Square Wheels and Round Tuits

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A Conversation, Circa 1981

Me: You get a lot more performance if you buffer disk I/O

Hobbyist: But then I can't just eject the floppy

Me: You also need memory protection

Hobbyist: Why? I'm the only one using the machine

Me: (Argghh!)

A Talk, Circa 1982

Me: Writing code in a high-level language will improve productivity and reduce bugs

Audience: You don't understand how small these machines are!

Me: They'll get bigger

Audience: But today they're small

The Sins of the Fathers. . .

- "Programs written specifically for IBM compatibles could run faster by bypassing slow MS-DOS functions, e.g. by writing video information directly to the area of memory assigned to it." —Wikipedia entry on DOS
- That meant that Windows 95 had to permit such behavior, and hence couldn't really run protected
- Windows 98 couldn't, either; on Windows XP, most users run as Administrator because many applications require it
- *We are paying today for decisions made 25 years ago*

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Embedded systems, now . . .

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

—George Santayana, 1906

The Root Cause

- Vendors shipped as soon as the hardware was capable of handling *base* functionality
- A year later, the better hardware is used for more functionality
- By the time people think about security, there's an installed base problem
- Besides, no one believed there was a problem
- We have two challenges:
  - To ensure that new systems are designed properly
  - To figure out how to retrofit legacy systems

"Software longa, hardware brevis"
—*Melinda Shore*

There is a Threat

- 34 security incidents targetted at process plants were identified between 1995 and 2003
- 29% of the incidents led to companies losing the ability to monitor or control the plant
- 36% of external attacks came through the Internet
- The number of incidents has been increasing sharply since 2000.

Source: `http://www.crime-research.org/news/19.10.2004/727/`

Cell Phone/PDA Viruses

- "Prepare for the likelihood of an increasing number of threats as time goes on." (Microsoft.com)
- "Cardtrap.A, a Trojan that attacks Symbian mobile phone operating systems, attempts to infect users' PCs if they insert the phone's memory card into their computers." (news.com)
- "What if a virus drained your cell's battery and suddenly you couldn't be reached?" ... "Once initiated, it sends the attacker an email containing the IP address of your PDA." (Symantec.com)

More Problems

- Systems are not designed for the threat model
- Note the third bullet on an earlier slide: SCADA systems are being attacked through the Internet
- Why are SCADA systems even connected to the Internet?

Bellovin's Laws of Networking

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3. Networks interconnect at the edges, not the center

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- Of course, the corporate net is (and should be) connected to the Internet...

We Have to Start Somewhere

- We need to start on a solution *now*
- We need to learn what hasn't worked
- In that category I place doing nothing, relying on obscurity, and assuming that a corporate net is secure
- I also assert that general-purpose subsets of corporate nets, even if firewalled, are likely to be insecure

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The Square Wheel

- "I've invented the triangular wheel. It's a great improvement over the square wheel."
- "Why is that?"
- "One less bump!"

Parts of a Solution

- We need an architecture for secure new systems
- We need a way to layer a solution onto old systems

Securing New Systems

- The solution must be based on sound cryptographic and software engineering principles
- We can't afford to cut corners again
- We can't be hobbled by performance myths (see David Wagner's talk on myths about sensor nets)
- You can do a remarkable amount of crypto in a very small system these days
- Measure before you say it can't be done — and if it can't be done today, it will probably be possible before your code is finished

Principles

"Moderate loss of local system efficiency due to judicious application of the principles often results in a gain in effectiveness under reasonable global cost metrics."

–Peter Neumann, 1969

Solution Characteristics

- Universality — *all* requests must pass a security check
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Auditability — use (limited) local memory for short-term audits; keep larger, long-term logs at a border controller
- Updatability — security upgrades *will* be needed

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- Note that this list is identical to that for a conventional operating system

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Retrofits

- Don't rely on corporate firewalls
- Implement security principles via front ends
- We need application-specific firewalls, for the protocols used on embedded systems

It May be Easier

- Security for embedded systems is probably not harder than for general-purpose systems
- It may be easier — they do fewer things
- We need to understand what the hardware limits actually are

Mostly, though, we need the willpower to get around to it