

# Cookbook: Lower Bounds for Statistical Inference in Distributed and Constrained Settings

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Part IV: Upper bounds and discussion

Those were lower bounds.



Those were lower bounds.

Are they tight?

# Upper bounds for learning



Estimation		
$\Delta_k, \ell_1$	$\frac{k}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{k}{\min\{2^\ell, k\}}$	$\frac{k}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{k}{\varrho^2}$
$\mathcal{B}_d, \ell_2$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\varrho^2}$
$\mathcal{G}_d, \ell_2$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\varrho^2}$

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Focus on **communication**  
for this part

# Upper bounds for testing

Testing		
$\Delta_k, \ell_1$	$\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{k}{\min\{2^\ell, k\}}$	$\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{k}{\min\{2^\ell, k\}}}$
$\mathcal{B}_d, \ell_2$	$\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}}$
“Hide-and-Seek”	$\frac{\log d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	

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$\mathcal{B}_{d, \ell_2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}}$
“Hide-and-Seek”	$\frac{\log d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	

(analogous for **privacy**)

That's seven upper bounds to prove.  
(in  $\approx 30$  minutes)



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Discrete distributions  
under  $\ell_1$  loss: 3

Bernoulli product  
under  $\ell_2$  loss: 3

Bernoulli product hide-  
and-seek: 1


Let's do several at once: **simulate-and-infer**

**Idea:** if, **under constraints**, given messages from  $s$  users the server can simulate one sample from the unknown  $\boldsymbol{p}$ , then


$$n = s \cdot n_{\text{centralized}}$$

users suffice.

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 **Theorem (easy).** For  $\mathcal{B}_d$ , noninteractive private-coin simulate-and-infer is possible with  $s = \frac{d}{\ell}$ .

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 **Theorem (easy).** For  $\mathcal{B}_d$ , noninteractive private-coin simulate-and-infer is possible with  $s = \frac{d}{\ell}$ .

*Proof.* First user sends the first  $\ell$  bits of  $X_1$ , ...,  $s$ -th user sends last  $\ell$  bits of  $X_s$ . Server creates

$$\tilde{X} := (X_{11}, \dots, X_{1\ell}, X_{21}, \dots, X_{2\ell}, \dots, X_{s1}, \dots, X_{s\ell}) \in \{\pm 1\}^d$$

Since  $\mathbf{p}$  is a product distribution,  $\tilde{X} \sim \mathbf{p}$ . □

Let's do several at once: **simulate-and-infer**

 **Corollary.** For  $\mathcal{B}_d$ , noninteractive private-coin **mean estimation** under  $\ell_2$  loss is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\ell}\right)$ .


*Proof.* Recall that the centralized sample complexity is  $O\left(\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$ , by taking the empirical mean. □

Let's do several at once: **simulate-and-infer**

❖ **Corollary.** For  $\mathcal{B}_d$ , noninteractive private-coin **mean testing** under  $\ell_2$  loss is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\ell}\right)$ .

*Proof.* Recall that the centralized sample complexity is  $O\left(\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$ , by taking the squared  $\ell_2$  norm empirical mean (and computing its expectation and variance). □

Let's do several at once: **simulate-and-infer**

 **Corollary.** For  $\mathcal{B}_d$ , noninteractive private-coin **hide-and-  
seek** can be performed with  $n = O\left(\frac{\log d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\ell}\right)$ .

*Proof.* Recall that the centralized sample complexity is  $O\left(\frac{\log d}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$ , by computing the empirical mean of each coordinate to  $\pm \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$  (and taking a union bound). □


Let's do several at once: `simulate-and-infer`

That's three upper bounds via `simulate-and-infer`. Let's do two more.




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 **Theorem** ([ACT20d]). For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive private-coin simulate-and-infer is possible with  $s = \frac{k}{2^\ell}$ .

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 **Theorem.** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive private-coin simulate-and-infer is possible with  $s \asymp \frac{k}{2^\ell}$  (in expectation).

# Let's do several at once: simulate-and-infer

 **Theorem.** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive private-coin simulate-and-infer is possible with  $s \asymp \frac{k}{2^\ell}$  (in expectation).


*Proof.* First,  $\ell = 1$ . Take  $s = 2k$  users, pair them: users  $2i - 1$  and  $2i$  send  $Y_{2i-1} = \mathbb{I}_{X_{2i-1}=i}$  and  $Y_{2i} = \mathbb{I}_{X_{2i}=i}$ , resp.

If

- there is a unique  $i \in [k]$  s.t.  $Y_{2i-1} = 1$ , and
- for that  $i$  we also have  $Y_{2i} = 0$

then the server outputs that  $i$ . Otherwise, it outputs  $\perp$ .

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If

- there is a unique  $i \in [k]$  s.t.  $Y_{2i-1} = 1$ , and
- for that  $i$  we also have  $Y_{2i} = 0$

then the server outputs  $\tilde{X} = i$ . Otherwise,  $\tilde{X} = \perp$ .

$$\Pr[\tilde{X} = i \mid \tilde{X} \neq \perp] = p_i \prod_{j \neq i} (1 - p_j) \cdot (1 - p_i) = p_i \cdot \prod_j (1 - p_j)$$

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 **Theorem.** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive private-coin simulate-and-infer is possible with  $s \asymp \frac{k}{2^\ell}$  (in expectation).

*Proof (cont'd).* So

$$\Pr[\tilde{X} = i \mid \tilde{X} \neq \perp] \propto \mathbf{p}_i$$

which is good. Moreover,


$$\Pr[\tilde{X} \neq \perp] = \prod_j (1 - \mathbf{p}_j) \geq \prod_j 4^{-\mathbf{p}_j} = \frac{1}{4}$$

using that  $1 - x \geq 4^{-x}$  for  $0 \leq x \leq \frac{1}{2}$ . So we are good as long

as  $\|\mathbf{p}\|_\infty \leq \frac{1}{2}$  ... which we can assume via a simple trick using 


and losing a factor 2:  $\mathbf{p}'$  on  $[2k]$  with  $\mathbf{p}'_i = \mathbf{p}'_{i+k} = \frac{\mathbf{p}_i}{2}$ .

Let's do several at once: **simulate-and-infer**

 **Theorem.** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive private-coin simulate-and-infer is possible with  $s \asymp \frac{k}{2^\ell}$  (in expectation).


*Proof (cont'd).* We just proved that  $\mathbb{E}[s] \leq 4k$ , for  $\ell = 1$ . For  $\ell \geq 1$ , partition  $[k]$  in sets  $S_1, \dots, S_{\frac{k}{2^\ell - 1}}$  of size  $2^\ell - 1$ . Users  $2i - 1$  and  $2i$  send 0 if their sample is outside  $S_i$ , or the index of their sample inside  $S_i$  otherwise. Same analysis as for the case  $\ell = 1$ . □

Let's do several at once: **simulate-and-infer**

 **Corollary.** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive private-coin **estimation** under  $\ell_1$  loss is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{k}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{k}{2^\ell}\right)$ .

*Proof.* Recall that the centralized sample complexity is  $O\left(\frac{k}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$ , by taking the empirical distribution. □

Let's do several at once: **simulate-and-infer**


 **Corollary.** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive private-coin **identity testing** under  $\ell_1$  distance is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{k}{2^\ell}\right)$ .

*Proof.* Recall that the centralized sample complexity is  $O\left(\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$ , e.g., via a  $\chi^2$ -type test (and computing its expectation and variance). □




# Two more to go, and public coins to use


We just proved 5 out of 7 upper bounds, via distribution simulation: all were **private-coin**, noninteractive. 

The last two are public-coin upper bounds, and both will rely on some type of **dimensionality reduction**: use public randomness to project  $p$  to a lower-dimensional random subspace  $\rightsquigarrow$  “**domain compression**” 

## Domain compression for $\mathcal{B}_d$

 **Theorem.** For  $\mathcal{B}_d$ , noninteractive public-coin **mean testing** under  $\ell_2$  loss is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{d}{\ell}}\right)$ .

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 **Theorem.** For  $\mathcal{B}_d$ , noninteractive public-coin **mean testing** under  $\ell_2$  loss is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{d}{\ell}}\right)$ .

*Proof.* Pick a **common** u.a.r. random vector  $Z \in \{\pm 1\}^d$ : all users replace their  $X_i$  by  $X'_i := Z \cdot X_i \in \{\pm 1\}^d$ .  
Conditioned on  $Z$ , new mean s.t.  $\|Z \cdot \mu\|_2^2 = \|\mu\|_2^2$ .

Partition the  $d$  coordinates in  $\ell$  groups  $S_1, \dots, S_\ell$  of same size. User  $i$  computes  $\mathbb{I}[\sum_{j \in S_t} X'_{ij} > 0]$  for all  $1 \leq t \leq \ell$  and send those  $\ell$  bits.

So the server gets  $n$  i.i.d. samples from some  $\mathbf{p}_Z$  on  $\{\pm 1\}^\ell$ .

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*Proof (cont'd).* Why is this good?

- This  $\mathbf{p}_Z$  is a product distribution on  $\{\pm 1\}^\ell$
- If  $\mathbf{p}$  has mean  $\mu = \mathbf{0}$ , then  $\mathbf{p}_Z$  has mean  $\mu_Z = \mathbf{0}$
- If  $\mathbf{p}$  has mean  $\|\mu\|_2 > \varepsilon$ , “then”

$$\Pr_Z[\|\mu_Z\|_2 > \varepsilon \cdot \sqrt{\ell/d}] = \Omega(1)$$

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*Proof (cont'd).* This last part is not quite obvious. Helps to think of each  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{|S_t|}} \sum_{j \in S_t} X'_{ij} = \sqrt{\frac{\ell}{d}} \sum_{j \in S_t} X_{ij} Z_j$  as **roughly normal**:

$$N_t \approx \mathcal{N}\left(\sqrt{\frac{\ell}{d}} \sum_{j \in S_t} Z_j \mu_j, 1\right)$$

So  $t$ -th bit has parameter  $\Pr[N_t \geq 0] = \Omega\left(\sqrt{\frac{\ell}{d}} \sum_{j \in S_t} Z_j \mu_j\right) \dots$

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*Proof (cont'd).* The mean vector then satisfies


$$\mathbb{E}_Z[\|\mu_Z\|_2^2] \geq \frac{\ell}{d} \sum_{t=1}^{\ell} \left( \sum_{j \in S_t} Z_j \mu_j \right)^2 = \frac{\ell}{d} \|\mu\|_2^2$$

and (**handwaving**) we can show that


$$\Pr_Z[\|\mu_Z\|_2 > \varepsilon \cdot \sqrt{\ell/d}] = \Omega(1).$$

We are done: the server can do mean testing over  $\{\pm 1\}^\ell$  with  $\varepsilon' := \varepsilon \sqrt{\ell/d}$ , for which  $n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{\ell}}{\varepsilon'^2}\right) = O\left(\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2 \sqrt{\ell}}\right)$  is enough.  $\square$

# Domain compression for $\Delta_k$

 **Theorem ([ACT20d,ACHST20]).** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive public-coin **identity testing** under  $\ell_1$  distance is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{k}{2^\ell}}\right)$ .

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 **Theorem.** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive public-coin **identity testing** under  $\ell_1$  distance is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{k}{2^\ell}}\right)$ .


*Proof.* Pick a **common** u.a.r. **hash function**  $h: [k] \rightarrow [2^\ell]$ : all users replace their  $X_i$  by  $X'_i := h(X_i)$ , which they can send.

So server gets  $n$  i.i.d. samples from some  $\mathbf{p}_h$  on  $[2^\ell]$ . It also knows  $h$ , so can compute  $\mathbf{q}_h$  (where  $\mathbf{q}$  is the reference distribution).

All that remains is to do identity testing of  $\mathbf{p}_h$  to  $\mathbf{q}_h$ ...



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*Proof (cont'd).* Why is this good?

- Server has  $n$  i.i.d. samples from this  $\mathbf{p}_h$  on  $[2^\ell]$
- If  $\mathbf{p} = \mathbf{q}$  then  $\mathbf{p}_h = \mathbf{q}_h$
- If  $\|\mathbf{p} - \mathbf{q}\|_1 > \varepsilon$ , “then”

$$\Pr_h \left[ \|\mathbf{p}_h - \mathbf{q}_h\|_1 > \varepsilon \cdot \sqrt{2^\ell / k} \right] = \Omega(1)$$

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*Proof (cont'd).* This last part is not obvious: going to handwave the argument. Proving the analogous statement for  $\ell_2$  is a bit simpler:

1. Check that  $\mathbb{E}_h[\|\mathbf{p}_h - \mathbf{q}_h\|_2^2] \approx \|\mathbf{p} - \mathbf{q}\|_2^2$
2. Bound the variance of  $\|\mathbf{p}_h - \mathbf{q}_h\|_2^2$
3. Apply Paley-Zygmund's inequality.

(For the  $\ell_1$  statement, a few more ingredients are needed.)

## Domain compression for $\Delta_k$

 **Theorem.** For  $\Delta_k$ , noninteractive public-coin **identity testing** under  $\ell_1$  distance is possible with  $n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{k}{2^\ell}}\right)$ .





*Proof (cont'd).* Once we have this, we are done: the server can do identity testing to  $q_h$  over  $[2^\ell]$  with  $\varepsilon' := \varepsilon\sqrt{2^\ell/k}$ , for which

$$n = O\left(\frac{\sqrt{2^\ell}}{\varepsilon'^2}\right) = O\left(\frac{k}{\varepsilon^2\sqrt{2^\ell}}\right)$$

is enough.  $\square$

That's seven upper bounds we proved.  
(in  $\approx 30$  minutes)

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$\Delta_{k, \ell_1}$	$\frac{k}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{k}{\min\{2^\ell, k\}}$	$\frac{k}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{k}{Q^2}$	$\Delta_{k, \ell_1}$	$\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{k}{\min\{2^\ell, k\}}$	$\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{k}{\min\{2^\ell, k\}}}$
$\mathcal{B}_{d, \ell_2}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{Q^2}$	$\mathcal{B}_{d, \ell_2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}}$
$\mathcal{G}_{d, \ell_2}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	$\frac{d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{Q^2}$	"Hide-and-Seek"	$\frac{\log d}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \frac{d}{\min\{\ell, d\}}$	

# Summary

This tutorial: techniques for proving lower bounds, in both **interactive** and **noninteractive** settings, for statistical **estimation** and **testing** under “**local constraints**.”

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- |                                       |          |
|---------------------------------------|----------|
| I. Introduction                       | Clément  |
| II. Lower Bounds for Estimation       | Jayadev  |
| III. Lower Bounds for Testing         | Himanshu |
| IV. Some upper bounds, and discussion | Clément  |

# Some open problems

First, happy to discuss those (and more) in detail during the conference, interactively! Please feel free reach out.



# Some directions

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**Open Problem #1:** What if all users had **different constraints**? E.g., different bandwidth constraints, or different privacy requirements...

**Open Problem #2:** Other types of constraints! Linear measurements, threshold measurements (univariate case), or malicious noise à la Massart...

# References and previous work

For a detailed bibliography:

[www.cs.columbia.edu/~ccanonne/tutorial-focs2020/bibliography.html](http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~ccanonne/tutorial-focs2020/bibliography.html)

