The Human Immune System and Network Intrusion Detection

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ABSTRACT: This paper reviews and assesses the analogy between the human immune system and network intrusion detection systems. The promising results from a growing number of proposed computer immune models for intrusion detection motivate this work. The paper begins by briefly introducing existing intrusion detection systems (IDS's). A set of general requirements for network-based IDS's and the design goals to satisfy these requirements are identified by a careful examination of the literature. An overview of the human immune system is presented and its salient features that can contribute to the design of competent network-based IDS's are analysed. The analysis shows that the coordinated actions of several sophisticated mechanisms of the human immune system satisfy all the identified design goals. Consequently, the paper concludes that the design of a novel network-based IDS based on the human immune system is promising for future network-based IDS's.

Keywords: computer immune systems, human immune systems, network intrusion detection.

1. INTRODUCTION

An intrusion detection system (IDS) is an automated system for the detection of computer system intrusions. The main goal of an IDS is to detect unauthorised use, misuse and abuse of computer systems by both system insiders and external intruders. In parallel to rigorous investigation into intrusion prevention such as firewall and cryptography, the significance of research into IDS has been growing and various approaches have been suggested and developed [1], [7]. As one novel approach, a few computer scientists have proposed simple computer immune models for intrusion and computer virus detection [4], [5], [6], [9]. The promising initial results from these models motivate computer scientists to understand human immune systems more fully.

This paper aims to unravel the significant features of the human immune system, which would be successfully employed for a novel network intrusion detection model. Several salient features of the human immune system, which detects intruding pathogens, are carefully studied and the possibility and the advantages of adopting these features for network intrusion detection are reviewed and assessed.

This paper is structured as follows: the following section briefly describes existing IDS's. Section 3 outlines the requirements of network-based IDS's. Section 4 introduces three network-based IDS design goals to satisfy these requirements. Then, in section 5, an overview of the human immune system is presented. Section 6 analyses the significant features of human immune systems and compares these with the design goals of network-based IDS's. Finally, this paper presents the conclusion drawn from this work and future work.

2. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS

Early IDS's operated at the *host level*, whereas contemporary systems tend to be *network-based* [7]. *Host-based* IDS's monitor a single host machine using the audit trails of a host operating system and *network-based* IDS's monitor any number of hosts on a network by scrutinising the audit trails of multiple hosts and network traffic.

Both host-based IDS's and network-based IDS's mainly employ two techniques: *anomaly detection* and *misuse detection* [7]. The anomaly detection approach establishes the profiles of normal activities of users, systems, system resources, network traffic and/or services and detects intrusions by identifying significant deviations from the normal behaviour patterns observed from profiles. The misuse detection approach defines suspicious misuse signatures based on known system vulnerabilities and a security policy. This approach probes whether these misuse signatures are

present or not in the auditing trails. These two techniques have different strengths and weaknesses and should be reciprocal in a complete IDS [7].

This paper focuses on presenting the analogy between human immune systems and network-based IDS's. Somayaji *et al*. [9] present more general principles and suggest various possibilities for a computer immune system. In contrast, this paper concentrates on the design of competent *network-based IDS's*, and analyses the several outstanding features of the human immune system with this specific problem in mind.

3. REQUIREMENTS OF NETWORK-BASED IDS'S

Before presenting the human immune system features, it is necessary to comprehend which functions are required to design a competent network-based IDS's. A careful examination of the literature allows the significant functions to be distilled into seven points:

Robustness: it should *have multiple detection points, which are robust enough against the attack and any system faults on IDS's* [1], [4]. The critical weak point of an IDS is its failure and subversion by intruders. If intruders already know the existence of an IDS and can subvert it, then the effort to develop the IDS was futile.

Configurability: it should be able to *configure itself easily to the local requirements of each host or each network component* [1], [9]. Individual hosts in a network environment are heterogeneous. They may have different security requirements. In addition to hosts, different network components such as routers, filters, DNS, firewalls, or various network services may have various security requirements

Extendibility: it should be *easy to extend the scope of IDS monitoring by and for new hosts easily and simply regardless of operating systems* [1], [9]. When a new host is added to an existing network environment and especially when this new host runs a different operating system that has a different format of audit data, it is not simple to monitor it in a consistent manner with existing IDS's.

Scalability: it is necessary to *achieve reliable scalability to gather and analyse the high-volume of audit data correctly from distributed hosts* [1]. In the case of the monolithic IDS's, the audit trail collection procedure is distributed and its analysis is centralised [7]. However, it is very difficult to forward all audit data to a single IDS for analysis without losing the data. Even if it scales for all audit data correctly, it may cause severe network performance degradation.

Adaptability: it should be *dynamically adjusted in order to detect dynamically changing network intrusions* [1], [9]. Computer system environments are not static. Users, vendors and system administrators are constantly changing them. Therefore, the normal activities of networks and intrusions are also continuously changing according to this environment.

Global Analysis: in order to detect network intrusions, it should *collectively monitor multiple events generated on various hosts to integrate sufficient evidence and to identify the correlation between multiple events* [1], [7]. Many network intrusions often exploit the multiple points of a network. Thus, from a single host, they might appear to be just a normal mistake. But if they are collectively monitored from multiple points, they clearly can be identified as a single attack attempt.

Efficiency: it should be *simple and lightweight enough to impose a low overhead on the monitored host systems and network* [1], [5], [9]. A single IDS is expected to perform monitoring, data gathering, data manipulation and decision making. It may impose a large overhead on a system and could place a particularly heavy burden on CPU and I/O, resulting in severe system and network performance degradation.

Even though various approaches have been developed and proposed until now [1], [7], no existing network-based model satisfies these requirements completely.

4. THE DESIGN GOALS OF NETWORK-BASED IDS'S

Upon analysis, the requirements identified above can be used to derive three main design goals of an effective network-based IDS. They are being distributed, self-organising and lightweight.

4.1 DISTRIBUTED

The first design goal is being distributed. A distributed network-based IDS delegates its responsibilities to a number of distributed components. A number of independent intrusion detection processes monitor only a small aspect of the

overall system. They operate concurrently and co-operate with each other. If a network-based IDS is distributed, it will satisfy the following requirements.

Robustness: for a distributed network-based IDS, the failure of one local intrusion detection process does not cripple an overall IDS even though it causes the minimal degradation of overall detection accuracy.
Configurability: a single intrusion detection process can be simply tailored to local requirements of a specific host without considering the various requirements of other hosts.
Extendibility: even when a new host running a different operating system is added to a network, it is easy to add a new intrusion detection processes on this new host. This is because intrusion detection processes are independent and thus existing processes do not need to be modified when a new intrusion detection process is added.
Scalability: because audit data collection and its analysis take place in the same place, at a monitored local host, the high volume of audit data is distributed amongst many local hosts. Hence, distributed IDS's are more scalable than IDS's based on a single central server.

4.2 SELF-ORGANISATION

The second goal is being self-organising. Without a central controller having predefined information, a self-organising network-based IDS automatically learns intrusion signatures which are previously unknown and/or distributed. This is achieved through the interaction with changing network environments, various security requirements and other intrusion detection processes. If a network-based IDS is self-organising, it will satisfy the following requirements.

Adaptability: it is highly adaptive because there is no need for manual update of its intrusion signatures as network environments change.
Global analysis: the overall intrusion detection system simply provides the global analysis. This is because it is self-organising from the interactions among a large number of various intrusion detection processes.

4.3 LIGHTWEIGHT

The third design goal is being lightweight. A lightweight network-based IDS does not impose a large overhead on a system or place a heavy burden on CPU and I/O. If a network-based IDS is lightweight, it will satisfy the last requirement.

Efficiency: by placing minimal work on each component of the IDS, the main jobs that should be performed by local hosts and networks are not adversely affected by the monitoring.

5. OVERVIEW OF HUMAN IMMUNE SYSTEMS

Before we can identify which features of human immune systems may prove useful in the design of an effective network-based IDS, it is necessary to investigate the major mechanisms of the human immune system. An overview is presented in this section (largely based on [8], [10]). The overall human immune system is implemented through the interactions between a large number of different types of innate and acquired cells rather than the function of one particular human organism. From a large number of different cells, lymphopcytes (white blood cells), play a central role. Their main mechanism is distinguishing self cells, which are the cells of human body, from non-self cells, which are dangerous foreign cells. Each lymphocyte is specialised in reacting to a limited number of structurally related harmful foreign cells, known as antigens. Lymphocytes have the specific binding areas, called receptors, which have complementary shapes to the determinants of antigens, called epitopes. A specific antigen is recognised by its epitopes binding to lymphocyte antibody receptors.

Lymphocytes are classified into two main types: B-cells and T-cells. B-cells are antibody secreting cells and T-cells kill antigens or help or suppress the development of B-cells. Both B-cells and T-cells have their own unique genetic structures. Both B-cells and T-cells are expressed by several chains of DNA (*gene libraries*) and each chain has a variable domain and a constant domain. The genes in a variable domain are highly variable from one to another and this determines the specific binding area to antigens. The genes in the constant domain are invariable and show various biological effects when B-cell antibody receptors bind to antigen epitopes. B-cells and T-cells are developed in the bone marrow and the thymus respectively. At the bone marrow and the thymus, several gene libraries uniquely corresponding to domains of B-cells and T-cells contain the candidate genes to express B-cell and T-cell receptors. A specific receptor is generated by selecting gene segments randomly from gene libraries and joining them. Furthermore, in order to generate diverse receptors, they adopt a progressive series of genetic operators during their development processes.

These include gene rearrangements, choosing different joining sites, somatic mutation, class switching and others (the details of these genetic operators are presented in [10]).

Figure 1 Development of B-cells and T-cells (left). Clonal selection (right).

Before leaving the bone marrow and the thymus, maturing B-cells and T-cells have to pass the last test, negative selection. In B-cell and T-cell development process, totally new cell receptors can be generated via various genetic operators. Therefore, it leaves the possibility for randomly generated receptors to bind to self cell epitopes. To prevent this, when maturing B-cells and T-cells bind to self cells circulating through the bone marrow and the thymus, they are killed instead of being released into a body. Figure. 1 (left) shows the development of B-cells and T-cells in the bone marrow and the thymus.

Mature B-cells and T-cells that pass the negative selection are released from the bone marrow and thymus. Both B-cells and T-cells continuously circulate around the body in the blood and encounter antigens for activation and evolution. The antibodies of B-cells, which recognise harmful antigens by binding to them, are activated directly or indirectly. When B-cell antibody receptors bind to antigen epitopes with strong affinity above a threshold, they are directly activated. On the other hand, B-cell antibody receptors can bind to antigen epitopes with weak affinity below a threshold. In this case, B-cells need the help of T-cells and Major-Histocompatibility Complex (MHC) molecules to be activated. MHC molecules have two important functions to help B-cell activation. Firstly, they bind to the fragments of antigens specially hidden inside cells, (not visible on the cell surface) and secondly, they transport these fragments to the B-cell surface. When B-cell antibody receptors bind to antigen epitopes with weak affinity, MHC molecules try to find some hidden antigen inside cells. When MHC molecules find them, they transport them on the surface of B-cells. The receptors of T-cells are genetically structured to recognise the MHC molecule on the B-cell surface. Thus, T-cells can bind to MHC molecules on B-cell surfaces. When the T-cell binds to MHC molecule with strong affinity, it sends a chemical signal to the B-cell which allows it to activate, grow and differentiate. What does make the T-cells determine the B-cell activation? One major difference between B-cells and T-cells is that only B-cells perform somatic mutation, which is a very high rate of mutation, to increase its diversity when they are developed in the bone marrow. Hence, B-cells have more various and new receptors that T-cells. In addition, the thymus is centrally located while the bone marrow is distributed. Thus, most of self cells pass through the thymus and hence the negative selection in the thymus is more reliable than that in the bone marrow. Therefore, the final decision of B-cell activation with weak affinity is made by the T-cells.

With or without the assistance of T-cells, B-cells are activated and this activation is immediately followed by clonal selection. The activated B-cells are divided into a number of clones that have the same antigen-binding properties as parent B-cells or mutated antigen-binding properties. On the other hand, if any antigen cannot activate B-cells within a limited time, they rapidly die off. Therefore, based on the existing antigens, only the fittest B-cell antibodies survive. Because antigens constantly change, the efficiency of detection is maintained by the evolution of B-cell antibodies via clonal selection. Furthermore, when antigens activate B-cells, they produce memory cells for the reoccurrence of same antigens in the future. Because of these memory cells, antigens that have been identified previously are detected much quicker (known as the secondary response). Figure 1 (right) shows the generation of memory cells via clonal selection.

In contrast, idiotype antibodies, which are anti-antibodies, can activate antibody receptors. Immune systems let antigens and anti-antibodies compete to bind to antibodies and the winning anti-antibodies can suppress binding between antigen and antibody. The inhibition of idiotype antibody against antigen contributes to regulate an appropriate level of immune responses. Immunologist, Jern, proposed immune network theory [2], [3] based on understanding the role of the idiotype antibody. He views immune systems as a functional network of lymphocytes and the network at any moment

has the dynamic state of internal interactions of antibodies and antigens. The continuous chain of differentiation by antigens and suppression by idiotype antibodies can form a large-scaled network. When this network finally reaches the equilibrium status between suppression and stimulation, it determines the overall immune system.

6. HUMAN IMMUNE SYSTEM FEATURES FOR NETWORK-BASED IDS'S

By performing a careful analysis of the complex capabilities of human immune systems summarised above, it is possible to identify several significant features for network-based intrusion detection. Upon investigation, it becomes clear that specific features can act together in order to satisfy each of the three design goals of competent network-based IDS's: being distributed, self-organising and lightweight.

6.1 DISTRIBUTED

The human immune system is distributed. The following mechanisms allow the human immune system to detect antigens in a truly distributed way.

Immune Network: the human immune system is implemented through the interactions between a large number of different types of cells. Instead of employing a central co-ordinator, human immune systems sustain the appropriate level of immune responses by maintaining the equilibrium status between antibody suppression and activation using idiotype antibodies [2], [3].

Unique Antibody Sets: the human immune system generates various groups of antibodies to detect different antigens. Its evolution mechanism through natural selection of gene libraries and clonal selection maintains a number of different sets of antibodies. Therefore, each antibody set is unique and independent. These properties do not require any central co-ordinator and they allow the human immune system to detect antigens in a local antibody level [9].

6.2 SELF-ORGANISATION

The overall immune response is composed of three evolutionary stages: gene library evolution generating effective antibody, negative selection eliminating inappropriate antibodies and clonal selection cloning well-performing antibodies. These three stages are self-organising rather than being directed by a central organ or predefined information.

Gene Library Evolution: antibodies recognise antigens by the complementary properties that only antigens, not self-cells, show. Thus, some knowledge of antigen properties is required to generate competent antibodies. The human immune system learns this knowledge by its evolution over time and hence provides us with efficient and 'knowledge-rich' DNA. Because of this evolutionary self-organisation process, our gene libraries act as archives of information on how to detect commonly observed antigens [10].

Negative Selection: as the second stage, this eliminates inappropriate and immature antibodies, which bind to self. The important constraint that the immune system has to satisfy is not to attack self cells. Instead of having any global information about self cells, this constraint satisfaction is performed in the thymus and bone marrow by presenting self cells, and removing any antibodies which attack these cells [4], [8].

Clonal Selection: as the third stage, this process clones antibodies performing well. In contrast, antibodies performing badly die off after a given life time. Thus, according to currently existing antigens, only the fittest antibodies survive. Similarly, instead of having the predefined information about specific antigens, it self-organises the fittest antibodies by interacting with the currently existing antigens [8], [10].

6.2 LIGHTWEIGHT

The human immune system is lightweight. The following mechanisms allow it to be lightweight and are focused on three ideas: i) how a vast number of antigens can be detected with a smaller number or antibodies, ii) how the known antigen information can be reused efficiently and iii) how numerous antibodies can be generated with a limited number of genes. Approximate binding, memory cells and gene expression provide the answers to these questions respectively.

Approximate Binding: The immune response activates when the affinity of antibody and antigen binding is above a certain threshold. In other words, a single antibody can detect any number of antigens as long as their affinity is above the threshold. This approximate binding contributes to increase the generality of immune systems [4].

Memory Cells: memory cells store the genetic information of previously detected antigen epitopes and respond efficiently and quickly when they meet the same antigens in the future [9], [10]. Because memory cells have a longer life span than ordinary antibodies, they retain immunity without the need to create the same antibodies again.

Gene Expression: the immune system maintains antibody diversity in order to ensure the effective detection of a wide range of antigens. In an antibody development process, known as gene expression, several genetic mechanisms are employed to generate diverse antibodies from the gene libraries. The main idea of these mechanisms is that a vast number of new antibodies can be generated from new combinations of gene segments in the gene libraries [8], [10].

In summary, this analysis shows that the human immune system is distributed through its immune network and unique antibody sets. It is self-organising because of the three evolutionary processes of gene library evolution, negative selection and clonal selection. It is lightweight because of the generality of approximate binding and gene expression, and the efficiency of memory cells.

Since the human immune system is distributed, self-organising and lightweight, it clearly fulfils the design goals for network-based intrusion detection systems. Perhaps most importantly, the mechanisms used by human immune systems satisfy the three goals in an elegant and highly optimised way and this motivates future research harnessing such processes. Because of this study, it is thought that the application of computer immune systems to network-based intrusion detection is likely to provide significant benefits over other approaches.

7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This paper has investigated network-based IDS's and provided a set of general requirements for them by a careful examination of the literature. Based on these requirements, three principal design goals were identified. After sketching the simplified human immune system, their salient features that can contribute to build a competent network-based intrusion detection system were analysed. This analysis show that the human immune system is equipped with a number of sophisticated mechanisms, which satisfy the three identified design goals. Consequently, the design of a novel network-based IDS based on the human immune system is promising for future network-based IDS's.

Current work involves the creation of a more specific artificial immune model, which actually monitors a real network. In particular, the work is focussing on the design of some of the subtle mechanisms identified in section 6 which satisfy the network-based IDS design goals under a real network environment.

8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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