
Have I Met You Before? Using Cross-Media

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Outline

- I. Introduction
 - Results of our quick survey
 - Legitimate calls from those with weak social ties
 - Legitimate calls with no Caller IDs
- 2. Proposal: Labeling calls using cross-media relations
- 3. Conclusions


Survey of Incoming Calls



- Fewer unsolicited calls to cell phones
 - Effect of national regulations

Data: Calls to students in our lab in Feb. 2009 (246 calls to cell, 136 calls to landlines) IPTComm'09

Survey of Incoming Calls



Known caller IDs
 Unknown caller IDs from known persons
 No caller IDs from known persons
 Unsolicited calls


- 17-29 % could not be labeled legitimate before answering.
 - w/o caller IDs: international calls
 - w/unknown caller IDs:
 from persons/companies
 having prior contact via
 web or email

Cross-media relations

Data: Calls to students in our lab in Feb. 2009 (246 calls to cell, 136 calls IPTComm'09

Typical SPIT Filter

Receive a request for real-time communication (audio/video/text)



Black List and White List

- Black list: to reject requests
 - Block list
 - Known SPIT caller addresses at a reputation service
- White list: to accept requests
 - Buddy list

Limits to "strong ties"

- Addresses of outgoing requests in call history
- Directory service, e.g., LDAP server

Problem and Approaches

- Problem
 - How to label incoming requests
 - Legitimate calls from those with weak social ties
 - Legitimate calls with no Caller IDs
 - Approaches
 - Focus on prior contact when delivering callee's contact address through different media
 - Enhance white list beyond caller IDs

Cross-media relations

Anti-SPIT Work

- A collection of solutions is needed.
- I: Places burdens on callers
 - Do-Not-Call registry service
 - Turing tests to detect a prerecorded message


II: Labels incoming requests at callees or service providers

- Blacklists/Whitelists based on Caller ID: how to learn/ share/expand lists
- Suspicious traffic

|&||:

- Prior permissions from callee to caller in SIP
- Using HTTP responses to publish caller IDs for future calls

Proposal: Using Cross-media Relations



Proposal

Cross-Media Relations Offered by Callers

Callee

Potential caller

Web client

Web server e.g., https://book.airline.com

HTTP request

HTTP response

Correspondence-URI: sip:operator@book.airline.com, tel:18001234567

Potential caller

Callee

Email client

Email client

e.g., service@opentable.com

Message

Content-Type: text/directory; profile="vCard"

- Forms: Caller's contact addresses in plain text or hashed
 - Hashed are only for labeling.
 - Better for callers privacy to avoid publishing routable addresses
- Containers
 - An HTTP header in response
 - V-card in email message body

Proposal

Cross-Media Relations Offered by Callees

Callee

Potential caller

Web client

Web server e.g., https://ffp.airline.com/join

HTTP POST

phone1=sip:kumiko+coms4001@cs.
columbia.edu&phone2=tel:+12129
1770400012

HTTP response

Potential caller

Callee

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Email client

Email client


e.g., interviewer@hr.it.com

Message requesting real-time comm.

Message to accept Message-ID:<004301c9b17f257f6a 40707e3ec0@columbia.edu> Weak-secret as a proof of prior contact


• Subaddressing in callee's contact address in HTTP POST form

- A field in sign-up form in message body
- Similar to subaddressing in email addresses or extensions of phone numbers
- Message-IDs of outgoing emails



Proposed SPIT Filter

Receive a request of real-time communication (audio/video/text)



Conclusions

- Summary
 - Goal: Reduce false positive filtering by enabling callees to lable incoming requests from weak social ties
 - Approach: Use cross-media relations as a proof of prior contact
 - Caller ID in plain text or hashed format, customized callee's ID, and Message-ID
- Next Step
 - Evaluation of usability and effectiveness using prototype