Network Working Group R. Sparks, Ed. Internet-Draft Estacado Systems Expires: October 13, 2005 A. Hawrylyshen Jasomi Networks A. Johnston MCI J. Rosenberg Cisco Systems H. Schulzrinne Columbia University April 14, 2005 Session Initiation Protocol Torture Test Messages draft-ietf-sipping-torture-tests-06 Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 13, 2005. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). Abstract Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 1] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 This informational document gives examples of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) test messages designed to exercise and "torture" a SIP implementation. Table of Contents 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Document Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Representing Long Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Representing Non-printable Characters . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 Representing Long Repeating Strings . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. SIP Test Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1 Parser tests (syntax) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1 Valid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1.1 A short tortuous INVITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1.2 Wide range of valid characters . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.1.3 Valid use of the % escaping mechanism . . . . . . 9 3.1.1.4 Escaped nulls in URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.1.5 Use of % when it is not an escape . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.1.6 Message with no LWS between display name and < . . 11 3.1.1.7 Long values in header fields . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.1.8 Extra trailing octets in a UDP datagram . . . . . 14 3.1.1.9 Semicolon separated parameters in URI user part . 15 3.1.1.10 Varied and unknown transport types . . . . . . . 16 3.1.1.11 S/MIME signed message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.1.1.12 Unusual reason phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1.1.13 Empty reason phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1.2 Invalid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.1.2.1 Extraneous header field separators . . . . . . . . 20 3.1.2.2 Content length larger than message . . . . . . . . 20 3.1.2.3 Negative Content-Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.2.4 Request scalar fields with overlarge values . . . 22 3.1.2.5 Response scalar fields with overlarge values . . . 23 3.1.2.6 Unterminated quoted string in display-name . . . . 23 3.1.2.7 <> enclosing Request-URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.1.2.8 Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) . . . . . 25 3.1.2.9 Multiple SP separating Request-Line elements . . . 26 3.1.2.10 SP characters at end of Request-Line . . . . . . 27 3.1.2.11 Escaped headers in SIP Request-URI . . . . . . . 28 3.1.2.12 Invalid timezone in Date header field . . . . . 28 3.1.2.13 Failure to enclose name-addr URI in <> . . . . . 29 3.1.2.14 Spaces within addr-spec . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.1.2.15 Non-token characters in display-name . . . . . . 30 3.1.2.16 Unknown protocol version . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.1.2.17 Start line and CSeq method mismatch . . . . . . 31 3.1.2.18 Unknown Method with CSeq method mismatch . . . . 31 3.1.2.19 Overlarge response code . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.2 Transaction layer semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 2] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.2.1 Missing transaction identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.3 Application layer semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.3.1 Missing Required Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.3.2 Request-URI with unknown scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3.3 Request-URI with known but atypical scheme . . . . . . 34 3.3.4 Unknown URI schemes in header fields . . . . . . . . . 35 3.3.5 Proxy-Require and Require . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.3.6 Unknown Content-Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.3.7 Unknown authorization scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.3.8 Multiple values in single value required fields . . . 37 3.3.9 Multiple Content-Length values . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.3.10 200 OK Response with broadcast Via header field value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.3.11 Max-Forwards of zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.3.12 REGISTER with a contact header parameter . . . . . . 40 3.3.13 REGISTER with a url parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 41 3.3.14 REGISTER with a url escaped header . . . . . . . . . 42 3.3.15 Unacceptable Accept offering . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.4 Backward compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.4.1 INVITE with RFC2543 syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A. Bit-exact archive of each test message . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.1 Encoded Reference Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 52 Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 3] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 1. Overview This document is informational, and is NOT NORMATIVE on any aspect of SIP. This document contains test messages based on the current version (2.0) of the Session Initiation Protocol as defined in [RFC3261]. Some messages exercise SIP's use of SDP as described in [RFC3264]. These messages were developed and refined at the SIPIt interoperability test events. The test messages are organized into several sections. Some stress only a SIP parser and others stress both the parser and the application above it. Some messages are valid, and some are not. Each example clearly calls out what makes any invalid messages incorrect. This document does not attempt to catalog every way to make an invalid message, nor does it attempt to be comprehensive in exploring unusual, but valid, messages. Instead, it tries to focus on areas that have caused interoperability problems or have particularly unfavorable characteristics if they are handled improperly. This document is a seed for a test plan, not a test plan in itself. The messages are presented in the text using a set of markup conventions to avoid ambiguity and meet Internet-Draft layout requirements. To resolve any remaining ambiguity, a bit-accurate version of each message is encapsulated in an appendix. 2. Document Conventions This document contains many example SIP messages. Although SIP is a text-based protocol, many of these examples cannot be unambiguously rendered without additional markup due to the constraints placed on the formatting of RFCs. This document defines and uses the markup defined in this section to remove that ambiguity. This markup uses the start and end tag conventions of XML, but does not define any XML document type. The appendix contains an encoded binary form of all the messages and the algorithm needed to decode them into files. 2.1 Representing Long Lines Several of these examples contain unfolded lines longer than 72 characters. These are captured between tags. The single unfolded line is reconstructed by directly concatenating all Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 4] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 lines appearing between the tags (discarding any line-feeds or carriage returns). There will be no whitespace at the end of lines. Any whitespace appearing at a fold-point will appear at the beginning of a line. The following represent the same string of bits: Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue, third value Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue , third value Header-name: first value, reallylong second value, third value Note that this is NOT SIP header line folding where different strings of bits have equivalent meaning. 2.2 Representing Non-printable Characters Several examples contain binary message bodies or header field values containing non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded characters. These are rendered here as a pair of hexadecimal digits per octet between tags. This rendering applies even inside quoted-strings. The following represent the same string of bits: Header-name: value one Header-name: value206F6Ee The following is a Subject header field containing the euro symbol: Subject: E282AC 2.3 Representing Long Repeating Strings Several examples contain very large data values created with Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 5] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 repeating bit strings. Those will be rendered here using value. As with this rendering applies even inside quoted-strings. For example, the value "abcabcabc" can be rendered as abc. A display name of "1000000 bottles of beer" could be rendered as To: "130 bottles of beer" and a Max-Forwards header field with a value of one google will be rendered here as Max-Forwards: 10 3. SIP Test Messages 3.1 Parser tests (syntax) 3.1.1 Valid messages 3.1.1.1 A short tortuous INVITE This short, relatively human-readable message contains: o line folding all over o escaped characters within quotes o an empty subject o LWS between colons, semicolons, header field values, and other fields o both comma separated and separate listing of header field values o mix of short and long form for the same header field name o unkown Request-URI parameter o unknown header fields o unknown header field with a value that would be syntactically invalid if it were defined in terms of generic-param o unusual header field ordering o unusual header field name character case o unknown parameters of a known header field o uri parameter with no value o header parameter with no value o integer fields (Max-Forwards and CSeq) with leading zeros All elements should treat this as a well-formed request. The UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue header field deserves special attention. If this header field were defined in terms of comma separated values with semicolon separated parameters (as many of the Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 6] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 existing defined header fields), this would be invalid. However, since the receiving element does not know the definition of the syntax for this field, it must parse it as a header-value. Proxies would forward this header field unchanged. Endpoints would ignore the header field. Message Details : wsinv INVITE sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com;unknownparam SIP/2.0 TO : sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com ; tag = 1918181833n from : "J Rosenberg \\\"" ; tag = 98asjd8 MaX-fOrWaRdS: 0068 Call-ID: wsinv.ndaksdj@192.0.2.1 Content-Length : 151 cseq: 0009 INVITE Via : SIP / 2.0 /UDP 192.0.2.2;branch=390skdjuw s : NewFangledHeader: newfangled value continued newfangled value UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue: ;;,,;;,; Content-Type: application/sdp Route: v: SIP / 2.0 / TCP spindle.example.com ; branch = z9hG4bK9ikj8 , SIP / 2.0 / UDP 192.168.255.111 ; branch= z9hG4bK30239 m:"Quoted string \"\"" ; newparam = newvalue ; secondparam ; q = 0.33 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.3 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.4 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 7] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.1.1.2 Wide range of valid characters This message exercises a wider range of characters in several key syntactic elements than implementations usually see. Of particular note: o The Method contains non-alpha characters from token. Note that % is not an escape character for this field. A method of IN%56ITE is an unknown method. It is not the same as a method of INVITE o The Request-URI contain unusual, but legal, characters o A branch parameter contains all non-alphanum characters from token o The To header field value's quoted-string contains quoted-pair expansions, including a quoted NULL character o The name part of name-addr in the From header field value contains multiple tokens (instead of a quoted string) with all non-alphanum characters from the token production rule. That value also has an unknown header parameter whose name contains the non-alphanum token characters and whose value is a non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded string. The tag parameter on this value contains the non-alphanum token characters o The Call-ID header field value contains the non-alphanum characters from word. Notice that in this production: * % is not an escape character. (It is only an escape character in productions matching the rule "escaped") * " does not start a quoted-string. None of ',` or " imply that there will be a matching symbol later in the string * The characters []{}()<> do not have any grouping semantics. They are not required to appear in balanced pairs o There is an unknown header field (matching extension-header) with non-alphanum token characters in its name and a UTF8-NONASCII value If this unusual URI has been defined at a proxy, the proxy will forward this request normally. Otherwise a proxy will generate a 404. Endpoints will generate a 501 listing the methods they understand in an Allow header field. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 8] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : intmeth !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~ sip:1_unusual.URI~(to-be!sure)&isn't+it$/crazy?,/;;* :&it+has=1,weird!*pas$wo~d_too.(doesn't-it) @example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-.!%66*_+`'~ To: "BEL:\07 NUL:\00 DEL:\7F" From: token1~` token2'+_ token3*%!.- ;fromParam''~+*_!.-%= "D180D0B0D0B1D0BED182D0B0D18ED189D0B8D0B9" ;tag=_token~1'+`*%!-. Call-ID: intmeth.word%ZK-!.*_+'@word`~)(><:\/"][?}{ CSeq: 139122385 !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~ Max-Forwards: 255 extensionHeader-!.%*+_`'~: EFBBBFE5A4A7E5819CE99BBB Content-Length: 0 3.1.1.3 Valid use of the % escaping mechanism This INVITE exercises the % HEX HEX escaping mechanism in several places. The request is syntactically valid. Interesting features include: o The request-URI has sips:user@example.com embedded in its userpart. What that might mean to example.net is beyond the scope of this document. o The From and To URIs have escaped characters in their userparts. o The Contact URI has escaped characters in the URI parameters. Note that the "name" uri-parameter has a value of "value%41" which is NOT equivalent to "valueA". Per [RFC2396], unescaping URI components is never performed recursively. A parser must accept this as a well-formed message. The application using the message must treat the % HEX HEX expansions as equivalent to the character being encoded. The application must not try to Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 9] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 interpret % as an escape character in those places where % HEX HEX ("escaped" in the grammar) is not a valid part of the construction. In [RFC3261], "escaped" only occurs in the expansions of SIP-URI, SIPS-URI, and Reason-Phrase. Message Details : esc01 INVITE sip:sips%3Auser%40example.com@example.net SIP/2.0 To: sip:%75se%72@example.com From: ;tag=938 Max-Forwards: 87 i: esc01.239409asdfakjkn23onasd0-3234 CSeq: 234234 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw C: application/sdp Contact: Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.4 Escaped nulls in URIs This register request contains several URIs with nulls in the userpart. The message is well formed - parsers must accept this message. Implementations must take special care when unescaping the AOR in this request to not prematurely shorten the username. This request registers two distinct contact URIs. Message Details : escnull REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:null-%00-null@example.com From: sip:null-%00-null@example.com;tag=839923423 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: escnull.39203ndfvkjdasfkq3w4otrq0adsfdfnavd CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: Contact: Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 10] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 L:0 3.1.1.5 Use of % when it is not an escape Most of the places % can appear in a SIP message, it is not an escape character. This can surprise the unwary implementor. The following well-formed request has these properties: o The request method is unknown. It is NOT equivalent to REGISTER o The display-name portion of the To and From header fields is "%Z%45". Note that this is not the same as %ZE o This message has two Contact header field values, not three. is a C%6Fntact header field value A parser should accept this message as well formed. A proxy would forward or reject the message depending on what the Request-URI meant to it. An endpoint would reject this message with a 501. Message Details : esc02 RE%47IST%45R sip:registrar.example.com SIP/2.0 To: "%Z%45" From: "%Z%45" ;tag=f232jadfj23 Call-ID: esc02.asdfnqwo34rq23i34jrjasdcnl23nrlknsdf Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK209%fzsnel234 CSeq: 29344 RE%47IST%45R Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: C%6Fntact: Contact: l: 0 3.1.1.6 Message with no LWS between display name and < This OPTIONS request is not valid per the grammar in RFC 3261 since there is no LWS between the quoted string in the display name and < in the From header field value. This has been identified as a specification bug that will be removed when RFC 3261 is revised. Elements should accept this request as well formed. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 11] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : lwsdisp OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: "caller";tag=323 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: lwsdisp.1234abcd@funky.example.com CSeq: 60 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP funky.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.1.7 Long values in header fields This well-formed request contains header fields with many values and values that are very long. Features include: o The To header field has a long display name, and long uri parameter names and values o The From header field has long header parameter names and values, in particular a very long tag o The Call-ID is one long token Message Details : longreq INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: "I have a user name of extreme proportion" longvalue; longparamname=shortvalue; verylongParameterNameWithNoValue> F: sip: amazinglylongcallername@example.net ;tag=12982424 ;unknownheaderparamname= unknowheaderparamvalue ;unknownValuelessparamname Call-ID: longreq.onereallylongcallid CSeq: 3882340 INVITE Unknown-Long-Name: unknown-long-value; unknown-long-parameter-name = Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 12] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 unknown-long-parameter-value Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip33.example.com v: SIP/2.0/TCP sip32.example.com V: SIP/2.0/TCP sip31.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip30.example.com ViA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip29.example.com VIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip28.example.com VIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip27.example.com via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip26.example.com viA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip25.example.com vIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip24.example.com vIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip23.example.com V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip22.example.com v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip21.example.com V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip20.example.com v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip19.example.com Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip18.example.com Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip17.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip16.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip15.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip14.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip13.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip12.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip11.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip10.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip9.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip8.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip7.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip6.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip5.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip4.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip3.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip2.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip1.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;received=192.0.2.5; branch=verylongbranchvalue Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: amazinglylongcallername @host5.example.net> Content-Type: application/sdp l: 151 Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 13] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.8 Extra trailing octets in a UDP datagram This message contains a single SIP REGISTER request, which ostensibly arrived over UDP in a single datagram. The packet contains extra octets after the body (which in this case has zero length). The extra octets happen to look like a SIP INVITE request, but (per section 18.3 of [RFC3261]) they are just spurious noise that must be ignored. A SIP element receiving this datagram would handle the REGISTER request normally and ignore the extra bits that look like an INVITE request. If the element is a proxy choosing to forward the REGISTER, the INVITE octets would not appear in the forwarded request. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 14] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : dblreq REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=43251j3j324 Max-Forwards: 8 I: dblreq.0ha0isndaksdj99sdfafnl3lk233412 Contact: sip:j.user@host.example.com CSeq: 8 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.125;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw23492 Content-Length: 0 INVITE sip:joe@example.com SIP/2.0 t: sip:joe@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=141334 Max-Forwards: 8 Call-ID: dblreq.0ha0isnda977644900765@192.0.2.15 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw380234 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m =video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.9 Semicolon separated parameters in URI user part This request has a semicolon-separated parameter contained in the "user" part of the Request-URI (whose value contains an escaped @ symbol). Receiving elements will accept this as a well formed message. The Request-URI will parse such that the user part is "user;par=u@example.net". Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 15] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : semiuri OPTIONS sip:user;par=u%40example.net@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: semiuri.0ha0isndaksdj CSeq: 8 OPTIONS Accept: application/sdp, application/pkcs7-mime, multipart/mixed, multipart/signed, message/sip, message/sipfrag Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.1.10 Varied and unknown transport types This request contains Via header field values with all known transport types and exercises the transport extension mechanism. Parsers must accept this message as well formed. Elements receiving this message would process it exactly as if the 2nd and subsequent header field values specified UDP (or other transport). Message Details : transports OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: ;tag=323 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: transports.kijh4akdnaqjkwendsasfdj Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 60 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP t1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Via: SIP/2.0/SCTP t2.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKklasjdhf Via: SIP/2.0/TLS t3.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK2980unddj Via: SIP/2.0/UNKNOWN t4.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKasd0f3en Via: SIP/2.0/TCP t5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK0a9idfnee l: 0 3.1.1.11 S/MIME signed message This is a signed MESSAGE request. The signature is binary encoded. The body contains null (0x00) characters. Receivers must take care to properly frame the received message. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 16] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Parsers must accept this message as well formed, even if the application above the parser does not support multipart/signed. Message Details : smime01 MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.com SIP/2.0 To: From: ;tag=2929017b Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.0.1:5060 ;branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-5032442a6f48352f-1--d87543-;rport Call-ID: 74dd6bf53ebdf741@Y2ouY2lzY28uc2lwaXQubmV0 CSeq: 1 MESSAGE Route: Contact: Max-Forwards: 70 Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Content-Type: multipart/signed ;boundary=4d7f63e86a96c361;micalg=sha1 ;protocol=application/pkcs7-signature Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2005 17:30:54 GMT User-Agent: SIPimp.org/0.2.5 (curses) Content-Length: 1567 --4d7f63e86a96c361 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary This has a null in the body. --4d7f63e86a96c361 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime;name=smime.p7s Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required ;filename=smime.p7s Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary 308204E006092A864886F70D010702A08204D1308204CD020101310B3009 06052B0E03021A0500300B06092A864886F70D010701A08202D2308202CE 30820237A00302010202080195007102330113300D06092A864886F70D01 010505003070310B3009060355040613025553311330110603550408130A 43616C69666F726E69613111300F0603550407130853616E204A6F736531 0E300C060355040A1305736970697431293027060355040B132053697069 74205465737420436572746966696361746520417574686F72697479301E Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 17] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April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d7f63e86a96c361-- 3.1.1.12 Unusual reason phrase This 200 response contains a reason phrase other than "OK". The reason phrase is intended for human consumption, and may contain any string produced by Reason-Phrase = *(reserved / unreserved / escaped / UTF8-NONASCII / UTF8-CONT / SP / HTAB) This particular response contains unreserved and non-ASCII UTF-8 characters.This response is well formed. A parser must accept this Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 18] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 message. Message Details : unreason SIP/2.0 200 = 2**3 * 5**2 D0BDD0BE20D181D182 D0BE20D0B4D0B5D0B2D18FD0BDD0BED181D182D0BE20D0B4 D0B5D0B2D18FD182D18C202D20D0BFD180D0BED181D182D0 BED0B5 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923 Call-ID: unreason.1234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343 To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229 Content-Length: 155 Content-Type: application/sdp Contact: v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.13 Empty reason phrase This well formed response contains no reason phrase. A parser must accept this message. The space character after the reason code is required. If it were not present, this message could be rejected as invalid (a liberal receiver would accept it anyway). Message Details : noreason SIP/2.0 10020 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe Call-ID: noreason.asndj203insdf99223ndf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: ;tag=39ansfi3 To: ;tag=902jndnke3 Content-Length: 0 Contact: Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 19] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.1.2 Invalid messages This section contains several invalid messages reflecting errors seen at interoperability events and exploring important edge conditions that can be induced through malformed messages. This section does not attempt to be a comprehensive list of all types of invalid messages. 3.1.2.1 Extraneous header field separators The Via header field of this request contains additional semicolons and commas without parameters or values. The Contact header field contains additional semicolons without parameters. This message is syntactically invalid. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Message Details : badinv01 INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=134161461246 Max-Forwards: 7 Call-ID: badinv01.0ha0isndaksdjasdf3234nas CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;;,;,, Contact: "Joe" ;;;; Content-Length: 153 Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.2 Content length larger than message This is a request message with a Content Length that is larger than the actual length of the body. When sent over UDP (as this message ostensibly was), the receiving element should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. If this message Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 20] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 arrived over a stream-based transport such as TCP, there's not much the receiving could do but wait for more data on the stream and close the connection if none is forthcoming in a reasonable period of time. Message Details : clerr INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 80 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93942939o2 Contact: Call-ID: clerr.0ha0isndaksdjweiafasdk3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-39234-23523 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 9999 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.155 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.155 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.3 Negative Content-Length This request has a negative value for Content-Length. An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the framing error is not recoverable and the connection should be closed. The same behavior is appropriate for messages that arrive without a numeric value in the Content-Length header field such as: Content-Length: five Implementors should take extra precautions if the technique they choose for converting this ascii field into an integral form can return a negative value. In particular, the result must not be used as a counter or array index. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 21] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : ncl INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 254 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=32394234 Call-ID: ncl.0ha0isndaksdj2193423r542w35 CSeq: 0 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.53;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: -999 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.53 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.53 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.4 Request scalar fields with overlarge values This request contains several scalar header field values outside their legal range. o the CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1. o the Max-Forwards value is >255. o the Expires value is >2**32-1. o the Contact expires parameter value is >2**32-1. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request due to the CSeq error. If only the Max-Forwards field were in error, the element could choose process the request as if the field were absent. If only the expiry values were in error, the element could treat them as if they contained the default values for expiration (3600 in this case). Other scalar request fields that may contain aberrant values include, but are not limited to, the Contact q value, the Timestamp value, and the Via ttl parameter. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 22] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : scalar02 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK342sdfoi3 To: From: ;tag=239232jh3 CSeq: 36893488147419103232 REGISTER Call-ID: scalar02.23o0pd9vanlq3wnrlnewofjas9ui32 Max-Forwards: 300 Expires: 10 Contact: ;expires=280297596632815 Content-Length: 0 3.1.2.5 Response scalar fields with overlarge values This response contains several scalar header field values outside their legal range. o the CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1. o The Retry-After field is unreasonably large (note that RFC 3261 does not define a legal range for this field). o The Warning field has a warning-value with more than 3 digits An element receiving this response will simply discard it. Message Details : scalarlg SIP/2.0 503 Service Unavailable Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com ;branch=z9hG4bKzzxdiwo34sw ;received=192.0.2.129 To: From: ;tag=2easdjfejw CSeq: 9292394834772304023312 OPTIONS Call-ID: scalarlg.noase0of0234hn2qofoaf0232aewf2394r Retry-After: 949302838503028349304023988 Warning: 1812 overture "In Progress" Content-Length: 0 3.1.2.6 Unterminated quoted string in display-name This is a request with an unterminated quote in the display name of Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 23] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 the To field. An element receiving this request should return an 400 Bad Request error. An element could attempt to infer a terminating quote and accept the message. Such an element needs to take care that it makes a reasonable inference when it encounters To: "Mr J. User Message Details : quotbal INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: "Mr. J. User From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93334 Max-Forwards: 10 Call-ID: quotbal.aksdj Contact: CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.59:5050;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 153 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.7 <> enclosing Request-URI This INVITE request is invalid because the Request-URI has been enclosed within in "<>". It is reasonable to always reject a request with this error with a 400 Bad Request. Elements attempting to be liberal with what they accept may choose to ignore the brackets. If the element forwards the request, it must not include the brackets in the messages it sends. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 24] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : ltgtruri INVITE SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=39291 Max-Forwards: 23 Call-ID: ltgtruri.1@192.0.2.5 CSeq: 1 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.5 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 160 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=3149328700 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.8 Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) This INVITE has illegal LWS within the Request-URI. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request. An element could attempt to ignore the embedded LWS for those schemes (like sip) where that would not introduce ambiguity. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 25] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : lwsruri INVITE sip:user@example.com; lr SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com;tag=3xfe-9921883-z9f From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=231413434 Max-Forwards: 5 Call-ID: lwsruri.asdfasdoeoi2323-asdfwrn23-asd834rk423 CSeq: 2130706432 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2395 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 160 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=3149328700 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.9 Multiple SP separating Request-Line elements This INVITE has illegal multiple SP characters between elements of the start line. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP characters while processing the request. If the element forwards the request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the messages it sends. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 26] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : lwsstart INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 8 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8814 Call-ID: lwsstart.dfknq234oi243099adsdfnawe3@example.com CSeq: 1893884 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw3923 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.10 SP characters at end of Request-Line This OPTIONS request contains SP characters between the SIP-Version field and the CRLF terminating the Request-Line. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP characters while processing the request. If the element forwards the request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the messages it sends. Message Details : trws OPTIONS sip:remote-target@example.com SIP/2.02020 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.examle.com;branch=z9hG4bK299342093 To: From: ;tag=329429089 Call-ID: trws.oicu34958239neffasdhr2345r Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 238923 OPTIONS Max-Forwards: 70 Content-Length: 0 Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 27] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.1.2.11 Escaped headers in SIP Request-URI This INVITE is malformed as the SIP Request-URI contains escaped headers. It is acceptable for an element to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request. An element could choose to be liberal in what it accepts and ignore the escaped headers. If the element is a proxy, the escaped headers must not appear in the Request-URI of forwarded request (and most certainly must not be translated into the actual header of the forwarded request). Message Details : escruri INVITE sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:example.com%3E SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=341518 Max-Forwards: 7 Contact: Call-ID: escruri.23940-asdfhj-aje3br-234q098w-fawerh2q-h4n5 CSeq: 149209342 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host-of-the-hour.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.12 Invalid timezone in Date header field This INVITE is invalid as it contains a non GMT time zone in the SIP Date header field. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed (though an element shouldn't do that unless the contents of the Date header field were actually important to its processing). An element wishing to be liberal in what it accepts could ignore this value altogether if it wasn't going to use the Date header field anyhow. Otherwise, it could attempt to interpret this date and adjust it to GMT. RFC 3261 explicitly defines the only acceptable timezone designation Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 28] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 as "GMT". "UT", while synonymous with GMT per [RFC2822], is not valid. "UTC" and "UCT" are also invalid. Message Details : baddate INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2234923 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: baddate.239423mnsadf3j23lj42--sedfnm234 CSeq: 1392934 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 16:00:00 EST Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.13 Failure to enclose name-addr URI in <> This REGISTER request is malformed. The SIP URI contained in the Contact Header field has an escaped header, so the field must be in name-addr form (which implies the URI must be enclosed in <>). It is reasonable for an element receiving this request to respond with a 400 Bad Request. An element choosing to be liberal in what it accepts could infer the angle brackets since there is no ambiguity in this example. In general, that won't be possible. Message Details : regbadct REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:user@example.com;tag=998332 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: regbadct.k345asrl3fdbv@10.0.0.1 CSeq: 1 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 135.180.130.133:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:sip.example.com%3E Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 29] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 l: 0 3.1.2.14 Spaces within addr-spec This request is malformed since the addr-spec in the To header field contains spaces. Parsers receiving this request must not break. It is reasonable to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response. Elements attempting to be liberal may ignore the spaces. Message Details : badaspec OPTIONS sip:user@example.org SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host4.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdju43234 Max-Forwards: 70 From: "Bell, Alexander" ;tag=433423 To: "Watson, Thomas" < sip:t.watson@example.org > Call-ID: badaspec.sdf0234n2nds0a099u23h3hnnw009cdkne3 Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.15 Non-token characters in display-name This OPTIONS request is malformed since the display names in the To and From header fields contain non-token characters but are unquoted. It is reasonable to always reject this kind of error with a 400 Bad Request response. An element may attempt to be liberal in what it receives and infer the missing quotes. If this element were a proxy, it must not propagate the error into the request it forwards. As a consequence, if the fields are covered by a signature, there's not much point in trying to be liberal - the message should be simply rejected. Message Details : baddn OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP c.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: Bell, Alexander ;tag=43 To: Watson, Thomas Call-ID: baddn.31415@c.example.com Accept: application/sdp Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 30] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.16 Unknown protocol version To an element implementing [RFC3261], this request is malformed due to its high version number. The element should respond to the request with a 505 Version Not Supported error. Message Details : badvers OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/7.0 Via: SIP/7.0/UDP c.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: A. Bell ;tag=qweoiqpe To: T. Watson Call-ID: badvers.31417@c.example.com CSeq: 1 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.17 Start line and CSeq method mismatch This request has mismatching values for the method in the start line and the CSeq header field. Any element receiving this request will respond with a 400 Bad Request. Message Details : mismatch01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525 Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: mismatch01.dj0234sxdfl3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.2.18 Unknown Method with CSeq method mismatch This message has an unknown method in the start line, and a CSeq method tag which does not match. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 31] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Any element receiving this response should respond with a 501 Not Implemented. A 400 Bad Request is also acceptable, but choosing a 501 (particularly at proxies) has better future-proof characteristics. Message Details : mismatch02 NEWMETHOD sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525 Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: mismatch02.dj0234sxdfl3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Contact: Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/sdp l: 139 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.19 Overlarge response code This response has a response code larger than 699. An element receiving this response should simply drop it. Message Details : bigcode SIP/2.0 4294967301 better not break the receiver Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe Call-ID: bigcode.asdof3uj203asdnf3429uasdhfas3ehjasdfas9i CSeq: 353494 INVITE From: ;tag=39ansfi3 To: ;tag=902jndnke3 Content-Length: 0 Contact: 3.2 Transaction layer semantics This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser and transaction layer logic. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 32] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.2.1 Missing transaction identifier This request indicates support for RFC 3261-style transaction identifiers by providing the z9hG4bK prefix to the branch parameter, but it provides no identifier. A parser must not break when receiving this message. An element receiving this request could reject the request with a 400 Response (preferably statelessly, as other requests from the source are likely to also have a malformed branch parameter), or it could fall back to the RFC 2543 style transaction identifier. Message Details : badbranch OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242 Max-Forwards: 3 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bK Accept: application/sdp Call-ID: badbranch.sadonfo23i420jv0as0derf3j3n CSeq: 8 OPTIONS l: 0 3.3 Application layer semantics This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser and application layer logic. 3.3.1 Missing Required Header Fields This request contains no Call-ID, From, or To header fields. An element receiving this message must not break because of the missing information. Ideally, it will respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 33] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : insuf INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 CSeq: 193942 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.95;branch=z9hG4bKkdj.insuf Content-Type: application/sdp l: 153 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.95 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.95 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.2 Request-URI with unknown scheme This OPTIONS contains an unknown URI scheme in the Request-URI. A parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request. An element receiving this request will reject it with a 416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. Some early implementations attempt to look at the contents of the To header field to determine how to route this kind of request. That is an error. Despite the fact that the To header field and the Request URI frequently look alike in simplistic first-hop messages, the To header field contains no routing information. Message Details : unkscm OPTIONS nobodyKnowsThisScheme:totallyopaquecontent SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: unkscm.nasdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34 CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Length: 0 3.3.3 Request-URI with known but atypical scheme This OPTIONS contains an Request-URI with an IANA registered scheme Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 34] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 that does not commonly appear Request-URIs of SIP requests. A parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request. If an element will never accept this scheme as meaningful in a request-URI, it is appropriate to treat it as unknown and return a 416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. If the element might accept some URIs with this scheme, then a 404 Not Found is appropriate for those URIs it doesn't accept. Message Details : novelsc OPTIONS soap.beep://192.0.2.103:3002 SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: novelsc.asdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34 CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Length: 0 3.3.4 Unknown URI schemes in header fields This message contains registered schemes in the To, From and Contact header fields of a request. The message is syntactically valid. Parsers must not fail when receiving this message. Proxies should treat this message as they would any other request for this URI. A registrar would reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response since the To: header field is required to contain a SIP or SIPS URI as an AOR. Message Details : unksm2 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: isbn:2983792873 From: ;tag=3234233 Call-ID: unksm2.daksdj@hyphenated-host.example.com CSeq: 234902 REGISTER Max-Forwards: 70 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.21:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: l: 0 Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 35] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.3.5 Proxy-Require and Require This request tests proper implementation of SIP's Proxy-Require and Require extension mechanisms. Any element receiving this request will respond with a 420 Bad Extension response containing an Unsupported header field listing these features from either the Require or Proxy-Require header field depending on the role in which the element is responding. Message Details : bext01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=242etr Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: bext01.0ha0isndaksdj Require: nothingSupportsThis, nothingSupportsThisEither Proxy-Require: noProxiesSupportThis, norDoAnyProxiesSupportThis CSeq: 8 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TLS fold-and-staple.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Length: 0 3.3.6 Unknown Content-Type This INVITE request contains a body of unknown type. It is syntactically valid. A parser must not fail when receiving it. A proxy receiving this request would process it just like any other INVITE. An endpoint receiving this request would reject it with a 415 Unsupported Media Type error. Message Details : invut INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Contact: To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8392034 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: invut.0ha0isndaksdjadsfij34n23d CSeq: 235448 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP somehost.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/unknownformat Content-Length: 40 3.3.7 Unknown authorization scheme This REGISTER request contains an Authorization header field with an unknown scheme. The request is well-formed. A parser must not fail when receiving it. A proxy will treat this request as any other REGISTER. If it forwards the request, it will include this Authorization header field unmodified in the forwarded messages. A registrar that does not care about challenge-response authentication will simply ignore the Authorization header field, processing this registration as if the field were not present. A registrar that does care about challenge-response authentication will reject this request with a 401, issuing a new challenge with a scheme it understands. Endpoints choosing not to act as registrars will simply reject the request. A 405 Method Not Allowed is appropriate. Message Details : regaut01 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=87321hj23128 Max-Forwards: 8 Call-ID: regaut01.0ha0isndaksdj CSeq: 9338 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.253;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Authorization: NoOneKnowsThisScheme opaque-data=here Content-Length:0 3.3.8 Multiple values in single value required fields The message contains a request with multiple Call-ID, To, From, Max-Forwards and CSeq values. An element receiving this request must not break. An element receiving this request would respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 37] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : multi01 INVITE sip:user@company.com SIP/2.0 Contact: Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.25;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 CSeq: 5 INVITE Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.1 CSeq: 59 INVITE Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.2 From: sip:caller@example.com;tag=3413415 To: sip:user@example.com To: sip:other@example.net From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2923420123 Content-Type: application/sdp l: 155 Contact: Max-Forwards: 5 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.25 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.25 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.9 Multiple Content-Length values Multiple conflicting Content-Length header field values appear in this request. From a framing perspective, this situation is equivalent to an invalid Content-Length value (or no value at all). An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the framing error is not recoverable and the connection should be closed. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 38] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : mcl01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bK293423 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:other@example.net;tag=3923942 Call-ID: mcl01.fhn2323orihawfdoa3o4r52o3irsdf CSeq: 15932 OPTIONS Content-Length: 13 Max-Forwards: 60 Content-Length: 5 Content-Type: text/plain There's no way to know how many octets are supposed to be here. 3.3.10 200 OK Response with broadcast Via header field value This message is a response with a 2nd Via header field value's sent-by containing 255.255.255.255. The message is well formed - parsers must not fail when receiving it. Per [RFC3261] an endpoint receiving this message should simply discard it. If a proxy followed normal response processing rules blindly, it would forward this response to the broadcast address. To protect against this being used as an avenue of attack, proxies should drop such responses. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 39] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : bcast SIP/2.0 200 OK Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 255.255.255.255;branch=z9hG4bK1saber23 Call-ID: bcast.0384840201234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343 To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229 Content-Length: 155 Content-Type: application/sdp Contact: v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.11 Max-Forwards of zero This is a legal SIP request with the Max-Forwards header field value set to zero. A proxy should not forward the request and respond 483 (Too Many Hops). An endpoint should process the request as if the Max-Forwards field value were still positive. Message Details : zeromf OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=3ghsd41 Call-ID: zeromf.jfasdlfnm2o2l43r5u0asdfas CSeq: 39234321 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2349i Max-Forwards: 0 Content-Length: 0 3.3.12 REGISTER with a contact header parameter This register request contains a contact where the 'unknownparam' Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 40] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 parameter must be interpreted as being a contact-param and not a url-param. This REGISTER should succeed. The response must not include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter for this binding. Likewise, "unknownparam" must not appear as a url-parameter in any binding during subsequent fetches. Behavior is the same, of course, for any known contact-param parameter names. Message Details : cparam01 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=DkfVgjkrtMwaerKKpe To: sip:watson@example.com Call-ID: cparam01.70710@saturn.example.com CSeq: 2 REGISTER Contact: sip:+19725552222@gw1.example.net;unknownparam l: 0 3.3.13 REGISTER with a url parameter This register request contains a contact where the URI has an unknown parameter. The register should succeed and a subsequent retrieval of the registration must include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter. Behavior is the same, of course, for any known url-parameter names. Message Details : cparam02 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=838293 To: sip:watson@example.com Call-ID: cparam02.70710@saturn.example.com CSeq: 3 REGISTER Contact: l: 0 Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 41] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.3.14 REGISTER with a url escaped header This register request contains a contact where the URI has an escaped header. The register should succeed and a subsequent retrieval of the registration must include the escaped Route header in the contact URI for this binding. Message Details : regescrt REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:user@example.com;tag=8 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: regescrt.k345asrl3fdbv@192.0.2.1 CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw M: L:0 3.3.15 Unacceptable Accept offering This request indicates the response must contain a body in an unknown type. In particular, since the Accept header field does not contain application/sdp, the response may not contain an SDP body. The recipient of this request could respond with a 406 Not Acceptable with a Warning/399 indicating that a response cannot be formulated in the formats offered in the Accept header field. It is also appropriate to respond with a 400 Bad Request since all SIP UAs supporting INVITE are required to support application/sdp. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 42] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : sdp01 INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com Contact: From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=234 Max-Forwards: 5 Call-ID: sdp01.ndaksdj9342dasdd Accept: text/nobodyKnowsThis CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Length: 151 Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.4 Backward compatibility 3.4.1 INVITE with RFC2543 syntax This is a legal message per RFC 2543 (and several bis versions) which should be accepted by RFC 3261 elements which want to maintain backwards compatibility. o There is no branch parameter at all on the Via header field value o There is no From tag o There is no explicit Content-Length (The body is assumed to be all octets in the datagram after the null-line) o There is no Max-Forwards header field Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 43] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : inv2543 INVITE sip:UserB@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP iftgw.example.com From: Record-Route: To: sip:+16505552222@ss1.example.net;user=phone Call-ID: inv2543.1717@ift.client.example.com CSeq: 56 INVITE Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 4. Security Considerations This document presents NON NORMATIVE examples of SIP session establishment. The security considerations in [RFC3261] apply. Parsers must carefully consider edge conditions and malicious input as part of their design. Attacks on many Internet systems use crafted input to cause implementations to behave in undesirable ways. Many of the messages in this draft are designed to stress a parser implementation at points traditionally used for such attacks. This document does not, however, attempt to be comprehensive. It should be considered a seed to stimulate thinking and planning, not simply a set of tests to be passed. 5. IANA Considerations This document has no actions for IANA. 6. Acknowledgments The final detailed review of this document was performed by: Diego Besprosvan, Vijay Gurbani, Shashi Kumar, Derek MacDonald, Gautham Narasimhan, Nils Ohlmeier, Bob Penfield, Reinaldo Penno, Marc Petit-Huguenin, Richard Sugarman, and Venkatesh Venkataramanan. Earlier versions of this document were reviewed by: Aseem Agarwal, Rafi Assadi, Gonzalo Camarillo, Ben Campbell, Cullen Jennings, Vijay Gurbani, Sunitha Kumar, Rohan Mahy, Jon Peterson, Marc Petit-Huguenin, Vidhi Rastogi, Adam Roach, Bodgey Yin Shaohua and Tom Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 44] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Taylor. Thanks to Cullen Jennings for contributing the S/MIME message. Thanks to Neil Deason for contributing several messages and Kundan Singh for performing parser validation of messages in earlier versions. The following individuals provided significant comments during the early phases of the development of this document: Jean-Francois Mule, Hemant Agrawal, Henry Sinnreich, David Devanatham, Joe Pizzimenti, Matt Cannon, John Hearty, the whole MCI IPOP Design team, Scott Orton, Greg Osterhout, Pat Sollee, Doug Weisenberg, Danny Mistry, Steve McKinnon, and Denise Ingram, Denise Caballero, Tom Redman, Ilya Slain, Pat Sollee, John Truetken, and others from MCI, 3Com, Cisco, Lucent and Nortel. 7 Informative References [RFC2396] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396, August 1998. [RFC2822] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001. [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M. and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002. [RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June 2002. Authors' Addresses Robert J. Sparks (editor) Estacado Systems EMail: RjS@estacado.net Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 45] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Alan Hawrylyshen Jasomi Networks 2033 Gateway Place Suite 500 San Jose, CA 95110 EMail: alan@jasomi.com Alan Johnston MCI 100 South 4th Street St. Louis, MO 63102 EMail: alan.johnston@mci.com Jonathan Rosenberg Cisco Systems 600 Lanidex Plaza Parsippany, NJ 07052 Phone: +1 973 952 5000 EMail: jdrosen@cisco.com URI: http://www.jdrosen.net Henning Schulzrinne Columbia University Department of Computer Science 450 Computer Science Building New York, NY 10027 US Phone: +1 212 939 7042 EMail: hgs@cs.columbia.edu URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu Appendix A. Bit-exact archive of each test message The following text block is an encoded, gzip compressed TAR archive of files that represent each of the example messages discussed in Section 3. To recover the compressed archive file intact, the text of this document may be passed as input to the following Perl script (the output should be redirected to a file or piped to "tar -xzvf -"). Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 46] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 #!/usr/bin/perl use strict; my $bdata = ""; use MIME::Base64; while(<>) { if (/-- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/ .. /-- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/) { if ( m/^\s*[^\s]+\s*$/) { $bdata = $bdata . $_; } } } print decode_base64($bdata); Figure 58 Alternatively, the base-64 encoded block can be edited by hand to remove document structure lines and fed as input to any base-64 decoding utility. A.1 Encoded Reference Messages -- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- H4sIAAAAAAACA+xd23LbSHqei1RSUZXeAVYt1zO2QDW6GyfK9Ehja2a0Poxj yZ7M7qY8TaJBggQBCg2KllNxkr1IVW7yAsllqnK7uUtqq5JX8LxBbvYiV3mF dAM8gABIQrZ48Bg9Q5MiGodu9vf1f+q/G8QirE+bVYuEn62oAF40jKN3XVNn 3kVREfxM4V+pSMGqyuspKlDBZxL4bA1lwEISSNJnQYf1SdBl8+otOz5qy+T9 IynfPTs//e7pmcScfm3AaHBEX5Ne36VVP2hJZ6fPDmAV7O68dEht/NfBi4fP pLbPQlwd1236vZoKNHDYCIjXbNffmO1vcONR1+oMMIII7+48Ia/lr/1gSAKL 1SSdX/LrgJ8k7X1FXXdfOnb5pTyLBnvSPfEkpNqqNviRo8Qd7h+GpFXHCGGI dnfOfX7y9yRkvrcvnbf9HmH83KgZYXUYfT/TlPu7Ow+I68qnD2tSYzzmmWUD /nge9CwGCDDNAURt1Pa8IQBm0+p6lN/puNmk/bAmkX7fdZokdHzvgFl9fr0z elGTkAl5E01p1JG7O25N4s3b3fk4fn/eF/GPtkICWIZ/DLQ0/qECS/xvFP8c cVP8C7Tl1RjDWBxrcnjN8kcEWIQghmkCQDmUopj8UxVWlRSLLEJgAtGjUcyI 5Xu2D5GDIehcAsIApxUbdZA3RqzxsWJ1RfjnwKernP6X4V8BUE3hH2t6Of+v pZw+fXl6fnLz8PdoGMEf8vnVFBN2VgJIojcag3wa5XN7z+MY5oCFyO1gKMuM WrbXi6SIGL8Kn3JNhKX40ecIJ0nZJEcsGe7uPOS3rElfB86+BBTpV8STIB+K kqLVAOD/Sydn5/yOvheSJueee4k2iuur1URL78cVqRfK51d9msdUo8OPqdcK 27wNqiJ457LO+8Gv99pc+HHplQRNnYsSOtR5A03eQOn0GZ4Qo7q7w+ry7k6z nj0Q1oFgsl6dDCzHl3iXKzqQnp8/Ozh++UzirYLi4KVjUV9CEOqTQ4g/B6kH Yb9H+jWkSI+fPfiU6fCT5H9vpexfQP9TUJr/kaqW/L9u+S9XcZrVAUVJUm2z iA44TLN/VKZKIC8pNXC5FhhPSlGZ1QLjU/OaklIB+bDn401Rj2basFTf42WO yvex4t/xLoGySfuPjpQE/lWBf13BJf63Tv7rVN9DAlQQVjQu0SsQaxkxcBaS 8UgEbQIc5lmky6wOYVwWFDYawqb621zJb6JDqoeH+4f7+wkBbu9XPh1Zlzo+ neGFQ17yRDS0VKy7pgSnzBXhlE3JcLzXL2nANqn/AYxRBv9IK/G/NfO/npn/ 9bz5v+jUPzPzH1ejyX/ZjH8xpL5z0aeJef+8Opr6C0/50UgXk76envQnc7vy iRmHGk3CleWNyv8c+sL+wxlNUXRV0SP5Xy/l/7WU0ewpQQCk7x4tmlJNI4Vv Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 47] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 BcHYtJM5B6pqNfFKn8dIgwbixCk2o1EIkIENDCBQ+ITPJ3+bdFEH0mBILZsd n1n2xOeiTkSAqfiRFk1i4UPhaEdjdSFTjVqDkZUKmnkSgFrIsDM1EEUXF+Yh aCT55f71JQXTmCsqiEOlvacsN8P/9HW4Wu2vgP1HV9PyH4ZKyf/b5//rvHof FwCGNAzSgqCWpP94EM4ofrs7z+nFwAk46Xp+2Ha81tmg3/eDkJ23Hbaf9+WJ E7Ypv9GzwH99JSdOF184lI3qjs8PHvrH3lX2WI6fcGaGO398Jtm+a8mcyGU+ eqKJZJkUnJ5btkWybDitpm9t1P8HVAVn9D+ASvyvU/7D0MSmpiOgcDSGIQ0E wKRGQElX4qiSAtqkzqVA13wJEaQlPYhMg8PZp0msjwYcYZZvo0EHAsQ/ejbi TzDgn9o2YYi2I8MPYaYzlfkQNnFK7ruXR1uxwohM4jHbGUl+9/JEv7iiCWDH s7wuRbkonSPg8cZmJLyPcf5vcsYONuz/0TWUnf9L++/22H9nZ27jQy3CpvDz 8398OM/BPvBawVXawz5mkHjIzggLQ+oQzhZWFxUwEs+677Mztiz8O1iGSIXo 2o59k5f3sAsvMAyv1jLc5IOa9Dbr/1FB1v8D9BL/6yjPT745PTs/eR7hNRf8 GfwwEg4C770cv1PLr7hdyl47ttk87NovW51uED4ZEho8ejQ2+uafkiSG8Vjm o0cBR9nnHJMDlMbNThCQuPxdxdQhH4KQl6PWUElS0OHA63r+0Itu8rOxDo/6 DG4S/1jTM/iHpfz/qeLfQAafJK+HebgU8ygP8/euBfr7P0OfkNVwA3qxUfuf gtQM/lWt9P9uCf6LifrZo6NALagqHdRBMLMIyNjdOa1Jo/E3I82bptD9bc9F bhcihBWYmqZHN0vH+U5l/ynU51sroJrHWFG48hxzHX/gqbaUDCKZ6a/xM84e LxIogxWE8rppQnbpzjJ1nePKjNB0lAwluU6gTE4nIAPE8darD2q+gZAYqbDm U3q6MoWy5qrdP8v9/xik+R8qpf9/3fYf/mIVdCyotYJBgruSTJWdFyq6ymhF h3lsF8lXpxXIGeuS8jfehU3Kktcb2WCRkeE9fXfHqUnx+BQrQ4AZmYS7na4H ke/xP4CMEstCoFgYiouafQTp5jtqFjj5d3ekiZ2qoj3IWwpyyL/nnXHoVTSl R+uX/M0d8KarFYQrSLl/Q6w5lzTL0ICyXJf/4Ybt/1pW/+dILvl/PfJ/Betc Vq5gNdYBAtpyWBiQoDpXG9ir/JpXHwVTB5T5g6A5I+zenyzvX1ozon8bItgh lt2ZCQqLh6Ygfe9i6CMcXEDkINwJhG+w6bkQeYHb9ZiIC5t10D9YugYQArNi v2EedZMziIkwlpI9krtsccZ4QFyHMCV2CaYcgg8q2teZqjAOD0tXzV4TRRVR quKN2x94J3sD192s/x9n7X9auf5/y/R/MUzkCgCy+DBPtZ1baWTZM00Y5+9Y sBx4PCSRCQHyLPuy27EIs7sXaIj9MLgAxGI2JwVyaU2WBGNkGkL6W6D4L3P7 JQJ1plDkTTnKnHg/p9a8io9r220v5J0dDAJns+v/Z/Cvxfgv7X/r1v/SBrwv n/uDkNYr6EGKGyro5EZyAyDMdR8jb03YvFX3EX/MiwsYD+VIWZSF3NDuyKRD USOQOTdcANMYyjYZ0qANL+Q29tQpfXCq4ZM/XKw9yr4th20qt7kYUzzib5XG s1INLMuHFcdjA3vD+h/WlDT/Y1Ta/zbN/1OOH7FkFLe13Kdg5vgUqtE4W0qK 7mjZ7TV50JzrRDDL3CjL8B/2aNjeqPwHQQb/ulrqf2spt/gAoAFloeO15Cd8 JPhWtPxO1XTDfHXn7o/ViuNZlFq330YkobwaeAM2IG71xfPTt5+Hvtygt9gg oF/80mHe7fCuE/7ioBmQN1df7h8cHt6p/dIJ77YJqyv7Q+oE1q07fcJ+MfTf Wq9C369+bvlUnCY74RdHy8NPxpYdZVH4ZvVWRdPuvLr74+23I3vVVyePa7/9 M+npC/72mfRQ/PW3I6PUdduTa+YK/S71lLc/xh/g7buv4k/oTuVWVY5v1Bt4 FvFSxi+bn/5MhJbcvv327p1XvHKlvvfT3737/bt/f/dfP/3u3e9/+qef/vHd f7z7z71IYH4VXfWtcvvuj/zKcjUh/I5xPPQDq/LrR/KtKu+B20fizx/ffvH5 /Xu13x7s/dVvvvybv06k0VIgRIYqXWMMpIV1KMJT6WvO6YyT+LeUWDTg967c ufuKd3/t//7w33/813/749//y//+8x+2dw3Mpy3/XUIVo43a/zRdy8p/Zfzf uuW/F1z+++qoWAygY4etYXWex/euggBSVVXh5YhXrTZdhwN/NrCO363eb/se vS+W+jU5UcmRwWF0jczTHPaIZQV1xtJ29rEF4q6iqWAcx5esNnu7GdKMB7+i K3recyZiilRtIvjebE6YD8jqdxPkybtgEG7a/wcy9j+slfk/t0j/K5oF84OW BRmRwR8v9A3Ew3U2Q5TFbKcjsngjaxoLomK8IPyN+T1aLEvofLCPIoNtP+iR MCvc4Ei6uRchl/eMdK/f7A0ksca4vsent70D/uW9g/Hhjf3+ru+1Vh0AvAT/ mqbjjP6nl/7/7cF/pESdSiKISyKSqCd5pEcl35a47B/QHv3AN6kf+AIaHFd7 uWt6axrv05lgfKV+SYMrMXxv8nVJ3AE9FJ+im4hWrvpVZ23e8vjGq2hS3ivS OSlX+p7yt++dsP3UfykeQGi0MUeTHnnD1UE3epyYsMXDrvLrbEA0NI1t/B9D PB6K7UjjXclYqce3SNwhGiM388/4+aNf3aWMTZpw4x8Ss/d4suFSeED5l1fr Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 48] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 /3c85JyJrIAMETkAJsLCi7hn5Me85k2+ZIG1mjTqePmmIS3Hv+vqrt8fc4Yc cX99HXeK2pRjA+QMhdCsmnaZrQFna7zM1lBSNfLuA9J1jjN1oJmqc5q9zmxG MFEn5zp6qk05zwO1dJ2c66ipOnnPg9N1cq6T6uOXUk3K1En18mVenXQ/S1L2 XiB9nWwdxcz8XjmVjGylnFr68p9e0QrUUQvUwQXqoAJ1YIE6BYa0ApbXMZdX MZZXKdDJBfq4QBcX6OECHVykf5dUyWiVo8Q5Vn1i1xkrmusS9tbxips0ouul MbMbkC3fY88O91MIynHDVrjqAMCl+X+AmtL/VaWM/1ur/p+fSOtmovxMaCoZ v2Ey0H8yBpWjhPF75KVcHm+irnCbHg3csEGfD3ETQUMHW0IE7pBZDutvNv97 TvxHuf/XesrN7P+3F0Nu714OD0wz8i2J+x8PRRF6QBpN68jmGuZVnjNOA3NS cwpayJyVb9gvt/4b43/z8f8o7f9XgVLm/9q0/f9QcoPlFBBD+7VNZZNPYoaB 5DemXSQrMIozs2f8feosJUSjM04GavnUd8TWS1Fw/zDw4k8GwkE3WlQ0cv4p iIuUGkYFYlWVuamLIDIXCRbK+gWLxYrFtgkWZflY+F8QYLhR/U9Haf6HoIz/ XSf/58t/czPAfpBCaBgKnuX40Qi0u94Fl/04x2METJNYYuk3GVJ0lCMDKoaJ DGNJvg9lmRyIzHGO15Ww/Pabj3pNd9P5f4Cajf8s8z9slf537WQ6IpUCRMVo whe7NuSZjcRyowRRxEPVbntCBPQDp02GtuUT5ONAhT5yAjbdIUhRuTA0VRIz wMxoohrI1srs/hPS1+FB3yWOJ2B9zh+b3maS50tDciWFviT8obxrhlKPeFeS 3wxpyCQSUImJ3SUYtUSlBpXEidXtUD57DuuRsNleJQkswz9ScWb+L+M/t9H+ 815xnQirUF20/UtyDHZE5kH22rLdoqncS1PPjeAfbg7/Ohf2p/jXI/yrpf1n LeXpyfdPTs6//e7hdjAAXMIAcyX1lKC+mCnmJ/9b7hFG5vuI9HnS/FbYaHoD N3RWrAEsX/+LU/jHGij3f9uI/ZcDus+F14LrP6C6DHfj8Z6fbTnXHxSvt5pC fkISo6FqGmKbqKMEkkanmIXPgQtIa2LTFuZpkYR4vg4zPpLRYIrYv6NMWGKd bbFAlEXGaKSlfoaMRf2ajAXnOrHhjSdUKOWyTRav6a7Y+lNA/pvJ/xXxPyj3 f964/2+e9Req+EPlwci0g5JWYDEOZ5b1QSUyIQUqhkM0CQcCBcKBUJHEfrNP pqIPM/TK77Prl0h0MydSCK0tVNDzA0qY7210/x+Y0f+Ucv3/esp4/0/e/9IH 7+05GUyEo1js7OmI7LymCaHI4zl39/ZyF88Nzv/+JXVZc7Pxf1BNz/9iS9AS /+u0//qkX21Q2q8dHExBj2oIAHgzYcBGJtIHzVBHPA7jSB9+eXDBGcYbxoE/ XXeapRvFKYTnbc49WoNhFvH84jIn0cXADxtks/m/daxl8V/af7dH/o/W/z8J qtKvqpLIyxPPolnR/36hzX9zNrlSknHA4yEZqQGLYvvNtNBedNcr1aypQAUF aKFwoAfaxM5XN2AjDmiLDMLN7v8rkv2k8Y9L++9ayor3/zN0BJV2ByIFGot2 tpsMwxkbwBjSnDPm7uknJvypcXKO7n88CNt+4LyJIFyTnvrfefSR5w/Zedth Z822SEHi98nFgMocB6QuAjQyKP9Ziga84xvEaoabxT9K6/+gnP+3Df+L0J+L fdM0EIILl/xMRl8XYZWwwEW21bg8UkBV/KdMFwEu2tATqVXF4LWReKEFexHP 7CG6eLcD/qrO7njwMw0j4b+A2Ddhs/hXtaz9r4z//NjxbyyDfjzwUtBPe3Vv cGufJ3NMjcug/xFs4/PehXGFigSr3QJwqf6PMvEfOizxvyX4z0/ADhcZ2BCG zLL9+Wb7pK1ggfUfCm0cdtqTQDCkGSbCYgEJVxBNBSB+OEEME3KZjGqIfNC3 zEviuRdo6AWuR4e+3SHMHDhZ2QQB3t6T130noJFRYg1lvmtitodFClHpkMbP VocGgKaumpqGoKGoH2DGjHvKbW0S/1q0/h9CqAGhKEbyv1r6/9fq/1MBks5o cOk0qfTCI5fEcUnDpe8F/zdvXluO2LGTDbPpj/iphVkhE1c1ogVKmNWxaWc4 MRDAaLWIgbCuQwQwH0d8ICXWf8wSAx/unk8YBb4tgk3bHrzwbZ+IPyChQ1tc KxBZycPgSj62QxrwW2ATAWggg/eUeBd/ivuYBpdzvieB53gtsSqN39a/pEE4 CKi0d+pJzwK/xSHL9rbT18Cs/sbXf+lqJv4HqqX9b7vs/5GR71VWCZi/djId G1ogJcDCZADxUB2ZBkVwkMVpwNrdOW42aT8crc7y/IZvXU1se9dwCijq4pjw mUWdW7MHwIc6AhjtORvO/wHUZP5vDZT7f66xpNd/HfJG1gcVDBLgvD4pzIW6 H7TiaAAEMVwUDzAel7n+AGM6s4/Bn4Lg/swX/W6T6XLP6dF9IUbHJQoN560N D3rOa2rtJ75gTsvj3yTq8gmctCg/wK+c+MMOSGsRpWz/ejQmemWz6z+wosFI /tcVCHQ9Wv+taqX+v5by5OTs7PibWADoDnpO15+P9nv5lWZldtsd2PZVji7P ZXSg6I08uEA9tvfn2e5ly9BVjGQudkOMIdFsLuar0JYVeXzoMBB7ByTIQ8eW pTVsFdGGZetYOfoB+oMfoPvmB2gMmtAdkr/8i0Gj93K6taU06gcu9Cf2IJo8 WGbH71ErZ5/8/rzUp5GkEIhIRhrIJ17TtyJloeF4JLhKCxNpGjps+GLruOCq Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 49] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 ji3d1hA1NGJqTaQphz1OcG6rztpEOewHfug3fbeeJT5xHSIUkt2dh0Q07nxA 93mvS8f9QIJ8/pUUvYZATcXSN0/Od3dEiId83OKPFP1OTq8vePsgEkikz5uD gFH2RZ5gpOmC1mQ5/aCL1tEX6B+x1N5hUpswiUhia3jJ8SSuGkpC1KsWuWH+ ZHAYb78gPlb7Opue9NBhfZ85sbOYhPx3b/f494eRMMcfrR7Qi4ET8N/Gdlw6 7yoLWwR+9yf/86d/fucfvv3/9q4GuInjCuvPNjG1XUckULCZjWljYiOydyfZ khyBgUnqmmLXlh0TQ0rOupN1knyS705WDQQsU9xpQobEU0qnKcEzbQdCUmh+ GDJDgaaTZkhpXZuGwkyaMJ3OdCYwwxTy1/xQunsn25Is2U7byCHdz5at3bs9 nfbe233v7XtvBz4o0OcZhvpNo6jqDwa9npoLb8nNqSw0Ghbm6ODciZP0Q/2G s7DfMIxe1UNGg95gmKPfo+s2MHozLBg/T5+DmoXVqxhbTblmQ6ubMsNiXJhj xjwieENIW2WpYliEK/PMc9ysCOpDMk8Vwi/hqnxzDiJyQaHuguW4PNcM3LgM WnhZAWuQdit4cXfyIL6wrvTCxfMLoA2N5Ug8pRyMvR0V7ahIxYuw439zR4vg V3DZOO/WyQMNjO1P7Ad9js4Ye0wHY983xGK6vY8+d/DwqgfaWblo3xt3PLLt lXeKmNPrGzZsyV35x2eO795zqmRlj2vngaKSt93KcF/JgXXMyku95pZHL/yu wXePac/7t26p2pC79RHTlXdKF687//QPBi1XN903UPbik64/HRp+b7jq4pGm 6yd9hz6+eNSgVLV86+K87S1rj147WTP88d8GnzjGXTYY9Tr9T7fDh2ET+gKl xaZ6WDdwe/oRc+A2oStd9fwwNkym+eK4Y0vNJgOafkrx20LT7aZ54tBd0pEt 733n2ncPyh/s3ffCLx649HgKnRhRx3z5sqfsics7H/r9mdM3nnqpblHfjgPP fg0c6f3ZzmVv7x06FSuvfOzEt58/I+39UeX7IXCmbf2FjT95fDXffee+e5d8 1Hk6cL7yw/oSK2hp3j/4Qnj0t+0LI+/+av7qmsrj7uGlP750LmdwU/WA8vMT z/K7rtddeFV3bdFTD7/VXmz767/Kaw64By8epvr1f4b9+rOI9OHW7BNuAg9N sN1Q7Dm4YLynbjFSiWwISyaO5FBFE3TPQBvTDpdMHDVR6DEUNi15lXt9W+DJ k3fCN+84+w2+r/iXsHnipCLqXrgG5ufO0SqMebBw/L3BYND1oWc2UdbXwjzt NvOS65emkL4p1rfgyiHbP/NubN3+w2Nfl5Z0vrZJ+uT8qlppUdUpz47IuTeu rnj3H/ndf9m2YkAsbXp57WsLf3Njh3Dj/mtXvcbwbeGny5nWg+e+17YAND5z 5MFjdfndOx96af/ipR8u4KjjlV9tfv3BT3y/vrL6zb5dYduGtS/v7m1564J4 Nv96W3m7v/Sjw3/Pe6U/3chssegIPkdQEGN81gGA067/J+Z/0vR/pAsQ+T/L 9j82yIq1flYOdQnx8OZGgMSf1FpN1pfYYNiXrPSvY9dbvI1SG9vMuZGGC6sS HfxUOktS5hOX+tf3bt7ca6HRaVjQQ79YuhMjXR28hFqKQPMQ1s5inOO2PLUi aaEO3QXPaqZ4bygEOtCjRY8N33UohAuS+i+N7GqfqU1P0fZJdqmB218A/sdC Klaf5FnM/1JVncL/Nhvx/5kd+99/lv/7v8r7DRJoMCD4fVY2wIlstz8Q5UVO ZmUvNvxlsPPNKCP49GkgUxq517SgVvRUrYKs7Od83tT10W+6gcJM0Y522CHS 5vE3Sr7NhrUNjW0NQLFO0ZiVOehleDHNouyU7k+QdQicV+T5NKZHRYrKsz3/ 22Aq/1sZSPg/6/wv8V0hhbeg/uhMb/QHIJM/gEp9GSgeL9VBR6IvUMYPSjYl BkNoSLEglTcUkTx8uoHFYaUd0O5IlDMwPYcET4SxOmx2HELIe3EEoU+iGatN mnYgoRm7IzG4MLNB74sRMRgRA7Kn67MdAaaV/61MKv9XEf7PLv+nrJtrMTFO JaTgTTO10BiPRvjZiAaOU6VIooGzwf9d9CzzP0On8r+NJvp/VjAz/39B7hCd SHZlqh20vZoZn6V9ioITBkSj0eXpxH7EmKlcrdKaqv77esM+XmQVnrOkpnGd mIytDpjo4Dt5Ns6ccI6aSSTQPXjxxlkf8omb3F2C4lvx/5YtNiLOev4fCm/2 o63/U9U2GmrxPyT/c1YwJtnTEAIXoCsqGFABbBUVNBg5MXISjMZG+9G/kRdH jo48P7ob16VUjfaP7gIWMHJqtG/s2MjRqXxiHPYUnqQY2uqgkweKOFHircAC eNIPMH6al6I855VXuadIJZQxGImitO2GMkgtPBfRvBRo7J48eWXbNqOUAOnc +B32SRmGPl2aAIc9Y54AfOjzt6UowU2EqCyIPbPr/40H/VT5D4eEkvE/u+s/ PUIPH+is9fhYQbJwouRJUpqQ8IaUQxH1AZsoHDYCZ0H+9M1BDQAADbDYmdKF BjDKjn8YRizI90p4pyHgBGX1oDkk82IHL3WCjRs3lpXFvS+1bDOchA/WToqJ wn/wlV0AJ/n1c/ZpVqI0ik+zCJU86qu3pPp6e2Q18ySEDvxRCX7k8W3lAbgb nax2B8BTneY2Oi6Hjs12jAPKcfFTxp3WwEfvY8XOIM/V8SyHQ0wAEPmoV6sD 8b20Ada6BTGCaiYfbNWeida+DYmvrWJEjrDB+/FhJ6ipWbYMvWqmnbs0nzf0 YWpPy1oYkJz0+IPSGAVE0ee41BsYq7GIIYtagR5IjxOM9YlqMLwbYB0cQw4L Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 50] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 eLpLoor449N6CFMGAHGhwCEE/HYAsA/ueBdrV0RvsTyhdjBVZV9O22zL0eyO rxW/kAs1GotExBE6aAJ0ljVFQkjVALIiCSIirzJMXhkJC10K9bZG664xN2BU o35L7Z5lbA/htFNqQDe6d7ic+fRZgDLmALVmZ2rfzCP2886y/k/DyfY/ov/f ROt/U1n6On0yZ6USBuA4yfmxKS/oFbvoEB20MpItAjVzX5Jpj6GpKVb2ZrTH G7YiCKm2A0hS/xEQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQ EBAQENyk+Dc2+ZBPABgBAA== -- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 51] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Sparks, et al. Expires October 13, 2005 [Page 52]