decrease in *era* is .79 against this weaker adversary at 75% sparsity level. With the increasing size of the baseline network, such as VGG16, WideResNet-28-4 size, the rate of degradation of robustness with sparsity decreases but it still decays faster than the test accuracy.

This observation is closely related to the previously reported relationship between adversarial training and the size of neural networks [30, 44]. In particular, Madry et al. [30] demonstrated that increasing the width of the network improves robust accuracy to a large extent. We complement these observations by highlighting that further reducing the number of parameters (before training) reduces the robustness at a much higher rate.



**Figure 7:** Compression hurts more in presence of adversarial training. We plot the fraction decrease in accuracy (+) for networks trained with benign training and robustness for different networks trained with adversarial training against varying adversarial strength.



**Figure 8:** Comparison of LWM and proposed pruning technique across varying adversarial perturbation budget ( $\epsilon$ ) in adversarial training for VGG16 network on CIFAR-10 dataset.

## C.2 Combining network pruning with robust training

We can further integrate the network pruning pipeline with robust training by updating the loss objective. For example, to achieve an empirically robust network, we can pretrain and fine-tuning a network with adversarial training (selecting  $L_{pt} = L_f = L_{adv}$ ). Similarly, for other robust training mechanisms, we can use their respective loss functions. Next, we discuss the limited performance of least weight magnitude (LWM) based pruning.

**Limitation of least weight magnitude based heuristic.** Though pruning with least weight magnitude based heuristic brings some gains in improving the robust accuracy of the network, there still exists a large room for improvement. For example, at a 99% pruning ratio for a VGG16 network, it still incurs a decrease in *era* by 17.6 percentage points compared to the non-pruned i.e., pre-trained network. We also observe a non-linear drop in performance with increasing adversarial strength in adversarial training. Consider Fig. 8, where we report the performance of the pre-trained networks along with the compressed network (at 99% pruning ratio) from the pruning pipeline for different adversarial perturbation budgets in adversarial training. Against a weaker adversary, where the pre-trained network is highly robust, weight-based pruning heuristic struggles to achieve high robustness after compression. At smaller perturbation budgets, this gap increases further with the increase in adversarial strength.

## C.3 Why focus on pruning and fine-tuning based compression pipeline

We focus on pruning and fine-tuning approach because it achieves the best results among all three pruning strategies namely pruning before training, run-time pruning, and pruning after training i.e., pruning and fine-tuning. This is because the other approaches are constrained and tend to do pruning in a less flexible manner or with incomplete information. On the other hand, despite the simplicity, pruning and fine-tuning based on least weight magnitude [19] can itself achieve highly competitive results [29]. With similar motivation, we integrate this approach with robust training and select it as the baseline. This simplicity also allows us to integrate different training objectives, such as adversarial training and verifiable robust training.

## C.4 Increase in generalization with pruning

For verifiable training with CROWN-IBP, we observe improvement in generalization across all experiments ranging from 0.9-1.5 percentage points. Note that both proposed and baseline techniques can improve the generalization. This further highlights how network pruning itself can be used to improve the generalization of




verified training approaches. Table 9 summarizes these results for proposed pruning methods where we observe improvement in robust accuracy after pruning at multiple pruning ratios.

### C.5 Additional comparisons across end-to-end pruning pipeline

In figure 9, we present additional comparisons of LWM and proposed pruning approach across the end-to-end compression pipeline. Though both approaches use the identical pre-trained network, the proposed approach searches for a better pruning architecture in the pruning steps itself. Fine-tuning further improves the performance of these networks. For the WRN-28-4 network on the SVHN dataset, we also observe that the fine-tuning step decreases the performance to some extent for the proposed approach. We hypothesize that this behavior could be due to an imbalance in the learning rate at the end of the pruning step and the start of the fine-tuning step. With further-hyperparameter tuning, our approach can achieve higher gains for this network. However, for an impartial comparison with baseline, we avoid excessive tuning of hyperparameters for the proposed approach and use a single set of hyperparameters across all networks. The results are reported on a randomly partitioned validation of the CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset at a 99% pruning ratio.

**Table 9:** Verified robust accuracy with CROWN-IBP with the proposed pruning methods for CNN-large network and CIFAR-10 dataset.

Pruning ratio	0	10	30	50	70	80	90
<i>vra-t</i>	45.5	46.1	46.0	45.9	45.9	46.0	46.1



**Figure 9:** Comparison of proposed pruning approach with least weight magnitude (LWM) based pruning at 99% pruning ratio for robust training with iterative adversarial training.

### C.6 Performance with benign training

In this work, we have largely focused on demonstrating the success of the proposed pruning approach with multiple robust training objectives. However, it is natural to ask whether the proposed approach also has the same advantage with benign training i.e., in the absence of an adversary. We compare the performance of LWM and our approach for VGG16 and WRN-28-4 across CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset in Table 10. Similar to robust training, our approach is also successful with benign training where it outperforms LWM based pruning in all experiments. In particular, even at a 99% pruning ratio, the proposed approach can maintain the accuracy within 1.2 percentage points for the SVHN dataset.

**Table 10:** Performance of LWM and proposed pruning technique for benign training.

Architecture		VGG16			WRN-28-4		
Pruning ratio		0%	95%	99%	0%	95%	99%
CIFAR-10	LWM	95.1±0.1	93.2±0.1	86.1±0.1	95.8±0.2	94.9±0.2	89.2±0.2
	HYDRA		<b>94.6±0.1</b>	<b>90.4±0.2</b>		<b>95.5±0.2</b>	<b>91.2±0.2</b>
SVHN	LWM	95.9±0.1	95.5±0.1	93.6±0.1	96.4±0.1	96.1±0.1	93.9±0.1
	HYDRA		<b>95.6±0.2</b>	<b>95.2±0.1</b>		<b>96.3±0.1</b>	<b>95.2±0.2</b>

### C.7 Further compression after integration with quantization

We also observe that our pruned networks can be easily quantized up to 8-bits (additional  $4\times$  compression) without leading to significant degradation of accuracy or robustness. We report these results in Table 11 for the VGG-16 network with CIFAR-10 dataset and 99% pruning ratio. It shows that the accuracy of even 99% pruned networks doesn't degrade beyond 0.4 percentage points up to 8-bits. We observe similar accuracy as original networks for up to 12-bits quantization. Note that the non-pruned network also incurs similar degradation in performance. Since the quantized networks have discontinuous gradients, thus not amenable to PGD attacks, we use transferability and black-box based attacks to measure robustness. For transfer-based attacks, we transfer adversarial examples from the original 32-bit width network. For a black-box attack, we use the Square attack [1]. While both attacks are only surrogate of PGD attacks, they do show a similar trend for both non-pruned and pruned networks at lower bit-widths.

**Table 11:** Performance with up to 6-bit quantization for both non-pruned, i.e., pre-trained, and 99% pruned VGG-16 network using our technique on CIFAR-10 dataset.

Bits	Non-pruned			99% pruned		
	Benign accuracy	Robust accuracy		Benign accuracy	Robust accuracy	
		Transfer-based	Gradient-free		Transfer-based	Gradient-free
12	82.7	60.8	64.1	73.1	49.4	52.4
8	82.5	62.1	71.7	72.7	51.0	61.2
6	81.2	61.0	75.4	72.5	50.6	65.4

### C.8 Detailed results on multi-step pruning

We compare the performance of proposed technique (single-step) with multi-step pruning using LWM, and summarize the top-1 and top-5 *era* obtained by each pruning strategy in Table 12. Though multi-step pruning can increase the performance of LWM, our approach still outperforms it by a large extent. For example, at 95% pruning ratio, multi-step pruning increases the *era* by 0.3 percentage points but it is still 1.5 percentage points lower than our proposed approach. Note that the performance of our proposed techniques can also be further increased with a multi-step approach, which however will incur additional computational overhead.

### C.9 Structured pruning

We present our results with structured pruning, i.e., filter pruning, in Table 13 for a VGG-16 network with adversarially training on CIFAR-10 dataset. Our pruning approach outperforms Adv-LWM baseline for structured pruning too, where we achieve up to 1.1 and 3.3 percentage point increase in benign accuracy and *era* respectively.

**Table 12:** Comparisons of top-1,5 *era* obtained by single step LWM, multi-step LWM, and proposed approach on ImageNet dataset.

Pruning ratio		95%		99%	
		top-1	top-5	top-1	top-5
Adv-LWM	single step	19.6	43.3	9.8	24.4
Adv-LWM	multi-step	19.9	45.2	8.4	23.2
HYDRA	single-step	<b>21.4</b>	<b>46.6</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>31.2</b>


**Table 13:** Benign-accuracy/*era* for structured pruning on a VGG-16 networks and CIFAR-10 dataset.

Pruning ratio	0	50	90
Adv-LWM	0/0	51.8/34.7	17.9/16.4
HYDRA		52.9/38.0	18.3/16.7
$\Delta$		+1.1/+3.3	+0.4/+0.3


## D Visualization of pruned weights

Recall that for each of the learning objectives, the SGD in the pruning step starts from the same solution obtained from the least weight-magnitude based pruning due to our scaled-initialization. However, with each epoch, we observe that SGD pruned *certain* connections with large magnitude as opposed to connections with smaller magnitude. Fig. 10, 11 shows the results after 20 epochs where a significant number of connections with smaller magnitude are not pruned (in contrast to the LWM approach). Another intriguing observation is that even the SGD based solver finds connections with very small magnitudes unnecessary and prunes them away. This phenomenon is particularly visible for adversarial training and randomized smoothing where a significant number of connections with very small magnitude are also pruned away by the solver. This phenomenon also exists for MixTrain and CROWN-IBP but the fraction of such connections is very small and thus not clearly visible in the visualizations. One reason behind this could be that both of these learning objectives are biased towards learning connections with smaller magnitudes [14].


Fig. 10, 11 present the visualization for pruned connection for adversarial training and randomized smoothing for each layer in the VGG16 network for CIFAR-10 dataset. Fig. 12, 13 presents similar visualization for MixTrain and CROWN-IBP for CNN-large networks.




**Figure 10:** Histogram of weights pruned by the baseline and proposed technique for adversarial training.



**Figure 11:** Histogram of weights pruned by the baseline and proposed technique for randomized smoothing based training.



**Figure 12:** Histogram of weights pruned by the baseline and proposed technique for MixTrain.



**Figure 13:** Histogram of weights pruned by the baseline and proposed technique for CROWN-IBP.