

Secure Overlay Network Design*

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Abstract

Due to the increasing security threats on the Internet, new overlay network architectures have been proposed to secure privileged services. In these architectures, the application servers are protected by a defense perimeter where only traffic from entities called servlets are allowed to pass. End users must be authorized and can only communicate with entities called access points (APs). APs relay authorized users' requests to servlets, which in turn pass them to the servers. The identity of APs are publicly known while the servlets are typically secret. All communications are done through the public Internet. Thus all the entities involved form an overlay network. The main component of this distributed system consists of n APs and m servlets. A design for a network is a bipartite graph with APs on one side, and the servlets on the other side. If an AP is compromised by an attacker (or fails), all the servlets that are connected to it are subject to attack. An AP is *blocked*, if all servlets connected to it are subject to attack. We consider two models for the failures: In the *stochastic model*, we assume that each AP i fails with a given probability p_i . In the *adversarial model*, we assume that there is an adversary that knows the topology of the network and chooses at most k APs to compromise. In both models, our objective is to design the connections between APs and servlets to minimize the (expected/worst-case) number of blocked APs. In this paper, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem in the stochastic model when the number of servlets is a constant. We also show that if the probability of failure of each AP is at least $1/2$, then in the optimal design each AP is connected to only one servlet (we call such designs *star-shaped*), and give a polynomial-time algorithm to find the best star-shaped design. We observe that this statement is not true if the failure probabilities are small. In the adversarial model, we show that the problem is related to a problem in combinatorial set theory, and use this connection to give bounds on the maximum number of APs that a perfectly failure-resistant design with a given number of servlets can support. Our results provide the *first* rigorous theoretical foundation for practical secure overlay network design.

Keywords: network design, network security, optimization, combinatorics.

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1 Introduction

Providing secure and highly available services using the shared Internet infrastructure is a challenging task due to security threats on the Internet. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are a major threat to Internet security. Attacks against high-profile web sites such as Yahoo, CNN, Amazon and E*Trade in early 2000 [7] rendered the services of these web sites unavailable for hours or even days. During the hour long attack against root Domain Name Servers (DNS) in Oct, 2002, only four or five of the 13 servers were able to withstand the attack and remain available to legitimate Internet traffic throughout the strike [14]. Internet service would have started degrading if the attack had been sustained long enough for the information contained in the secondary DNS caches to start expiring—a process that usually takes from a few hours to about two days. A recent attack on June 15, 2004 against Akamai’s DNS servers caused several major customers of Akamai’s DNS hosting services, including Microsoft Corp., Yahoo Inc., and Google Inc. to suffer brief but severe slowdown in their web performance [24]. The event was marked by going a step beyond “simple bandwidth attacks” on individual web sites to more sophisticated targeting of core upstream Internet routers, DNS servers and bandwidth bottlenecks.

To defend against DDoS attacks, one can trace the attack sources and punish the perpetrators [3, 5, 20, 22, 4, 21, 8, 1, 11]. Due to the large number of compromised hosts (known as Zombies) used in the attack, finding the attack origin can be very difficult. Techniques to prevent DDoS attacks and/or to mitigate the effect of such attacks while they are raging on have been proposed [13, 6, 17, 9, 15, 16]. These mechanisms alone do not prevent DDoS attacks from disrupting Internet services as they are reactive in nature. Recent research efforts [9, 2] have focused on designing overlay network architectures where certain critical elements are hidden from the attackers. The key entities in these architectures are access points (APs), servlets and end application servers. The end application servers are protected by a defense perimeter. Routers at the boundary are installed with filters which only allow traffic from the servlets in. The servlets are hidden from the attackers. Only a subset of access points are allowed to access each servlet. User requests must be authorized by access points and the requests are tunneled to their corresponding servlets via access points. The servlets then communicate with the end application servers. The access points can be geographically well placed to service the end users. The number of access points is assumed to be much larger than the number of secret servlets. All communications go through the public Internet. Thus all the entities involved form an overlay network. Figure 1 illustrates the elements of this attack-resilient network architecture. For further details, please refer to [2].

The ability of such distributed systems to service their users is characterized by how many access points can still communicate to the end application servers, should an attack happens. This depends on how the access points are connected to the servlets. Intuitively, if a vulnerable access point connects to all the servlets, once it is compromised, all the servlets will be subject to DDoS attacks. In the worst case, this in turn denies all other access points from accessing the servlets. The network must be designed to resist such attacks. However, how the network should be designed has not been rigorously analyzed. In this paper, we formalize the problem as a combinatorial




Figure 1: Elements of the attack-resilient network architecture [2]

optimization problem with the objective to maximize the number of surviving access points. We first define our problem setting.

Definition 1. *A design for a network with n APs and m servlets is a bipartite graph with APs on one side, and the servlets on the other side. If an AP fails (or is compromised), it attacks all the servlets that are connected to it and we say that these servlets are attacked. If all servlets connected to an AP are attacked, we say that the AP is blocked. By definition, we say any compromised AP is blocked.*

We are interested in designing secure networks in which the number of blocked APs is minimized. We consider two models of failures:

- In the *stochastic model*, we assume that each AP i fails with a given probability p_i . Our objective is to design the connections between APs and servlets to minimize the expected number of blocked APs¹.
- In the *adversarial model*, we assume that there is an adversary that knowing the topology of the network, chooses at most a given number k of APs to compromise. Our objective is to design the connections between APs and servlets to minimize the worst-case number of blocked APs.

Note that our model imposes no restriction on the connections between servlets and the APs. In particular, if an AP has a very high failure probability, in the optimal design it may not be assigned to any servlets.

This paper presents the *first* theoretical study of secure overlay network design. Our results provide guidelines for practical design of such networks.

¹See [2] for a detailed justification of this model.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the problem in the stochastic model. We first prove a lemma on the structure of the optimal design. This lemma restricts the number of possible solutions and gives a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem where the number of servlets is constant. It also implies a polynomial-time algorithm for the case that each AP can be connected to at most one servlet. We prove that if all failure probabilities are large enough (namely, greater than $\frac{1}{2}$), then the optimal design is of this form, and therefore can be found in polynomial time. We give an example that shows that if failure probabilities are small, then the optimal design is not necessarily star shaped, and in fact, the best star-shaped design can be worse than the optimal design by an arbitrary factor. Finally, in Section 2.1, we show hardness results for computing the expected number of blocked APs for a given network. In Section 3, we study the adversarial model. We establish a connection between the secure network design problem and a problem in combinatorial set theory, and use this to give the optimal design for the case of one failed AP. For constant number of failed APs, we use the probabilistic method to bound the maximum number of APs that we can support using a fixed number of servlets without blocking any other APs. We conclude in Section 4 with several open questions.

2 The Stochastic Model

In this section, we study the stochastic model. We give polynomial-time algorithms for this problem in two cases: when the number of servlets is a constant, and when the probability of failure of each AP is at least $1/2$. We also demonstrate the difficulty of the problem in Section 2.1 by showing that even when a design is given, computing the probability that a given AP will be blocked or the expected number of APs that will be blocked is $\#P$ -complete.

Our algorithms are based on the following lemma about the structure of the optimal design.

Lemma 1. *Assume that APs are ordered in decreasing order of their failure probabilities, i.e., $p_1 \geq p_2 \geq \dots \geq p_n$. For an AP i , let S_i be the set of servlets connected to i . There exists an optimal design in which for all $i < j < k$, if $S_i = S_k$, then $S_j = S_i$.*

Proof. Assume that there is no optimal design with the desired property. Let S_1, \dots, S_n be an optimal solution in which for some $i < j < k$, $S_i = S_k$ but $S_j \neq S_i$. Note that $S_i = S_k$ implies that if either i or k fails, then both i and k are blocked. In particular, the expected number of blocked APs given that i fails is equal to the expected number of blocked APs given that k fails and is equal to the expected number of blocked APs given that both i and k fail. Let B_{11} be the expected number of blocked APs given that j fails and at least one of i and k fail. Let B_{10} be the expected number of blocked APs given that at least one of i and k fail and j does not fail. Similarly, let B_{01} be the expected number of blocked APs given that j fails but neither i nor k fails and B_{00} be the expected number of blocked APs given that none of i and k and j fails. From this definitions, it is straightforward to see that $B_{11} \geq B_{01}$. The expected number \mathcal{P}^* of blocked APs in an optimal design can be expressed as follows.

$$\mathcal{P}^* = \mathbf{E}[\#\text{blocked APs}]$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= p_j(p_i + p_k - p_i p_k)B_{11} + (1 - p_j)(p_i + p_k - p_i p_k)B_{10} \\
&\quad + (1 - p_i)p_j(1 - p_k)B_{01} + (1 - p_i)(1 - p_j)(1 - p_k)B_{00}
\end{aligned}$$

Now we prove that the set of servlets of j can be exchanged with the set of servlets of either i or k without increasing the expected number of blocked APs. For contradiction, assume that both these exchanges increase the expected number of blocked APs. The expected number of blocked APs after exchanging i and j can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{P}_1 &= \mathbf{E}[\#\text{blocked APs}] \\
&= p_i(p_j + p_k - p_j p_k)B_{11} + (1 - p_i)(p_j + p_k - p_j p_k)B_{10} \\
&\quad + (1 - p_j)p_i(1 - p_k)B_{01} + (1 - p_j)(1 - p_i)(1 - p_k)B_{00}
\end{aligned}$$

Similarly, the expected number of blocked APs after exchanging j and k is

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{P}_2 &= \mathbf{E}[\#\text{blocked APs}] \\
&= p_k(p_i + p_j - p_i p_j)B_{11} + (1 - p_k)(p_i + p_j - p_i p_j)B_{10} \\
&\quad + (1 - p_i)p_k(1 - p_j)B_{01} + (1 - p_i)(1 - p_k)(1 - p_j)B_{00}
\end{aligned}$$

By our assumption, we have $\mathcal{P}^* < \mathcal{P}_1$ and $\mathcal{P}^* < \mathcal{P}_2$. The former inequality implies

$$p_j p_k B_{11} + p_i B_{10} + p_j(1 - p_k)B_{01} < p_i p_k B_{11} + p_j B_{10} + p_i(1 - p_k)B_{01}$$

Thus,

$$(p_i - p_j)(p_k B_{11} - B_{10} - (1 - p_k)B_{01}) > 0$$

Since $p_i \geq p_j$, we have

$$p_k B_{11} - B_{10} - (1 - p_k)B_{01} > 0 \tag{1}$$

Similarly, $\mathcal{P}^* < \mathcal{P}_2$ implies

$$p_i B_{11} - B_{10} - (1 - p_i)B_{01} < 0 \tag{2}$$

By subtracting (1) from (2), we get $(p_i - p_k)B_{11} < (p_i - p_k)B_{01}$, and hence $B_{11} < B_{01}$. However, this is impossible by the definition of B_{11} and B_{01} . \square

Using Lemma 1, we can prove the following result.

Theorem 1. *There is a polynomial-time algorithm that constructs the optimal design in the stochastic model when the number of servlets is at most a constant.*

Proof. Assume that APs are ordered in the decreasing order of their failure probabilities, i.e., $p_1 \geq p_2 \geq \dots \geq p_n$. Let S_i denote the set of servlets connected to the AP i . From Lemma 1, we know that there are indices $1 = \alpha_0 < \alpha_1 < \alpha_2 < \dots < \alpha_s = n + 1$ such that for each $j \in [\alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$, $S_j = S_{\alpha_i}$, and the sets $S_{\alpha_0}, S_{\alpha_1}, \dots, S_{\alpha_{s-1}}$ are pairwise distinct. Since the total number of distinct sets of servlets is 2^m , there are at most $\binom{n+2^m}{2^m} (2^m)!$ ways to pick the indices $\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_s$ and the corresponding S_i 's. This number is bounded by a polynomial in n if m is a constant. Therefore, the algorithm can check all such configurations and choose the one that has the minimum number of blocked APs.

The only thing that remains is to show that for a given configuration, it is possible to compute the expected number of blocked APs in polynomial time when m is a constant². This expectation can be written as $\sum_T B_T \Pr[\text{set of attacked servlets is } T]$, where the summation is over all subsets of the set of servlets, and B_T denotes the number of blocked APs if T is precisely the set of servlets that are attacked. Note that B_T is a number and not a random variable (since to determine whether an AP is blocked or not it is enough to know the set of attacked servlets), and can be computed efficiently. Since there are polynomially many subsets T , it is enough to show that for a given subset T , the probability that the set of attacked servlets is T can be computed in polynomial time. This event, which we denote by E_T , is equivalent to the following: for every servlet $i \notin T$, all APs connected to i are not compromised, and for every $i \in T$, at least one AP connected to i is compromised. For every $i \in T$, let c_i denote the *first* AP (in the increasing order of indices) that is connected to i and is compromised. Therefore, the event E_T is equivalent to the event that for every $i \in T$, there is an AP c_i connected to servlet i such that:

none of the APs that are connected to at least one servlet $i \notin T$ is compromised, and for every $i \in T$, c_i is compromised, but none of the APs indexed less than c_i that are connected to i are compromised.

Now, note that for distinct choices of $(c_i)_{i \in T}$, the above events are disjoint. Thus, the probability of E_T is the sum, over the choice of $(c_i)_{i \in T}$, of the probability of the above event. It is easy to see that this probability can be written explicitly as a product of p_j 's and $(1 - p_j)$'s. This completes the proof of the theorem. \square

If we can connect each AP to at most one servlet, the resulting graph is a union of stars. We say that the design is *star-shaped* in this case. The following theorem proves that the optimal star-shaped design can be found in polynomial time.

Theorem 2. *The optimal star-shaped design can be computed in polynomial time.*

Proof. Let the failure probabilities of the APs be $p_1 \leq p_2 \leq \dots \leq p_n$. It is easy to see that the proof of Lemma 1 holds even if the design is restricted to a star-shaped design. This shows that in the optimal star-shaped design we should partition the APs $1, \dots, n$ into at most $m + 1$ consecutive parts each of which is connected to no servlet or to one of the servlets. This can be done by dynamic programming in polynomial time. Let $A[k, t]$ be the minimum (over the choice of the star-shaped design) of the expected number of blocked APs when the set of APs consists of $1, 2, \dots, k$ and there exists t servlets. Let $B(a, b)$ be the expected number of blocked APs among the APs $a, a + 1, \dots, b$, if they are all connected to the same servlet (and no other AP is connected to this servlet). Note that $B(a, b)$ can be easily computed in polynomial time for each a and b . It is not hard to see that $A[k, t] = \min \{ \min_{1 \leq l \leq k} \{ A[l, t - 1] + B(l + 1, k) \}, \min_{1 \leq l \leq k} \{ A[l, t] + k - l \} \}$ and $A[k, 0] = k$. Using this recurrence, the values of $A[k, t]$ can be computed in polynomial time³. The value of the best star-shaped design is given by $A[n, m]$. \square

²The result of Section 2.1 shows that without the assumption that m is a constant this problem cannot be solved in polynomial time.

³The algorithm can be made slightly more efficient by observing that the subset of APs that are connected to none of the servlets should be among the APs with larger failure probabilities.

It might appear that star-shaped designs are weaker than general designs. The following theorem shows that if all failure probabilities are at least $\frac{1}{2}$, there is an optimal design that is star-shaped.

Theorem 3. *If all failure probabilities are at least $\frac{1}{2}$ then there is a star-shaped optimal design and therefore an optimal design can be found in polynomial time.*

Proof. We start from an optimal design, \mathcal{D} , and prove that we can change this design to a star-shaped design without increasing the expected number of blocked APs.

First we prove that we can get rid of all the cycles in the optimal design \mathcal{D} . If there is a cycle in \mathcal{D} , then there is a chordless cycle C in \mathcal{D} as well. The length of cycle C is even and is at least 4. We consider two cases:

Case 1: $|C| \geq 6$. In this case, let cycle C be $s_1 c_1 s_2 c_2 \dots s_k c_k s_1$, where c_i 's are APs and s_i 's are servlets. We claim that removing one of the matchings $c_1 s_1, c_2 s_2, \dots, c_k s_k$ or $c_1 s_2, c_2 s_3, \dots, c_{k-1} s_k, c_k s_1$ will not increase the expected number of blocked APs. Let \mathcal{D}_1 be the design \mathcal{D} after removing the matching $c_1 s_1, c_2 s_2, \dots, c_k s_k$ and \mathcal{D}_2 be the design after removing the matching $c_1 s_2, c_2 s_3, \dots, c_{k-1} s_k, c_k s_1$. Removing a matching from C will not increase the blocking probability of any AP other than c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k . So it is enough to argue that the expected number of blocked APs in c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k decreases as we remove one of these two matchings. Let E_{c_i} for all $1 \leq i \leq k$ be the event that all of servlets that are connected to c_i and are not in the set $\{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k\}$ are attacked. Let E_{s_i} be the event that at least one of the APs that are connected to servlet s_i fails. The probability of E_{c_i} is denoted by P_{c_i} , and the probability of E_{c_i} and not E_{s_j} is denoted by $P_{c_i \bar{s}_j}$. Similarly, the probability of E_{c_i} and E_{s_j} and not E_{s_1} is denoted by $P_{c_i s_j \bar{s}_1}$, etc. Let $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{T}}(c_i)$ be the blocking probability of c_i in design \mathcal{T} . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}}(c_i) &= p_i + (1 - p_i) \left(P_{c_i} - P_{c_i \bar{s}_i} (1 - p_{i-1}) \right. \\ &\quad \left. - P_{c_i \bar{s}_{i+1}} (1 - p_{i+1}) + P_{c_i \bar{s}_i \bar{s}_{i+1}} (1 - p_{i-1}) (1 - p_{i+1}) \right). \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}_1}(c_i) = p_i + (1 - p_i) P_{c_i s_i}$ and $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}_2}(c_i) = p_i + (1 - p_i) P_{c_i s_{i+1}}$.

In order to prove that the expected number of blocked APs is not more in one of the designs \mathcal{D}_1 and \mathcal{D}_2 , it is enough to prove that $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}}(c_i) \geq \frac{1}{2}(\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}_1}(c_i) + \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}_2}(c_i))$. In order to prove this, it is enough to show the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P} &:= P_{c_i} - P_{c_i \bar{s}_i} (1 - p_{i-1}) - P_{c_i \bar{s}_{i+1}} (1 - p_{i+1}) + P_{c_i \bar{s}_i \bar{s}_{i+1}} (1 - p_{i-1}) (1 - p_{i+1}) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} (P_{c_i s_i} + P_{c_i s_{i+1}}) \end{aligned}$$

Using $P_{c_i} = P_{c_i s_i} + P_{c_i \bar{s}_i} = P_{c_i s_{i+1}} + P_{c_i \bar{s}_{i+1}}$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P} &\geq \frac{1}{2} (P_{c_i s_i} + P_{c_i \bar{s}_i} + P_{c_i s_{i+1}} + P_{c_i \bar{s}_{i+1}}) - P_{c_i \bar{s}_i} (1 - p_{i-1}) - P_{c_i \bar{s}_{i+1}} (1 - p_{i+1}) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} (P_{c_i s_i} + P_{c_i s_{i+1}}) \end{aligned}$$

where we use the fact that $p_{i-1} \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $p_{i+1} \geq \frac{1}{2}$.

Case 2: $|C| = 4$. Let cycle C be $c_1s_1c_2s_2c_1$. The analysis of this case is very similar to the that of $|C| > 4$. We use the same notation as in the previous case. Again we prove that removing one the matchings c_1s_1, c_1s_2 or c_1s_2, c_2s_1 will not increase the expected number of blocked APs. Let \mathcal{D} , \mathcal{D}_1 and \mathcal{D}_2 be an optimal design, and this design after removing matchings c_1s_1, c_1s_2 and c_1s_2, c_2s_1 , respectively.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}}(c_i) &= p_i + (1 - p_i)(P_{c_i} - (1 - p_{i+1})(P_{c_i\bar{s}_1} + P_{c_i\bar{s}_2} - P_{c_i\bar{s}_1\bar{s}_2})) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2}(p_i + (1 - p_i)P_{c_1s_1} + p_i + (1 - p_i)P_{c_1s_2}) \\
&\quad + (1 - p_i)(p_{i+1} - \frac{1}{2})(P_{c_i\bar{s}_1} + P_{c_i\bar{s}_2}) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2}(\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}_1}(c_i) + \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}_2}(c_i)) + (1 - p_i)(p_{i+1} - \frac{1}{2})(P_{c_i\bar{s}_1} + P_{c_i\bar{s}_2}) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2}(\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}_1}(c_i) + \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}_2}(c_i))
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, in at least one of the designs \mathcal{D}_1 and \mathcal{D}_2 , the expected number of blocked APs is less than or equal to the expected number of blocked APs in \mathcal{D} .

After getting rid of all cycles, \mathcal{D} is a tree. Next, we show that it is possible to change this tree to a star-shaped design without increasing the expected number of blocked APs. Again, we consider two cases:

Case 1: There is a leaf s in tree \mathcal{D} that is a servlet.

In this case, let c be the AP connected to servlet s . Removing all edges of c to servlets other than s will decrease the expected number of blocked APs among APs other than c . Furthermore, the blocking probability of c will not increase, since c has a private servlet s .

Case 2: All leaves of \mathcal{D} are APs.

Consider a connected component of \mathcal{D} which is not a star. Now consider a leaf AP c in this component. AP c is connected to servlet s . Servlet s must have a neighboring AP c' which is connected to at least one other servlet s' , for otherwise the component would be a star. We claim that removing the edge $c's'$ decreases the expected number of blocked APs. Let \mathcal{D}' be the tree after removing $c's'$.

The blocking probability of all APs except c' decrease in \mathcal{D}' . In the following, we prove that removing $c's'$ also decreases the sum of blocking probabilities of the APs c and c' . Let $P_{c'}$ be the probability that all servlets connected to c' , except possibly s , are attacked. Let P_s be the probability that one AP other than c' and c in the neighborhood of s fails. As before, let $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}}(c)$ be the blocking probability of AP c in the design \mathcal{D} . Using the fact that \mathcal{D} is a tree, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}}(c) &= p_c + (1 - p_c)(p_{c'} + P_s - p_{c'}P_s) \\
\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}}(c') &= p_{c'} + (1 - p_{c'})P_{c'}(p_c + P_s - p_cP_s) \\
\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}'}(c) &= p_c + (1 - p_c)P_s \\
\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}'}(c') &= p_{c'} + (1 - p_{c'})P_{c'}.
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}}(c) + \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}}(c') = p_c + (1 - p_c)(p_{c'} + P_s - p_{c'}P_s) + p_{c'}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& + (1 - p_{c'})P_{c'}(p_c + P_s - p_cP_s) \\
= & \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}'}(c) + \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}'}(c') + (p_{c'} - (1 - p_{c'})P_{c'})(1 - p_c)(1 - P_s) \\
\geq & \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}'}(c) + \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{D}'}(c'),
\end{aligned}$$

where in the last inequality we use the fact that $p_{c'} \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $P_{c'} \leq 1$, and hence $p_{c'} - (1 - p_{c'})P_{c'} \geq 0$. This completes the proof of this case.

Using the above operations, we can change the tree-shaped design \mathcal{D} to a star-shaped design without increasing the expected number of blocked APs. Hence, we can change any optimal design to an optimal tree-shaped design and then to an optimal star-shaped design. \square

Another case for which we can show that there is an optimal star-shaped design is when the number of servlets is two.

Theorem 4. *If the number of servlets is two, then there is an optimal design that is star-shaped.*

Proof. For simplicity, we prove the theorem assuming all APs have the same failure probability p . The proof in the general case is similar. Let $q = 1 - p$. Let A_{00}, A_{10}, A_{01} , and A_{11} be the set of APs connected to none of the servlets, to servlet 1, to servlet 2, and to both servlets in an optimal solution. Let $n_{uv} = |A_{uv}|$ for $0 \leq u, v \leq 1$. Let P_1 be the probability that servlet 1 is attacked. For $i \in A_{10}$, $\mathbf{Pr}[i \text{ is blocked}] = P_1 = 1 - q^{n_{10} + n_{11}}$. Similarly, for $i \in A_{01}$, $P_2 := \mathbf{Pr}[i \text{ is blocked}] = 1 - q^{n_{01} + n_{11}}$, and for $i \in A_{11}$, $P_3 := \mathbf{Pr}[i \text{ is blocked}] = 1 - q^{n_{01} + n_{11}} - q^{n_{10} + n_{11}} + q^{n_{01} + n_{10} + n_{11}}$. The expected number of blocked APs is equal to $\mathcal{P}^* = n_{10}P_1 + n_{01}P_2 + n_{11}P_3$. Without loss of generality, assume that $n_{01} \geq n_{10}$. We prove that moving one of the APs from A_{11} to A_{10} decreases the expected number of blocked APs. Before moving this AP from A_{11} to A_{10} ,

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{P}^* & = n_{01} + n_{10} + n_{11} - (n_{10} + n_{11})q^{n_{10} + n_{11}} \\
& \quad - (n_{01} + n_{11})q^{n_{01} + n_{11}} + n_{11}q^{n_{01} + n_{10} + n_{11}}
\end{aligned}$$

After this movement, the expected number of blocked APs is

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{P} & = n_{01} + n_{10} + n_{11} - (n_{10} + n_{11})q^{n_{10} + n_{11}} \\
& \quad - (n_{01} + n_{11} - 1)q^{n_{01} + n_{11} - 1} + (n_{11} - 1)q^{n_{01} + n_{10} + n_{11}}
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{P}^* - \mathcal{P} & = q^{n_{01} + n_{11} - 1}[(n_{01} + n_{11})(1 - q) - 1 + q^{n_{10} + 1}] \\
& = q^{n_{01} + n_{11} - 1}[(n_{01} + n_{11})p - 1 + (1 - p)^{n_{10} + 1}] \\
& \geq q^{n_{01} + n_{11} - 1}(n_{01} + n_{11} - n_{10} - 1)p \\
& \geq 0,
\end{aligned}$$

where the last two inequalities are from $(1 - p)^{n_{10} + 1} - 1 \geq -p(n_{10} + 1)$ and $n_{01} + n_{11} \geq n_{10} + 1$. Therefore, we can move all APs from A_{11} to either A_{10} or A_{01} without increasing the expected number of blocked APs. Thus, there is a star-shaped optimal solution. \square

The above proof was based on a local operation that removes one of the edges attached to an AP of degree more than one. However, this local operation can increase the expected number of blocked APs when the number of servlets is more than two. For example, consider a cycle of size six with three APs and three servlets. It is not hard to show that removing any of the edges of this design will increase the expected number of blocked APs. In the following theorem, we show that without an assumption on the failure probabilities or the number of servlets, the optimal design need not be star shaped.

Theorem 5. *There is an instance of the secure network design problem in which the expected number of blocked APs in the optimal design is smaller than that of the optimal star-shaped design by an arbitrary factor.*

Proof. Choose a sufficiently large number m , and let $n = \binom{m}{m/2}$ and $p = 1/n^2$. We first analyze the expected number of blocked APs in the best star-shaped design with these parameters. Let n_i denote the number of APs connected to the i th servlet in such a design, and n_0 denote the number of APs not connected at all. The expected number of blocked APs can be expressed as

$$n_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m n_i (1 - (1-p)^{n_i}) \geq \sum_{i=0}^m n_i (1 - (1-p)^{n_i}).$$

There is at least one i , $0 \leq i \leq m$, with $n_i \geq n/(m+1)$. Thus, the above expression is at least

$$\frac{n}{m+1} \left(1 - (1-p)^{n/(m+1)}\right) \geq \frac{n}{m+1} \left(\frac{pn}{m+1} - \frac{p^2 n^2}{(m+1)^2}\right) \geq \frac{pn^2}{2(m+1)^2},$$

where the first inequality follows from $(1-p)^s \leq 1 - ps + p^2 s^2$.

Now, we propose a different design and analyze the expected number of blocked APs in such a design. For each of the $n = \binom{m}{m/2}$ APs, we pick a distinct subset of $m/2$ servlets, and connect the AP to the servlets in this set. This design guarantees that if only one AP is attacked, then no other AP will be blocked. We use this to bound the expected number of blocked APs. By the union bound, the probability that more than one AP is attacked can be bounded by $n^2 p^2$. In this case, we bound the number of blocked APs by n . Similarly, with probability at most np , exactly one AP is attacked, and in this case only one AP (the one that is attacked) is blocked. Thus, the expected number of blocked APs is at most $n^2 p^2 \times n + np \times 1 = 2/n$.

Therefore, the ratio of the expected number of blocked APs in the latter design to the one in the best star-shaped design is at most $4(m+1)^2/n$, which tends to zero as m tends to infinity. \square

2.1 Hardness of computing number of blocked APs

In this section, we show that given a design, it is hard to compute the probability that a given AP is blocked, and the expected number of APs that will be blocked. Note that while this result is an evidence that the secure network design problem is

difficult, it does not prove the hardness of finding the optimal network. In particular, as we observed in Theorems 2 and 3, for the case of failure probabilities $p = 1/2$ used in the following hardness result, the optimal design can be efficiently computed. The complexity of computing the optimal design for general failure probabilities is still open.

Theorem 6. *The following two problems are #P-hard:*

- *Given a design and assuming uniform failure probabilities of $p = 1/2$, compute the probability that a given AP i will be blocked.*
- *Given a design and assuming uniform failure probabilities of $p = 1/2$, compute the expected number of APs that will be blocked.*

Proof. First, we observe that the first problem can be reduced to the second by adding a “private servlet” for each AP except the AP i . It is easy to see that in this instance, the expected number of blocked APs is precisely equal to $(n - 1)/2$ (where n is the number of APs) plus the probability that the AP i is blocked in the original instance.

Now, it is enough to give a reduction from a known #P-hard problem to the first problem. For this purpose, we use the problem of computing the number of solutions of a set-cover instance. The problem is as follows: given a collection A_1, A_2, \dots, A_p of subsets of a finite universe \mathcal{U} , find the number of subsets of \mathcal{U} that have a nonempty intersection with every A_i . Provan and Ball [18] proved that this problem is #P-complete. Given an instance of this problem, we construct an instance of our problem as follows: The set of APs is $\mathcal{U} \cup \{0\}$, where 0 is a special AP (not in \mathcal{U}) whose probability of blocking we want to estimate. Corresponding to every set A_j , we add a servlet that is connected to all APs in the set A_j . In addition, we connect the AP 0 to all servlets. This completes the definition of the instance.

By our construction, the AP 0 is blocked if and only if either this AP is compromised, or the set of compromised APs form a solution of the set cover instance. Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[0 \text{ is blocked}] &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[0 \text{ is blocked} | 0 \text{ is not compromised}] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \times 2^{-|\mathcal{U}|} \times (\# \text{ of solutions of the set cover instance}) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, given the probability that 0 is blocked, one can easily compute the number of solutions of the set cover instance. \square

3 The Adversarial Model

In this section, we study a model where an adversary selects at most a given number k of APs to compromise, and the objective is to minimize the number of blocked APs in the worst case. We observe that the adversarial model is closely related to the following problem in extremal combinatorics.

Definition 2. Let $\mathcal{A} = (A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n)$ be a family of subsets of the universe $U = \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$. We call the family \mathcal{A} k -union free if for any $A_{i_0}, \dots, A_{i_k} \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $i_j \neq i_t$ for $j \neq t$, we have $A_{i_0} \not\subseteq \cup_{1 \leq j \leq k} A_{i_j}$. In particular, a family \mathcal{A} is 1-union free if none of the elements of \mathcal{A} is a subset of another. Let $\mathcal{L}_k(m)$ be the maximum number of subsets in a k -union free family of subsets of the universe $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$.

For 1-union free families, there is a classical result, known as Sperner's theorem (see, for example, [23]) which proves that the maximum cardinality of a collection of subsets of a universe of size m , none of which containing another, is $\binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor}$. In other words, $\mathcal{L}_1(m) = \binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor}$.

We call a design *perfect* for k failures, if no matter which k APs fail, no other AP is blocked. It is not difficult to see that there exists a perfect design for k failures with m servlets and n APs if and only if $n \leq \mathcal{L}_k(m)$. The following theorem gives lower and upper bounds on the value of $\mathcal{L}_k(m)$. The lower bound in this theorem is proved by Kleitman and Spencer [10] for a more general problem. We include the proof here for the sake of completeness. We also give an upper bound based on Sperner's theorem. Sperner's theorem gives a tight bound on the maximum number of subsets in a 1-union free family of subsets. See also Ruszinkó [19] for an upper bound for a related problem.

Theorem 7. For every k and m ,

$$\left(1 - \frac{k^k}{(k+1)^{k+1}}\right)^{-m/(k+1)} \leq \mathcal{L}_k(m) \leq k \left(1 + \left(\frac{m}{2}\right)^{\frac{1}{k}}\right) = O(k2^{m/k}m^{-1/(2k)}).$$

Proof. We start by proving the upper bound. Let $\mathcal{A} = (A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n)$ be a k -union-free family of subsets of $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$. Consider unions of k distinct sets from \mathcal{A} . We claim that no two such unions, say $A_{i_1} \cup \dots \cup A_{i_k}$ and $A_{j_1} \cup \dots \cup A_{j_k}$, are equal unless $\{i_1, \dots, i_k\} = \{j_1, \dots, j_k\}$. The reason for this is that if two such unions are equal and there is an index i_l not contained in $\{j_1, \dots, j_k\}$, then we have $A_{i_l} \subseteq A_{j_1} \cup \dots \cup A_{j_k}$, contradicting the assumption that \mathcal{A} is k -union-free. Therefore, the collection of sets that are obtained by taking the union of k distinct sets in \mathcal{A} contains exactly $\binom{n}{k}$ distinct sets. Furthermore, similar reasoning shows that no set in this collection is contained in another. Therefore, by Sperner's theorem, this collection can contain at most $\binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor}$ sets. Thus,

$$\binom{n}{k} \leq \binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor} \Rightarrow n \leq k \left(1 + \left(\frac{m}{2}\right)^{\frac{1}{k}}\right) = O(k2^{m/k}m^{-1/(2k)}),$$

completing the proof of the upper bound.

To prove the lower bound, we use the probabilistic method to construct a k -union-free collection of sets of the required size. Fix $p = \frac{1}{k+1}$, and pick each of the n sets in the collection by picking each element in $\{1, \dots, m\}$ independently with probability p . Therefore, for a given set of indices i_0, i_1, \dots, i_k , the probability that $A_{i_0} \subseteq A_{i_1} \cup \dots \cup A_{i_k}$ is precisely $(1 - p(1-p)^k)^m = \left(1 - \frac{k^k}{(k+1)^{k+1}}\right)^m$. Therefore, by the union bound, the probability that the collection is not k -union-free is less than $n^{k+1} \left(1 - \frac{k^k}{(k+1)^{k+1}}\right)^m$.

Hence, if we pick $n \leq (1 - \frac{k^k}{(k+1)^{k+1}})^{-m/(k+1)}$, there is a nonzero probability that the resulting collection is k -union-free. This completes the proof of the lower bound. \square

Note that the above theorem suggests a randomized algorithm for our network design problem: put each edge in the graph with probability $\frac{1}{k+1}$. We can bound the expected number of blocked APs resulting from this randomized algorithm using techniques similar to the ones used in the above proof. For small values of k , this algorithm works exponentially better than the optimal star-shaped design.

The only case where we know the exact value of $\mathcal{L}_k(m)$ is when $k = 1$. In this case, we can prove the following stronger theorem.

Theorem 8. *If $k = 1$, then there is a design in which the maximum number of APs an adversary can block is at most $\lceil n / \binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor} \rceil$. Conversely, for every design for such a network, there is a strategy for the adversary to block at least $\lceil n / \binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor} \rceil$ APs.*

Proof. We construct a design by connecting each of the n APs to a subset of size $\lfloor m/2 \rfloor$ of the set of servlets in such a way that for each of the $\binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor}$ such subsets, at most $\lceil n / \binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor} \rceil$ APs are connected to the subset. It is easy to see that no matter which AP an adversary compromises, the only blocked APs are the ones that are connected to exactly the same set of servlets, and therefore the number of blocked APs is at most $\lceil n / \binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor} \rceil$.

To prove the other direction, we use the fact that the collection of all subsets of a set of size m can be partitioned into $\binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor}$ chains (see [23] for a proof). Therefore, in every design there are at least $\lceil n / \binom{m}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor} \rceil$ APs that are connected to sets of servlets belonging to the same chain. Hence, if the adversary compromises the AP connected to the subset at the top of this chain, all other APs connected to the subsets in this chain will be blocked. \square

4 Conclusion

In this paper, we presented the first theoretical study of the secure network design problem. We showed that in the stochastic model, when failure probabilities are large (greater than $\frac{1}{2}$), there is an optimal star-shaped design, and such a design can be computed in polynomial time. On the other hand, there are instances with small failure probabilities where the optimal star-shaped design is arbitrarily worse than the optimal design. The case of small failure probabilities seems to be related to the stronger model where an adversary is allowed to select at most k APs to compromise. We observed that in this model, a random design performs considerably better than the optimal star-shaped design.

We still do not know of any hardness result or a polynomial-time algorithm for the general case of the secure network design problem, although the connection between this problem and the problem of finding a tight bound on the size of the largest k -union-free family of sets (which is a long-standing open problem) suggests that computing

the exact optimum is difficult. Even an approximation algorithm for this problem, or tighter bounds for the k -union-free problem, would be interesting. The Lovasz Local Lemma gives us a small improvement in the lower bound, but more significant improvements seem to require new techniques. Furthermore, it would be interesting to prove Theorem 3 with a weaker assumption (e.g., that probabilities are greater than a small constant), or show that such a generalization is not true. Finally, it is interesting to investigate generalizations of the problem; for example, there may be constraints on how many servlets an AP can connect or an AP may be restricted to connect to a subnet of the servlets.

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