COMS E6998-9: Software Security and Exploitation

Lecture 1: Introduction

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
Understanding the difference between "bugs" and "vulnerabilities"

Functional flaws are usually specification violations

...security bugs are different



Understanding security vulnerabilities*







^{*} Source: How to Break Software Security by J. Whittaker and H. Thompson. Addison Wesley, 2003.

Overall, this class is designed to help

Learn secure coding techniques to reduce the number of vulnerabilities




- •Input validation
- Authentication
- •Proper use of cryptography




you...

Reduce the severity of vulnerabilities that survive

Understand exploitation techniques and emerging low-level defensive techniques









Textbook

- No textbooks are required for this class.
- Midterm exam will be based on class materials and reading assignments (papers, etc.)
- Some books recommended are:








Assessment

■ Midterm (30%)
■ Homework (20%)
■ Project (50%)





Contact Info and Office Hours

- Regular office hours will be announced next class.
- You can also schedule a call/meeting through the week by email and feel free to email anytime.
- Course webpage:
 - http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~hthompson
- Email address:
 - hthompson@cs.columbia.edu



Project

- Your project is worth half of your grade.
- It will focus on one of the topics we cover in class or something related.
- Think about the topics over the next two weeks.
- A project proposal that describes your project, lists your team members etc. will be due by email on February 23rd.



Potential Project Topics

- Reverse engineering
- Fuzzing
- Privacy
- Exploitation methodologies
- Secure software development models
- Social networks and their relationship to software security
- Web security vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques
- Many more!



The Shifting IT Environment

(...or why security is becoming one of the most important issues in software development)



Shift: Technology


- Software communications is fundamentally changing – many transaction occur over the web:
 - Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), AJAX, ...
- Network defenses are covering a shrinking portion of the attack surface
- Legacy code is being exposed widely with web front ends
- The security model has changed from good people vs. bad people to enabling partial trust
 - There are more "levels" of access: Extranets, partner access, customer access, identity management, ...





Shift: Attackers


- Attackers are becoming organized and profitdriven
- An entire underground economy has been created:
 - Meeting place for buyers and sellers (chat rooms, auction sites, etc.)
 - What they are trading: vulnerabilities, botnet time, credit card numbers, PII, ...
 - New ways to exchange of "value" anonymously and in non-sovereign currency


























Shift: Compliance and Consequences

- The business has to adhere to regulations, guidelines, standards,...
 - SAS 112 has upped the ante on financial audits (and supporting IT systems) for not-for-profit organizations (such as Columbia) in the same way that SOX has for publicly traded companies
 - PCI DSS requirements on companies that process payment cards
 - HIPAA, GLBA, BASEL II, ..., many more
- Audits are changing the economics of risk and create an "impending event"

Hackers may attack you but auditors will show up

- Disclosure laws mean that the consequences of failure have increased
 - Waves of disclosure legislation



Shift: Consumer expectations

- Software consumers, especially businesses, are starting to use security as a discriminator
- In many ways security has become a non-negotiable expectation of business software
- Banks, photocopiers, pens, etc. are being sold based on security...
- Security starting to be woven into service level agreements (SLAs)



The Result: Software Security is Becoming a Very Serious Issue

- Most "network" vulnerabilities come from software vulnerabilities:
 - Vulnerable software running on a system connected to the network is usually to blame
 - Software can be created in a way that makes it "easy" to use or configure insecurely
 - Over 70% of attacks are now at the Application Layer, not at the system or network layer (source: Gartner)



Security in the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC)



What we know so far...

- Security must be integrated throughout the SDLC to be effective
- Everybody in the SDLC has security responsibility
- Security isn't a natural outcome of good traditional software quality practices; it take focused effort
- Vulnerabilities are much more expensive to fix the later they are discovered in the SDLC



Overview

Requirements

 gathering customer/operations security requirements and needs, gather regulatory and safety requirements, and threat/risk modeling

Design

 security design principles, security design reviews, abuse cases, and threat modeling

Development

 secure coding guidelines, tools, scans, and audits

Test

 negative testing, thinking like the bad guy, 3rd party audits

Deployment

 secure deployment guidelines, secure update mechanisms (patching) and response



Requirements

- Threat Modeling*
 - The process of transforming "bad things" that could happen into tangible security requirements
- Gather Customer/Operations Requirements
 - Legal requirements: SOX, SAS 112, GLBA, HIPAA, SB 1386,
 Regulation E, and many more
 - Safety requirements, contractual requirements, customer needs
 - Establish negative requirements: "The system should not..."



Design

- It's about designing security features correctly and designing functional features securely
- Defining a security design baseline (secure design patterns)
 - Principle of least privilege, defense in depth, compartmentalization, ...
 (more about these later in the course)
- Develop abuse cases that specifically address what the attacker can or would do
- Review design based on threat models, principles and requirements



Development

- Training: probably the most effective defense against coding vulnerabilities is to understand how software can be abuse (this course will be a huge step forward there)
- Secure code reviews, secure coding baseline, software security policies
- Tools: source code scanning, ...



Testing

- Security testing is about thinking like the attacker;
 understanding abuse as well as use.
- Activities
 - Security testing techniques 19 "attacks" (to be discussed later)
 - Fuzz-testing
 - Training
 - Using tools to catch low-hanging fruit



Deployment

- Document "security assumptions" about the product to pass to operations
- Develop a secure deployment guide
- Produce/deploy updates in a way that meets customer requirements. Things to consider:
 - Cost of deployment
 - Timeliness
 - Level of compatibility testing
 - Determining authenticity of patches



Thinking Like an Attacker

(...and defending against them)



Rethinking Software Security

- Software security is about minimizing business risks that come from software:
 - Ensuring the presence of security functionality (make sure security-related code is correct)
 - Ensuring that functional code behaves securely (absence of software security defects)
 - Thinking like the bad guy and considering business risks (compliance, attacker economics)



Abuse vs. Use

Use

We usually think of development in terms of use and *use cases*.

Thinking: What is the most likely path a user will take to perform a task.

Abuse

For security, we need to think more broadly and develop *abuse* cases for features.

Thinking: What could a motivated person do to leverage this feature to do something we never intended them to do.



Threat modeling: STRIDE*

Spoofing

• Lying about identity

Tampering with data

• Manipulating, corrupting or destroying data

Repudiation

Lying about whether or not an action was performed

Information disclosure

Exposing sensitive information

Denial of service

• Preventing users from doing something they are entitled to do

Elevation of privilege

Obtaining rights that were never granted



^{*}Source: Writing Secure Code, 2nd Ed., by Michael Howard and David LeBlanc, Microsoft Press © Hugh Thompson 2009

Other things to consider

- Obtaining unauthorized service
- Repurposing of a product/application
- Integrity of logs
- 19 attacks* (more on this later in the course)
- Attacker economics



BUG OF ZEN

