Encrypted Key Exchange

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Analyzing Kerberos

- In 1990, Mike Merritt and I were analyzing Kerberos
- Kerberos is a cryptographic network authentication system: you type in your password and it lets you set up encrypted sessions to various servers
- We found a number of flaws, some significant. But we also wondered about the role of the password: was it a security risk?



Passwords are Guessable

- We knew from the literature and experience that many people pick bad passwords [Morris and Thompson, 1979]
- Experiments show that 10-35% of passwords are guessable, depending on the environment
- The bad guys could always try lots of login attempts, but that's detectable
- Is there another way to exploit password-guessing?



Let's Back Up

- What are the enemy's goals?
- What are the enemy's powers?
- What is a cryptosystem?



What is Encryption?

- Encryption is a mathematical function that takes *plaintext* and a *key* and and produces *ciphertext*
- Think of the old Caesar cipher, $A \rightarrow D$, $B \rightarrow E$, etc.
- The key is 3 we shift letters down by 3
- Mathematically, let $A = 0, B = 1, \ldots$
- We'll shift by any amount, not just 3

$$E(p,k) = (p+k) \mod 26$$



Looking at Modern Cryptosystems

- A cryptosystem is a pair of functions, *E* and *D*:
- Encryption takes plaintext and a key and produces ciphertext:

 $E: P \times K \to C$

• Decryption maps ciphertext and the key to plaintext:

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 $D:C\times K\to P$

• For most modern cryptosystems, the labels of E and D are arbitrary:

$$\forall p, k : D(E(p,k),k) = p \forall p, k : E(D(p,k),k) = p$$

- The output of a good encryption algorithm looks very random.
- Decrypting ciphertext with the wrong key produces random garbage

The Enemy

- The enemy knows everything about how your system works, but doesn't know your passwords
- The enemy has complete control of the network
- You hand your packets to the enemy for delivery
- The enemy can inspect, modify, delete, or repeat any or all packets
- The enemy wants to get your password; with that, not only can all conversations, past and present be read, the enemy can impersonate you



What the Enemy Actually Sees

• At some point, you send or receive a message encrypted using your password as a key:

 $E(M, \mathsf{PW})$

- Can the enemy attack this?
- Passwords are guessable let's guess at keys



Guessing at Keys

Suppose you see the message **uryyb jbeyq**, encrypted with a Caesar cipher. What's the key?

Key	Plaintext
Key 1	tqxxa iadxp
Key 2	spwwz hzcwo
Key 3	rovvy gybvn
Key 11	jgnnq yqtnf
Key 12	ifmmp xpsme
Key 13	hello world
Key 14	gdkkn vnqkc
Key 15	fcjjm umpjb

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You Don't Need to Know the Language!

Suppose the ciphertext is jwvrwcz tm uwvlm.

Key	Plaintext
Key 5 Key 6 Key 7 Key 8 Key 9	erqmrxu oh prqgh dqplqwt ng oqpfg cpokpvs mf npoef bonjour le monde anmintq kd Inmcd
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Verifiable Plaintext

- Most real plaintext is easily recognizable
- (Some Unix systems have a command caesar that will automatically try to find the key to Caesar ciphers)
- This is called *verifiable plaintext*
- If a message has verifiable plaintext, an attacker can validate guesses at passwords
- We need a way to encrypt messages, using a password as a key, that does not have any verifiable plaintext



Another Detour into Math

- Given b^x , can we find x?
- Sure that's $\log_b x$
- But what if we have $b^x \mod p$?
- That's called the *discrete log* problem, and there are no efficient solutions for large enough (about 1024 bits) moduli



Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange


- Suppose that *A* and *B* conventionally, Alice and Bob want to send encrypted messages to each other. They need a key.
- They agree on a base *b* and a modulus *p*

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- Alice picks a random number x and sends Bob $b^x \bmod p$
- Similarly, Bob picks a random number y and sends Alice $b^y \mod p$
- Alice knows x and $b^y \mod p$, and can calculate $(b^y)^x \mod p \equiv b^{xy} \mod p$
- Similarly, Bob can calculate $(b^x)^y \mod p \equiv b^{xy} \mod p$
- An eavesdropper only knows $b^x \mod p$ and $b^y \mod p$, and can't calculate the shared secret!

What Do These Exponentials Look Like?

- Let's look at the powers of 3 mod 11
- 3, 9, 5, 4, 1, 3, 9, 5, 4, 1
- That misses a lot of choices
- But what of the powers of 2 mod 11?
- 2, 4, 8, 5, 10, 9, 7, 3, 6, 1
- That got them all
- If we pick the right base, its exponentials are all the non-zero numbers less than 11
- More generally, if p and q are prime and p = 2q + 1, half of the integers less than p are generators of the group Zp





We Have our Pieces

- If we pick b and p properly, Diffie-Hellman exponentials are uniformly distributed in the range [1, p 1]
- Let's encrypt the exponential with the password:

 $E(b^x \mod p, \mathsf{PW})$

- Suppose the attacker guesses at PW
- An incorrect guess yields a uniformly distributed random number
- A correct guess yields a Diffie-Hellman exponential and that's uniformly distributed, too!
- There is no verifiable plaintext; the attacker gains no information



The Final Result

- Alice and Bob each pick random numbers, and calculate Diffie-Hellman exponentials
- They encrypt these exponentials with the shared password and exchange them:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} E(b^x \bmod p, \mathsf{PW}) & \to \\ & \leftarrow & E(b^y \bmod p, \mathsf{PW}) \end{array}$$

- They each know the password, so they can decrypt the exponentials and carry out the Diffie-Hellman calculation
- The result can be used to encrypt the rest of the traffic

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• An attacker learns nothing, no matter how guessable the password

What Happened Next

- Mike Merritt and I came up with some more schemes, and published a paper
- All of the variants *except* this one and it was the original have been cracked. This one is still believed to be secure.
- This paper found the sub-branch of cryptography known as SPAKA Strong Password Agreement and Key Agreement protocols
- There are now many more ways to solve this problem; some have been formally proven to be secure



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