Where to Now?

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December 12, 2006



The Past

19 Years Ago, This Weekend The IBM Christmas Card "Virus"

The Internet Worm What Have We Learned? What Would Have Stopped Those? Human Nature Security Standards

These Weren't New

The Present

The Future

The Past



19 Years Ago, This Weekend

The Past	
19 Years Ago, This	X
Weekend The IBM Christmas Card "Virus"	X X
The Internet Worm	X X X
What Have We Learned? What Would Have	XXXX
Stopped Those?	XXXXX
Human Nature	
Security Standards	X X X X X X X
These Weren't New	XXXXXXXXX
The Present	Х
The Future	
	X

A very happy Christmas and my best wishes for the next year. Let this run and enjoy yourself. Browsing this file is no fun at all. Just type Christmas.

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The IBM Christmas Card "Virus"

The Past 19 Years Ago, This Weekend The IBM Christmas Card "Virus"

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The Present

The Future

A simple executable script When invoked, it displayed an animated Christmas tree It also scanned the user's alias file for the

addresses of contacts, and sent out a copy of itself to each one

Sound familiar?



The Internet Worm

The Past 19 Years Ago, This Weekend The IBM Christmas Card "Virus"

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11 months later, it happened again
A worm was unleashed that spread by many
different mechanisms, including
password-guessing and buggy software
Multi-protocol, multi-platform — took out *lots*of machines



What Have We Learned?

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What Would Have Stopped Those?

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Human Nature

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There are no patches available for *H. sapiens* 1.0



Human Nature

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The release date for 2.0 has not been announced



Human Nature

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There are no betas in sight



The Past Me 19 Years Ago, This Weekend The IBM Christmas Card "Virus" The Internet Worm What Have We Learned? What Would Have Stopped Those? Human Nature Security Standards These Weren't New The Present The Future

"I just reread the Orange Book; nothing in it would have prevented the worm.



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The Future

"I just reread the Orange Book; nothing in it would have prevented the worm. "No, that's not so; a B2 system would have stopped it."



The Past Me 19 Years Ago, This Weekend The IBM Christmas Card "Virus" The Internet Worm **Him** What Have We Learned? What Would Have Stopped Those? Me Human Nature Security Standards These Weren't New The Present

The Future

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The Future

"I just reread the Orange Book; nothing in it would have prevented the worm. "No, that's not so; a B2 system would have stopped it."

"How so?"

"B2 requires a thorough search for bugs."



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These Weren't New

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My friends and I discussed "rabbit jobs" circa 1972, and we knew we weren't inventing them I saw my first fake login prompt (not "login screen"!) in 1969

Hoare warned about buffer overflows as a security problem in his 1980 Turing Award lecture



The Past

The Present

Progress? Systems Are Somewhat Better Fudd's First Law of Opposition

The Future

The Present



Progress?

The Past

The Present

Progress?

Systems Are Somewhat Better Fudd's First Law of Opposition

The Future

- We still see phishing, come-and-get-it attacks, and pump-and-dump spam
- We still see buffer overflows
- The only reason we don't see more "bring down the Net" worms is because they're bad for (evil) business
- Have we made progress?



Systems Are Somewhat Better



The Present Progress? Systems Are Somewhat Better Fudd's First Law of Opposition The Future

I'm no longer surprised to see a computer that's been up for a year or more We no longer reboot our computers daily because they really need it; even ordinary desktops can (usually) survive overnight But it doesn't seem to take much of a push to knock things over



Fudd's First Law of Opposition

The Past

The Present Progress? Systems Are Somewhat Better Fudd's First Law of Opposition

The Future

"Push something hard enough and it will fall over."

Firesign Theater, 1971



The Past

The Present

The Future

Where Now? High-Quality Software How is it Done? The Human Element Words of Wisdom Architecture Caveats

The Future



Where Now?

<u>The Past</u> The Present

The Future

Where Now? High-Quality Software

Software

How is it Done?

The Human Element

Words of Wisdom


Architecture

Caveats

We're not going to fix human nature We're not going to abolish buggy software Is there a solution?



Where Now?



Caveats

We're not going to fix human nature We're not going to abolish buggy software Is there a solution?

Not a perfect one, but we can (probably) achieve "good enough"



High-Quality Software

The Past

The Present

- The Future Where Now? High-Quality Software
- How is it Done? The Human Element Words of Wisdom Architecture Caveats

- We've been able to produce high-quality software when people cared enough (and paid enough)
- Yes, there have been plenty of problems with phone switches, avionics, and the like, but on the whole such software has a much better track record
- What does it take?



How is it Done?



The Present

The Future

Where Now? High-Quality Software

How is it Done?

The Human Element Words of Wisdom Architecture Caveats Disciplined software engineering We must understand our goals ⇒That may be "keep flying" or "keep the switch up"

Understand that people are part of the system The software architecture must be aimed first at those goals



The Human Element

The Past

The Present

The Future

Where Now? High-Quality

Software

How is it Done?

The Human Element

Words of Wisdom Architecture Caveats

- Human beings are an essential part of our computer systems
- We must design our systems to be resilient in the face of human error
- We must also design them to minimize such errors



Words of Wisdom

The Past

The Present

The Future Where Now? High-Quality Software How is it Done? The Human Element Words of Wisdom Architecture Caveats "If we assume that the people who use technology are stupid ('Bubbas') then we will continue to design poorly conceived equipment, procedures, and software, thus leading to more and more accidents, all of which can be blamed upon the hapless users rather than the root cause – ill-conceived software, ill-conceived procedural requirements, ill-conceived business practices, and ill-conceived design in general."

Don Norman, Risks Digest 23.07, 2003



Architecture

The Past

The Present

The Future

Where Now? High-Quality

Software

How is it Done?

The Human Element

Words of Wisdom

Architecture

Caveats

- We are never going to have absolutely-correct programs
- We can design systems to protect what really counts
 - This requires a change in architecture
 - Coding practices, no matter how good, won't help



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The Present

The Future Where Now? High-Quality Software How is it Done? The Human Element Words of Wisdom Architecture

Caveats



The Past

The Present

The Future Where Now? High-Quality Software How is it Done? The Human Element Words of Wisdom Architecture Caveats "You can't make systems foolproof because fools are so smart"



The Past

The Present

The Future Where Now? High-Quality Software How is it Done? The Human Element

Words of Wisdom

Architecture

Caveats

"You can't make systems foolproof because fools are so smart"

You have to know what really counts



The Past The Present The Future Where Now? **High-Quality** Software

- How is it Done?
- The Human Element
- Words of Wisdom
- Architecture
- Caveats

- "You can't make systems foolproof because fools are so smart"
- You have to know what really counts You'll still get it wrong sometimes — but less often